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Research Summary  
This study challenges the convention in the human rights scholarship that transnational human 
rights pressure predictably stimulates a positive change in state behavior, particularly when 
applied to seemingly vulnerable target states. Within-case evidence from the Horn and East Africa 
exemplify this argument. Insights are drawn from the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya, vulnerable 
target states in which transnational human rights pressure should have induced a positive human 
rights change but did not. It rather contributed to the unintended negative outcome of 
authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior. The study employs the process-tracing 
methodological approach to trace the impact of transnational human rights pressure applied 
during specified critical junctures through intermediating processes all the way to the outcome. 
In addition, a non-linear analytical framework is used to account for the relevant systemic and 
case-specific contextual factors that have a conditioning impact on how the processes of interest 
manifest. 
As a mechanistic approach to causality requires rich data, both field and archival research 
strategies were employed; semi-structured expert interviews were the primary data collection 
instrument. The interview subjects were selected on the basis of purposive and snowball/chain-
referral sampling techniques. Three rounds of field research and 60 semi-structured expert 
interviews were conducted. The two rounds of field research (January/February 2016 and 
September 2016) took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, while the third (October/November 2017) 
occurred in Nairobi, Kenya. Of the total 60 interviews, 50 were in-person interviews conducted 
during the field research, and the remaining 10 were conducted over Skype or phone. All 
interviews, both in-person and otherwise, were conducted between January 2016 and March 
2018. The experts for the interviews included representatives of international and domestic 
human rights NGOs, human rights activists, journalists, opposition personalities, political and legal 
analysts, academics and other stakeholders. Moreover, interviews took place with state officials 
from concerned ministries and departments and representatives of the donor community.  
The study inductively develops a context-bound theory of a mechanism with a middle-range 
generalizability that causally links transnational human rights pressure at critical political junctures 
and the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior. The 
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results can provide a better explanation of cases in which transnational human rights pressure 
contributes to a null effect or an unintended negative outcome in state behavior, especially in 
seemingly vulnerable target states. The study argues that, through a mechanism that has two parts 
with “productive continuity” of entities/actors engaged in activities (Beach & Pederson, 2013, 
2016), transnational human rights pressure ultimately contributed to the unintended negative 
outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior in the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya. The 
first part of the mechanism (Part 1) is named counter-discourse and quiet diplomacy, and the 
second (Part 2) is named regulatory crackdown. In addition to this theoretical contribution, the 
study’s potential to make a significant methodological contribution in optimizing the practical 
application of theory-building process-tracing, a less developed and applied variant this study uses, 
is immense. The analysis of the relevant systemic and case-specific contextual factors’ 
conditioning impact shows why the processes of interest played out the way they did, which also 
presents theoretical and practical implications. Overall, the insights from this study, especially 
from the recommendations offered in Chapter 7, provide a foundation for future policy 
interventions.  
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction  
During his state visit to six African countries in March 1998, President Bill Clinton applauded “the 
new generation of African leaders” for their commitment to democracy and economic reforms. 
Among others, these leaders, who were also celebrated as “the new breed,” included Paul 
Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Isaias Afewerki 
of Eritrea. They all took office in the early years of the 1990s, except for Yoweri Museveni, who 
assumed power in 1986. They were also considered to be the antithesis of the “big-men” 
syndrome that signified the previous African leadership. Such an assumption would never have 
been made if one could fast-forward time: three of the above are still in power, while Meles 
Zenawi died in office in 2012. These leaders have slowly abandoned the conventional ways of 
holding onto power, instead experimenting with other means, such as manipulating legal 
frameworks to make sure that they stay in power for as long as possible. They learn from each 
other about the "worst practices," and they show support for one another in what has come to 
be known as “authoritarian solidarity.” 
The unity showed against the International Criminal Court (ICC) for its attempt to prosecute 
Sudan’s president Omar Hassan al-Bashir and Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta provides a case 
in point. In an initiative led by Kenya, the Africa Union (AU), in its extraordinary session in 
October 2013, considered a collective withdrawal from the ICC. Though this has not happened, 
the session did pass a resolution calling upon the Court to suspend the cases of Uhuru Kenyatta 
and his Deputy William Ruto, which were ongoing at the time. Further, it requested a future 
grant of immunity from such prosecutions for sitting heads of state. Subsequently, an amendment 
that entrenches impunity was incorporated in the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights in June 2014. Since then, this regional Court extends immunity to 
African heads of state and senior government officials. The global backsliding of the promotion 
of liberal ideals such as human rights has enabled this authoritarian entrenchment, which has 
come to signify the current, post-9/11 international environment in which security and economic 
factors take precedence. As such, transnational human rights advocacy networks find it 
increasingly challenging to effect change on the ground, even in target states that are seemingly 
Page | 2 
 
vulnerable to transnational human rights pressure. After all, more pressure does not necessarily 
contribute to a positive human rights change.  
1.1 Existing knowledge and critique  
Empirical research on the impact of transnational human rights pressure on state behavior is fairly 
recent. Existing literature is profoundly concerned with explaining how transnational human 
rights pressure stimulates a positive change in state behavior.1 According to Brysk (1993), the 
change should surpass a mere termination of repression. This can best be captured by the term 
“internalization,” the final stage of a three-stage ''life cycle” of norms, which is preceded by “norm 
emergence” (first stage) and “norm cascade” (second stage) (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). At this 
phase of a norm socialization process, “international human rights norms are fully institutionalized 
domestically and norm compliance becomes a habitual practice of actors and is enforced by the 
rule of law” (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999: 33).  
Positive change in state behavior is often assumed to follow a predictably progressive, linear chain 
of pressure. According to the Boomerang Model developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), once the 
salience of an issue is raised, followed by favorable changes in target actors’ discursive and 
procedural positions, there is a higher probability of influencing target states’ policy and behavior. 
The Spiral Model of human rights change developed by Risse et al. (1999) shares this assumption. 
In this model, an initially norm-violating target state, pressured by transnational human rights 
advocacy networks, passes through five different stages before it internalizes human rights norms 
and displays a norm-compliant behavior. These stages are repression, denial, tactical concessions, 
prescriptive status, and rule-consistent behavior. The model mentions the probability of a 
backlash to repression in the middle of the spiral process. However, without explaining how and 
why this happens, the model argues that the process resumes its progression and eventually 
results in rule-consistent behavior.  
While the conditions for either the success or failure of such pressure are under-specified, the 
Spiral Model claims to be “generalizable across cases irrespective of cultural, political or economic 
                                                          
1 While rationalists emphasize the role of power and materialistic interests, scholars in the constructivist camp base 
their arguments on the international normative context. Nevertheless, recent studies have started to simultaneously 
draw on both traditions.   
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differences” (Risse et al., 1999: 6). This was a major source of criticism (see Schwarz, 2004) until 
the scholars re-evaluated the model in a follow-up book. By building upon their earlier work, 
Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink (2013) specified four mechanisms that move target actors from 
commitment to compliance: coercion, incentives - that is, sanctions and rewards, persuasion and 
discourse, and capacity building. Furthermore, they addressed the under-specification problem 
by identifying five scope conditions: regime type, degree of statehood, centralization of rule 
implementation, and target vulnerability. Although these inclusions broadened its explanatory 
relevance, the model still lacks a comprehensive explanation about cases in which transnational 
human rights pressure either failed to induce a positive change in state behavior (null effect) or 
resulted in an unintended negative outcome. This is due to the model’s principal intent, which is 
explaining positive human rights change.   
Furthermore, existing knowledge assumes that target states’ vulnerability to human rights 
pressure yields a positive change in state behavior. These states’ “vulnerability to both material 
and moral leverage” is significant for the success of transnational advocacy aimed at altering 
human rights practices (Keck & Sikkink, 1998: 207). As stated above, target vulnerability is one 
of the scope conditions put forth as a necessary condition for the assumptions of the re-evaluated 
Spiral Model to hold. Target vulnerability is often divided into two dimensions: material and social 
vulnerability. The former is required for advocacy strategies that intend to invoke material 
coercion to induce state behavior that is human rights norm-compliant (Risse et al., 2013). This 
renders target states that do not command significant resources and heavily depend on material 
benefits, such as foreign aid, vulnerable to transnational human rights pressure. Social 
vulnerability, on the other hand, is presumed to escalate if the target state actively seeks 
international legitimacy. Given the high standing of the human rights agenda in contemporary 
international relations, being labeled a “rogue” or “pariah” by transnational human rights advocacy 
networks that name and shame poor practices is a position that target states try to avoid at all 
costs (Krain, 2012; Montgomery, 2004: 22). Burgerman (1998, 2001) has argued that a target 
state complies with human rights norms only if the domestic political elite cares about the state’s 
international standing. In other words, target states’ desire to preserve their international 
reputation is believed to increase their propensity to comply with human rights norms. The fact 
that human rights issues have ceased to be considered the exclusive domain of states is 
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considered to cement social vulnerability’s momentum in commanding target states’ compliance. 
This effect increases if the states have formal human rights commitments, for instance, if they 
have ratified binding human rights instruments, such as treaties.  
While these assumptions about target states' vulnerability (whether material or social) seem to 
have attained an almost taken-for-granted status, we often see cases where transnational human 
rights advocacy networks apply pressure to target states that are assumed to be vulnerable, but 
these efforts fail to result in a positive human rights change. This calls for a review of mainstream 
assumptions. More pressure on target states that are materially and/or socially vulnerable does 
not necessarily induce positive or norm-compliant state behavior. Existing scholarship accepts 
the possibility of target states compensating their material vulnerability with a lack of social 
vulnerability and vice versa. However, it does not seem to accept the possibility of a target state 
being immune to transnational human rights pressure while being materially and socially 
vulnerable.  
Risse et al. (2013: 289) have pointed to the case of Zimbabwe and North Korea as examples of 
target states that compensate for their considerable material vulnerability with a disregard for 
international legitimacy, thus becoming resilient to social vulnerability. Burgerman has highlighted 
the cases of Burma, Guatemala, and Haiti to argue that “a poor and peripheral state could prove 
less vulnerable to network pressure than one with a more central position in the international 
system” (1998: 915). The Chinese case, on the other hand, has been featured by Risse et al. (2013: 
289) to show how social vulnerability can be counterpoised by material power. After stating that 
“the structural position of the target state, i.e., its alliances, size, and relative power, partly 
determines its vulnerability in terms of available points of leverage by which to exert pressure,” 
Burgerman (1998: 914-915) refers to China as the “obvious case” to resist such pressure. She 
lists material factors such as its wealth, nuclear power position, regional hegemony, huge 
domestic market, and a veto power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as its 
leverages for containing its social vulnerability.   
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1.2 The research agenda   
Drawing on insights acquired from Hafner-Burton (2008), this study classifies three possible 
outcomes of transnational human rights pressure on state behavior: positive change, null effect, 
and unintended negative outcome.2  
Figure 1. Possible outcomes of transnational human rights pressure on state behavior.  
Seminal studies on the impact of transnational human rights pressure on state behavior have 
focused on explanations about how the former ends up inducing a positive change in the latter 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink, 2002; Risse, 2000; 
Risse et al., 1999, 2013; Thomas, 2001). Only a limited number of studies have explored cases in 
which null effects or unintended negative outcomes were observed in state behavior. Wiest 
(2007), for instance, has stated that the Boomerang model’s hypothesis fails to hold in the Middle 
East and North Africa region, where integration with international human rights regimes should 
have been followed by an upsurge in transnational human rights mobilization but did not. Her 
analysis considers the intertwining of the process with transnational terrorism to be responsible 
for the failure. Her work underscores the need to examine contextual information in explaining 
processes. This is specifically important if the outcome happens to be different than expected. 
Broadly speaking, existing research that tries to explore the causation between international 
norms and state behavior “tend[s] to highlight only successful cases of norm compliance” (Bae, 
                                                          
2 Hafner-Burton (2008: 691-694) provides three possible scenarios for the impact of international publicity of human 
rights violations on domestic human rights practices. (1) It may be regarded as “cheap talk” that target states simply 
ignore. (2) It may end up having unintended negative consequences, and (3) it may induce actual human rights reforms.  
Unintended 
negative outcome   
Null effect   
Positive change   
State behavior 
Transnational 
human rights 
pressure   
Page | 6 
 
2007: 11). This is particularly true with qualitative case study research in which, according to 
Hafner-Burton and Ron, there is high optimism that “international law and human rights advocacy 
can, eventually, socialize many abusive states into better behavior” (2007: 380).  
Beyond having a null effect, transnational human rights pressure might worsen a situation by 
contributing to an unintended negative outcome. Kuperman’s (2008) study, for instance, that 
explores the moral hazards of the norm of humanitarian intervention, is worth highlighting here. 
He argues that, by encouraging some militants to rebel with the expectation of attracting 
intervention to the atrocities that would follow, the norm may result in genocidal violence that 
would not occur otherwise. With a comparative case study on Kenya and Uganda, Schmitz (2006) 
has challenged the conventional assumption that transnational mobilization contributes to 
positive outcomes in transitional democracies. He discusses the unintentional consequences of 
transnational human rights advocacy in domestic settings, especially the negative effect on the 
behavior of political elites and the development of domestic civil society. Wachman (2001) has 
argued that the human rights pressure aimed at shaming the Chinese government has had a 
counter-productive outcome beyond failing to foster the expected norm-compliant state 
behavior. Likewise, based on a survey experiment on women's rights in China, Gruffydd-Jones 
(2016) has shown the negative effects of a human rights pressure that comes from a threatening 
geopolitical opponent. 
Following on the abovementioned studies, this study also challenges the convention in the human 
rights scholarship that transnational human rights pressure predictably stimulates a positive 
change in state behavior, particularly when applied to seemingly vulnerable target states. It 
exemplifies this argument with within-case evidence from the Horn and East Africa. Insights are 
drawn from case studies on Ethiopia and Kenya, vulnerable target states in which transnational 
human rights pressure should have induced a positive human rights change but instead 
contributed to the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior. 
The overarching research questions ask how and why transnational human rights pressure 
contributes to an unintended negative outcome in state behavior when applied to target states 
that are seemingly vulnerable?  
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In order to provide answers to the abovementioned questions, the process-tracing 
methodological approach is used. The impact of the human rights pressure applied by 
transnational human rights advocacy networks to advocacy targets during identified critical 
political junctures - the 2005 and the 2007/8 political crises in Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively, 
is traced. It is important to thoroughly examine transnational human rights pressure at critical 
political junctions and subsequent developments because this has a lasting impact, whether 
positive, of null effect or with an unintended negative outcome. The findings of Dupuy, Ron, & 
Prakash (2014) state that a government’s actions against civil society, e.g., passing restrictive laws, 
often follow a critical time in a domestic political environment, such as elections. That is why 
transnational human rights advocacy networks must be mindful of their choice of advocacy 
strategies, which need to be specifically tailored to the context to have a meaningful effect. The 
recommendations offered in Chapter 7 address this issue. 
1.3 Research contributions  
The overall ambition of the study is theory-building; it aims to advance our understanding of the 
causal relationships of interest based on within-case evidence from the Horn and East Africa. It 
inductively develops a context-bound theory of a mechanism that causally connects transnational 
human rights pressure at critical political junctures and the unintended negative outcome of 
authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior. This theory, which is of a middle-range 
generalizability, can be useful in providing a better explanation of cases in which transnational 
human rights pressure contributes to a null effect or worse - an unintended negative outcome in 
state behavior, especially in seemingly vulnerable target states. In an attempt to answer the “how” 
research question, the process-tracing methodological approach is used to trace the impact of 
the pressure applied by transnational human rights advocacy networks to target actors during 
identified critical political junctures in the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya. The study argues that, 
through a mechanism that has two parts with “productive continuity” of entities/actors engaged 
in activities (Beach & Pederson, 2013, 2016), transnational human rights pressure ultimately 
contributed to the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior 
in these cases. The first part of the mechanism (Part 1) is named counter-discourse and quiet 
diplomacy (taking place in conjunction), and the second (Part 2) is named regulatory crackdown. 
The theory-building process-tracing, the variant this study uses, is the least developed and applied. 
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This study thus has the potential to make a significant methodological contribution by optimizing 
this variant’s practical application. 
To answer the “why” research question, a non-linear analytical framework is used to account for 
the relevant systemic and case-specific contextual factors that have a conditioning impact on how 
the processes of interest playout. The study aggregates these contextual factors and refers to 
them as “strategic importance.” The identified systemic factors at the international and regional 
levels of analysis are alternative powers and the “new scramble” for Africa, and the “security 
complex” and the war on terror in the Horn of Africa (HOA). The observable implications of 
these factors in the cases are also presented and analyzed. With regards to the case-specific 
contextual factors at the domestic level of analysis, political capital, and economic progress and 
potential are identified. This approach - the blending in of factors at international, regional, and 
domestic levels of analysis - is a deviation from the existing research’s affinity with causal 
explanations that are linear. While we can mention studies that have tried to account for the 
conjunction effect of different factors in contributing to outcomes, their adoption of such an 
approach is usually aimed at explaining positive human rights change. Burgerman (1998), for 
instance, presents three necessary but not sufficient conditions under which transnational human 
rights pressure influences a change in the policy or behavior of a target state. These are: the 
existence of a permissive structural context, the sensitivity of the target state's ruling coalition to 
the costs of a damaged international reputation, and the existence of organized local human rights 
activists. Nevertheless, this study intends to follow this approach to illustrate an unintended 
negative outcome of transnational human rights pressure on state behavior when applied to 
seemingly vulnerable target states.  
In addition to the above-mentioned theoretical and methodological contributions, the study aims 
to fill other gaps in scientific knowledge, making its contribution to the scholarly literature 
manifold. By presenting cases in which transnational human rights pressure ultimately contributed 
to an unintended negative outcome, the study tests the conventional assumption in the literature, 
that is, that transnational human rights pressure predictably stimulates a positive human rights 
change. Moreover, the fact that this non-conforming outcome was evidenced in states that are 
considered to be vulnerable targets calls for a conceptual revisit of the mainstream assumptions 
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concerning target vulnerability. Last, the insights from this study and, most importantly, the 
recommendations offered in Chapter 7, provide a foundation for future policy interventions.  
1.4 Outline of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 presents the research puzzle and its regional domino effect. It also situates the research 
in the ongoing scholarly discourse with a synthesis of the literature on transnational human rights 
advocacy networks, human rights consideration in aid allocation, electoral authoritarian regimes, 
and civic space. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework, which is formulated with the 
process-tracing methodological approach. Furthermore, a detailed discussion on the search for 
empirical evidence is presented. Chapter 4 presents the association between transnational human 
rights pressure at critical political junctures and the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian 
entrenchment in state behavior. Connecting the dots between the causal condition (C) and the 
outcome (O) is important for setting the scene for the discussion in Chapter 5 on the two parts 
of the mechanism that causally connect them. With the aim of providing an answer to the “how” 
research question, Part 1 of the mechanism, called counter-discourse and quiet diplomacy (taking 
place in conjunction), and Part 2, regulatory crackdown, are discussed. To show “why” the 
processes of interest played out the way they did in the case studies, Chapter 6 presents the 
systemic and case-specific contextual factors that are aggregated under the heading strategic 
importance. Chapter 7 takes a broader view of the case studies to offer recommendations on 
the way forward, along with some concluding remarks. The recommendations concern the choice 
of strategies to be followed by transnational human rights advocacy networks to induce the 
intended positive human rights change in state behavior. They are based on suggestions put forth 
by the different experts interviewed for the study.  
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Chapter 2  
Positioning the Research in Scholarship  
2.1 The research puzzle and its regional domino effect   
The case of Ethiopia  
The case of Ethiopia and the domino effect it has had in triggering a trend of authoritarian 
entrenchment in the Horn and East Africa is the puzzle that inspired this research endeavor. 
Ethiopia, a vulnerable target state by all conventional standards, seems to be immune to 
transnational human rights pressure. Given the mainstream assumptions about target 
vulnerability, transnational human rights pressure should have induced a positive human rights 
change in Ethiopia. This study argues that the human rights pressure applied by transnational 
human rights advocacy networks during the identified critical political juncture, the 2005 political 
crisis, ultimately contributed to the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian entrenchment 
in state behavior. As stated in Chapter1, existing research assumes that target states’ vulnerability 
yields a positive change in state behavior. In the following presented some of the characteristics 
that signify Ethiopia’s vulnerability, both material and social.  
First, Ethiopia is one of the most foreign aid-dependent states in the world, and aid accounts for 
roughly 50% to 60% of the national budget (Oakland Institute, 2013). According to Levitsky and 
Way, “weak states with small, aid-dependent economies (as in much of sub-Saharan Africa) are 
more vulnerable to external pressure than those in larger countries with substantial military 
and/or economic power” (2006: 382-383). Second, it is a state that strives to build on its 
influential standing in regional and continental affairs and the international reputation it holds as 
a result. Third, Ethiopia is a party to almost all of the major international and regional human 
rights instruments. It has ratified most of the core international human rights treaties, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Woman (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Furthermore, human 
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rights are the explicit pillars of the country’s Federal Constitution, which allows the use of 
international human rights instruments as guiding principles for its interpretation. The 
aforementioned characteristics of target vulnerability should have conditioned transnational 
human rights pressure to contribute towards a positive human rights change. However, this has 
failed to be the case, making it an aberration of the convention. 
According to various indicators, the human rights landscape in Ethiopia is worrisome. In Freedom 
in the World 2017, a report on the status of global political rights and civil liberties issued annually 
by Freedom House (2017b), Ethiopia scores a 6.5 freedom rating (on a scale of 1 = best, 7 = 
worst). This results in the net freedom status of “not free.” It also has a “not free” freedom of 
the press status, in which it scores 86 out of 100 (on a scale of 0 = most free, 100 = least free). 
Moreover, it ranks 150 out of 180 states in the 2018 World Press Freedom Index, published by 
Reporters Without Borders (2018). 
Ranking Body Rank Ranking Scale  
(best – worst) 
UN Human Development Index 174 (2016) 1 – 169 
World Bank Rule of Law Index 17 (2016) 100 – 0 
World Bank Voice and Accountability  
Index 
24 (2015) 100 – 0 
Transparency International  108 (2016) 1 – 176 
Freedom House: Freedom in the World Status: Not Free 
Political Rights: 7 
Civil Liberties: 6 (2016) 
Free/Partly Free/ Not Free 
1 - 7 
1 - 7 
Foreign policy: Failed States Index 15 (2017) 177 – 1 
Table 1. Ethiopia’s international rankings.3 
Different human rights monitoring and reporting bodies, including the United States (US) 
Department of State, portray a gloomy picture of the human rights situation in Ethiopia, which 
has intensified considerably subsequent to the 2005 political crises. Arbitrary incarceration; 
                                                          
3 Source: International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2018b).  
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torture of political opposition personalities, journalists, and human rights defenders; use of 
excessive force by security forces against civilian demonstrators; regulatory crackdowns on 
dissent; forced relocation; political capture of development aid; crimes against humanity; extra-
judicial killings; and violations of the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly in 
the context of elections and beyond are the most frequently reported rights violations. 
Nevertheless, the aid Ethiopia receives continually increases, explaining the widespread use of 
the expression “the donor darling Ethiopia.” Human rights considerations and aid flow are at 
odds with each other. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
ranks Ethiopia fifth among the top 10 Official Development Assistance (ODA) recipients from 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries (OECD - DAC, 2017). ODA, 
developed by the DAC, is the common measure of aid flows. Aid commitments to Ethiopia from 
all DAC countries and multilateral agencies were 1334.28 (in constant 2016 US Dollars [USD], 
millions) in 2000, which rose to 4894.94 in 2015.  
 
Figure 2. Aid commitments to Ethiopia from DAC countries and multilateral agencies (in constant 
2016 USD).4  
Transnational human rights advocacy networks often call upon Ethiopia’s major donor 
governments and multilateral agencies, which happen to be traditional/Western, to leverage their 
influence in pressuring the government into complying with international human rights norms. 
Despite such advocacy, donors seem to be reluctant to publicly acknowledge or condemn, for 
                                                          
4 Note: based on data from OECD - DAC (2018).  
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instance, the persistently reported “political capture” of development aid, let alone taking robust 
measures regarding wide-ranging rights abuses. In the handful of occasions that they have tried 
to investigate these allegations, they have been accused of “overlooking evidence” (Oakland 
Institute, 2013) and not acting upon confirmatory results. As human rights are part of the broader 
“good governance” agenda that the donor community routinely pushes elsewhere, this stance on 
Ethiopia demonstrates a double standard at play.  
Donors’ “see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil” approach to the poor human rights practices 
in Ethiopia (Human Rights Watch, 2008c: 118) is accompanied by the country’s portrayal of a 
tough stance against transnational human rights pressure, which it frames as foreign interference 
in its internal affairs. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition-
run government in power accuses transnational human rights advocacy networks of an 
ideologically driven campaign based on the pretext of human rights (see Government 
Communication Affairs Office, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, 2010). 
It depicts them as agents of neo-liberalism, which it has already labeled a dead end to Africa's 
development (see Meles, 2006, 2012). It often claims that it is targeted for reasons that are not 
related to human rights.  
The hardline counter-discourse by the EPRDF government, which often borders on name-calling, 
labels human rights criticisms a blatant attack on states that follow alternative development 
models rather than neo-liberalism. This refers to its current experiment with the developmental 
state model. A minimalist definition of this model is a development trajectory that tries to 
champion economic development by downplaying the relevance of political rights and civil 
liberties. Beyond the counter-discourse, the government embarked upon a regulatory crackdown 
to shrink the civic space, radically altering the legal framework to make it inconvenient to 
monitor, document, and report on its human rights practices. This relentless attempt to 
effectively institutionalize rule by law is what the study considers to signify the negative outcome 
of authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior. Here, the Charities and Societies Proclamation 
(CSP) is a case in point. Right after the passing of the CSP, several individuals who were working 
on human rights advocacy fled the country, and the remaining few are operating in a climate of 
fear. They constantly self-censor to avoid violating the provisions of the Proclamation. According 
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to Human Rights Council (2011: 6), this is “nearly impossible” because the Proclamation is vaguely 
worded.  
When it became operational, the CSP required civil society organizations (CSOs) to re-register 
in three categories: Ethiopian Charities/Societies, Ethiopian Resident Charities/Societies, and 
Foreign Charities. Article 14(5) of the CSP only permits “Ethiopian Charities/Societies,”- 
organizations acquiring "not more than 10% of their funds from foreign sources" and “wholly 
controlled” by Ethiopians, to work on activities related to human rights, women's rights, 
children's rights, disability rights, citizenship rights, conflict resolution, and democratic 
governance. Hence, human rights work is out-of-bounds for domestic organizations receiving 
more than 10% of their funding from abroad (Ethiopian Resident Charities/Societies) and Foreign 
Charities. Due to the provisions in the Proclamation that justify excessive government 
interference, in addition to the abovementioned severe restriction on funding, human rights 
organizations have decreased in number almost to the point of inexistence. Several have forfeited 
their mandate to work on issues with no reference to human rights work, and those that struggle 
to carry on have had to reduce their functions, lay off their workforce, and close offices (Amnesty 
International, 2012).  
Authoritarian entrenchment in the Horn and East Africa  
Ethiopia is a bad example that shows what it is possible. Kenya is a quick lab where it is 
tested. Then, the other states in the region get to learn what works and what doesn’t. 5 
Ethiopia has been accused of exporting "worst practices" onto the states in the region, 
contributing to a trend that Herman (2014) has referred to as “authoritarian contagion.” He 
states that the current crackdown on the civil society and the independent media in Kenya is the 
result of “the predictable outcome of the international community’s failure to punish earlier, 
comparable state-driven repression in Ethiopia.” After all, Ethiopia is a “true regional pioneer” of 
rule by law, he argues. He has criticized donors’ refusal to use aid as leverage and their 
prioritization of security and economic issues over democratic performance. As authoritarian 
regimes are less likely to be stable and/or prosperous in the long run, he considers this “a self-
                                                          
5 Henry Maina, regional director of Eastern Africa at Article 19. In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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defeating strategy.” Dunham (2015) has similarly argued that the decline in the freedom ratings 
of Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda indicate that they follow in the footsteps of “Ethiopia, which has 
set the regional standard for repressing dissent with harsh laws on civil society groups, the media, 
and terrorism.” The figure below shows the decline in the freedom ratings of six states in the 
region from 2010 through 2017.  
 
Figure 3. The decline in the freedom ratings of the states in the Horn and East Africa (2010 - 
2017).6 
Kenya’s various attempts to amend the Public Benefit Organizations (PBO) Act of 2013, which 
has not yet become operational despite court rulings that call for its commencement, 
demonstrates aspirations similar to Ethiopia’s CSP. Introducing a 15% limit on foreign funding and 
increasing the executive branch’s influence over the “Public Benefit Organizations Regulatory 
Authority,” a body that would be established to be responsible for the implementation of the 
Act, are some of the defining characteristics of the attempted amendments. The amendments 
have not succeeded so far; if they had, they would have curbed the progressive provisions in the 
Act. CSOs played an active role in the drafting of the Act; it thus has various provisions that 
would improve the civic space, when or if they are implemented. To mention just a few, the Act 
                                                          
6 Note: based on data from Freedom in the World report annually published by Freedom House. The report rates 
the level of political rights and civil liberties on a scale of 1 = best, 7 = worst. Retrieved from 
https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world  
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would provide an opportunity for CSOs to self-regulate and partner with the government, and it 
would bring together all of the CSOs registered under different legal regimes to be regulated by 
the Public Benefit Organizations Regulatory Authority.  
Other states in the region have successfully passed legislation that is often accused of intending 
to shrink civic space, and the impact on organizations working on human rights and governance 
issues has been severe. Uganda's Public Order Management Act of 2013 and Non-Governmental 
Organizations Act of 2016 are cases in point. Organizations that work to promote the rights of 
people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT), for instance, are under 
intense pressure. Pending legislation introduced by the Parliament in October 2014, the 
Prohibition of Promotion of Unnatural Sexual Practices Bill, would possibly criminalize 
organizations that promote the rights of the LGBT community if it becomes operational. The bill 
criminalizes homosexual relationships and the funding/sponsoring of any organization with the 
intent to promote what it refers to as an “unnatural” sexual practice. The bill is seen by many as 
the re-introduction of the Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2014, which was nullified in August 2014 
on a technicality. While the legislative framework in Uganda may seem permissible on the surface, 
this is actually not the case. However, it might be so for those working on issues that are 
“politically and socially acceptable to the Government” (International Center for Not-for-Profit 
Law, 2018c). This provision of a relatively extended space for organizations that align their focus 
with the government’s agenda in Uganda is also visible in other states in the region. In a critical 
analysis of the civic space in the states of the East African Community (EAC), Odhiambo (2017: 
5) has identified a trend across the region of using legislative and administrative measures towards 
shrinking the civic space. He states:   
Arbitrary actions taken against CSOs by regulating authorities, including attempts at 
deregistration, reluctance on the part of authorities to work with CSOs towards defining 
standards and enacting more enabling CSO legislation, harassment of human rights 
activists and media personnel, disappearance or murder of human rights activists and 
journalists, accusing organizations of funding terrorism where there is no evidence of such 
involvement, freezing of bank accounts of CSOs, and selective auditing of CSOs by the 
responsible authorities basically amounting to intimidation. 
Page | 17 
 
2.2 Existing research: a synthesis  
2.2.1 Transnational human rights advocacy networks 
Transnational human rights advocacy networks are coalitions of like-minded domestic and 
international actors who promote shared values, principled ideas, and norms (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998). They do not advance violence to attain their goal, which differentiates them from other 
transnational actors, such as terrorist organizations (Price, 2003: 580-581). Even if they operate 
at international and domestic levels, they are considered a unified single entity (Burgerman, 1998: 
909). This is mostly attributed to the advance in communication and transportation technologies 
(Keck & Sikkink, 1998: 10) and the increased opportunities to establish contacts at different 
international platforms, easing information exchange between actors at the two levels (Schmitz, 
2010).  
The network conception of transnational human rights advocacy does not clearly distinguish 
between the activities of the actors at the two levels of analysis, as doing so would “miss the 
complex connections among actors within the network” (Burgerman, 1998: 909). With regards 
to their structure, transnational human rights advocacy networks vary from loosely organized 
connections to highly centralized ones (Wong, 2008: 4). Khagram et al. (2002: 7) have stated that 
information exchange lies at the heart of transnational networking, which can be fulfilled by 
informal contacts. Transnational networks do not advance “sustained coordination of tactics” as 
do other forms of transnational collective action, such as transnational coalitions and 
movements.7 Networks may consist of opposition groups, foundations, churches, trade unions, 
the media, and others. Furthermore, the concept of a network may also include pressure 
emanating from within a state's bureaucracy and an international organization (Burgerman, 1998: 
908). However, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both international and domestic, are 
the centerpiece.  
                                                          
7 Khagram et al. (2002: 7-8) define transnational coalitions as domestic and international actors that are formally 
organized, and their constituencies regularly meet to strategize campaigns and review progress. Transnational social 
movements, on the other hand, are defined as domestic and international actors linked by a common purpose, and 
with a capacity to generate coordinated and sustained transnational mobilization to induce social change. They mostly 
use protest or any other action that threatens the social order. These definitions are, however, “not necessarily 
comprehensive or mutually exclusive” (2002: 9).     
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After the adoption of the United Nations (UN) Charter in 1945 and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, followed by the subsequent binding instruments, human rights 
became mainstream in international law and politics (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005). This has 
culminated in its attainment of a global standing, especially after the 1970s (Hafner-Burton & Ron, 
2007). The two most comprehensive human rights instruments - namely, the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR - that, together with the UDHR, constitute the Universal Bill of Rights, came into force 
in 1976. Most importantly, this period witnessed a proliferation of NGOs with a global reach, 
and the public grew increasingly attuned to human rights issues (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). These 
developments created transnational advocacy networks that advocate for the respect of 
universally acknowledged human rights norms. Furthermore, this period saw a shift in the 
strategies followed by NGOs to promote and protect human rights. They shifted from lobbying 
states at intergovernmental platforms such as the UN to “more contentious and distinctly 
transnational strategies” (Rodio & Schmitz, 2010: 445). 
Transnational advocacy has a history that goes beyond globalization (Tarrow, 2005), which can 
be traced as far back as anti-slavery campaigns (Rabben, 2002). Its prominence in the human rights 
scholarship, however, became apparent with the proliferation of international human rights 
NGOs, such as Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) (Schmitz, 2010; 
Tsutsui & Wotipka, 2004). Treaty ratification by states, especially by authoritarian ones, is mostly 
token and might not necessarily translate into norm-compliant state behavior (Hafner-Burton & 
Tsutsui, 2005, 2007; Hathaway, 2002). This creates what Mullerson (1997) has referred to as the 
“hypocrisy trap.” Hence, transnational human rights advocacy networks serve as “the mediating 
mechanism between treaty ratification and state compliance” (Wiest, 2007: 141). They constitute 
one of the five political opportunities that Osa and Corduneanu-Huci (2003) have identified as 
necessary to result in socio-political mobilization in authoritarian contexts.8 The existence of 
political opportunities, which can either be “open” or “closed,” is decisive for the success or 
failure of transnational collective action (Khagram et al., 2002: 17-20).  
Broadly speaking, human rights pressure with the intent of inducing a norm-compliant state 
behavior - that is, a behavior that complies with the universally accepted human rights norms - 
                                                          
8 The other four political opportunities identified are state repression, elite division, influential allies, and media 
access.  
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emanates from domestic and international sources. Pressure from foreign governments, 
international organizations, and international NGOs constitute an international source of 
compliance, whereas pressure from domestic societal groups and institutions is a domestic 
source of compliance (Cardenas, 2004, 2007). Although there was already a growing tendency in 
international relations literature to combine the international and domestic realms9, the 
mainstreaming of the inter-disciplinary research agenda on transnational advocacy has effectively 
blurred the divide between the two. Early works such as those of Clark (2001), Keck and Sikkink 
(1998), Khagram et al. (2002), Risse et al. (1999), Sikkink (1993), Smith, Pagnucco, and Lopez 
(1998), and Tarrow (2005) are credited with introducing and further developing the network 
conception of human rights advocacy in the study of international relations (Price, 2003; Tang, 
2009: 229).  
While it shares the constructivist's core emphasis on the role of norms and is often credited with 
addressing their conventional criticism of downplaying the role of agency in their analysis, this 
research agenda has blurred the constructivist-rationalist theoretical divide. It foregrounded “an 
eclectic mix of persuasive and instrumentalist tactics” used by such networks (Price, 2003: 583). 
It gives equal emphasis to “the power of norms and hard politics” (Tang, 2009: 235). Here, it is 
pertinent to note that various terminologies are used to refer to transnational advocacy 
networks. Even the seminal works mentioned above vary in their use of terms. The most 
frequently used are “principled-issue networks,” “transnational coalitions,” “transnational social 
movements,” and “transnational civil society.” This is because the research agenda combines two 
sets of literature from the international relations sub-field of political science and the literature 
on social movements in sociology (Khagram et al., 2002: 5). The scholars in these fields use 
different words to refer to the same phenomenon. That is, human rights advocates coordinate 
efforts that transcend states’ national boundaries with the intention of promoting and protecting 
human rights norms (Tang, 2009: 230).  
In authoritarian settings, domestic groups often reach out to forge alliances with international 
actors, such as international organizations, foreign states and international NGOs. This is done 
with the intent of pressuring the state into complying with international human rights norms, 
                                                          
9 The “two-level game” approach (Putnam, 1988) is a case in point.  
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triggering what Keck and Sikkink (1998) have referred to as the boomerang effect by challenging 
the abusive practices of a state “from above” and “from below” (Brysk, 1993). To better capture 
the domestic-international dynamics of a human rights pressure and in recognition of NGOs’ role 
in this enterprise, this study conceptualizes transnational human rights pressure as essentially 
resulting from the networking of international and domestic human rights NGOs. Together, they 
are referred to as transnational human rights advocacy networks that use various advocacy 
strategies to pressure target actors (a target state, influential governments and/or 
international/regional institutions, such as aid donors) with the aim of bringing about a positive 
human rights change in a target state.   
According to Wong, since international human rights NGOs engage in advocacy outside of their 
home states in collaboration, though in different degrees of cohesion, with their domestic 
counterparts, “they are transnational by definition” (2008: 4). Hence, she does not see the point 
in making a theoretical distinction between international NGOs and transnational networks; for 
her, the two are one and the same. While this study follows this line of reasoning to some extent, 
it explicitly accounts for the role of domestic human rights NGOs in this enterprise. For instance, 
it considers the reports by international human rights NGOs as an output of a transnational effort 
that also represents the role of domestic human rights NGOs. This would address the criticism 
against previous studies of giving less emphasis to the domestic dynamics of transnational 
networking, where domestic members of human rights networks are given a peripheral status in 
analysis (Schmitz, 2010). Similar criticisms are often raised against research on the 
institutionalization of international norms, where it is often argued that domestic political context 
is not given the required weight (Bae, 2007: 6). 
The incentive of transnational networking between international and domestic human rights 
NGOs is a two-way street. For one, international human rights NGOs provide domestic ones 
with international contacts, funding opportunities, and services. They help legitimize and magnify 
their causes. In addition, by forging an alliance with domestic groups, international human rights 
NGOs gain access to first-hand information about human rights violations. The information is 
usually published in a report to mobilize international outrage against the violations. Given the 
costly endeavor of maintaining a simultaneous physical presence in different places, networking 
offers a cost-effective way of monitoring states' behavior in all corners of the world.  
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Furthermore, if a network has a broad membership at the two levels, this would increase its 
legitimacy by addressing the issue of representativeness (Price, 2003: 595).  
Beyond their long-established relevance in norm generation, transnational advocacy networks’ 
potential for norm enforcement is a well-demonstrated fact in the literature. Without having to 
control power and material resources, they shape states' behavior by monitoring their 
compliance with human rights norms and revealing discrepancies between rhetoric and practice 
(Khagram et al., 2002; Schmitz, 2010). To this end, they use various advocacy strategies, such as 
“information politics” and “leverage politics” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). These strategies can also be 
categorized as “soft” and “hard” politics. Strategies that rely on information and persuasion, such 
as information politics, fall into the soft politics category. The calling upon of influential 
governments and/or international/regional institutions to take action or leverage politics falls into 
the hard politics category.  
In practice, information politics is often corroborated by leverage politics, which is usually 
associated with “pressure, arm-twisting, and sanctions” (Tang, 2009: 235). Information politics is 
defined as the strategic framing of information to easily catch the eyes of the public and policy 
makers. Due to their effective application of this strategy, transnational human rights advocacy 
networks are increasingly perceived as reliable sources of alternative information (Ron, Ramos, 
& Rodgers, 2005). Their capability to investigate, document and publicize human rights violations 
has led to their consideration as “the most important chroniclers of our time” (Montgomery, 
2004: 21). In naming and shaming human rights violators, the media is an important partner. 
Members of transnational human rights advocacy networks usually devise a media strategy to 
better appeal to the public. According to Ramos, Ron, and Thomas (2007), the media impact 
increases when reports are targeted at states with higher levels of state repression, economic 
development, population, and attention from Amnesty International.  
Naming and shaming evidently demonstrates the significance of transnational advocacy networks 
in human rights enforcement (Hafner-Burton, 2008: 693; Krain, 2012; Meernik, Aloisi, Sowell, & 
Nichols, 2012). The international legal order that, for long, considered human rights the exclusive 
domain of states has faded. Hence, exposing states' inferior human rights records is an effective 
tool to encourage compliance with international standards. As they lack the legal status and 
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resources of states and international organizations, transnational human rights advocacy 
networks profoundly rely on their capacity to mobilize the global public (Clark, 2001). By 
subjecting the abusive practices of a target state to international scrutiny, which would potentially 
damage its international legitimacy, these networks seek to shame the state into making human 
rights reforms. This task depends on establishing a moral authority based on confirmed norms 
(Tang, 2009: 230).10 Besides the damage on the international reputation and legitimacy of target 
states, naming and shaming exacerbate their susceptibility for a consequent and possibly robust 
international action. This likelihood became permissible with the primer of the latest international 
norm, Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  
At the 2005 World Summit, the UN General Assembly adopted the R2P. The norm states that 
the international community has a responsibility to step in to fill the gap when states fail to provide 
protection for their citizens. Besides this possibility, which is also referred to as humanitarian 
intervention, an effective application of “leverage politics” by transnational human rights advocacy 
networks may result in other actions against a target state. States may face the severance of 
diplomatic relations with other states; expulsion from international organizations; cessation of 
foreign aid; and the indictment of their leaders at the ICC, as was attempted with Sudan's 
President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta. Nevertheless, states’ 
prioritization of political interests over such normative issues makes it challenging to encourage 
them to candidly criticize the human rights practices of their peers, let alone agree to take the 
above-mentioned advanced measures (Lebovic & Voeten, 2009).  
In the contemporary international system, in which there is room to tie foreign aid and 
international cooperation to human rights conditionality, leverage politics - which often aim at 
affecting incentive structures - is presumed to have a positive impact in inducing a norm-compliant 
state behavior. It is common to see arguments claiming that human rights compliance increases 
when military and economic relations are made contingent upon states’ performance (Crawford 
& Klotz, 1999). Hence, transnational human rights advocacy networks try to “utilize the energy 
of other powerful actors who could in turn connect human rights practices to military and 
economic aid or to bilateral diplomatic relations” (Tang, 2009: 235). In other words, members of 
                                                          
10 See Mitchell & Stroup (2017) for the importance of reputation in establishing NGO authority and legitimacy, and 
see Gourevitch & Stein (2012) for the challenges of doing so.  
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a transnational network use formal and/or informal avenues to policy processes in Western states 
and international organizations with the intention of pressuring them to effect positive change in 
target states.  
A look at the textbook analytical framework developed by Levitsky and Way (2006) to study the 
role of external pressure in promoting democratic diffusion in the post-Cold War international 
environment may be insightful. This framework argues that the international system operates 
along two dimensions of “Western leverage” and “linkage to the West.” Western leverage is 
defined as states’ vulnerability to external democratizing pressure via mechanisms such as military 
force, diplomatic pressure, and conditionality. Linkage to the West, on the other hand, is defined 
as ties with the US, the European Union (EU), and Western-dominated multilateral institutions 
conditioned on dimensions of economic, geo-political, social, communication, and transnational 
civil society linkages. The framework stresses the importance of linkages for enhancing the 
effectiveness of leverage in inducing democratization in authoritarian settings. Furthermore, the 
relevance of the relationship between leverage and linkage in determining the efficacy of 
transnational human rights pressure in discussed. It is stated that where linkage is extensive, the 
boomerang effect of transnational human rights networks is “stronger and broader in scope” 
(Levitsky & Way, 2006: 386). 
2.2.2 Human rights consideration in aid allocation  
For a long time, aid was considered as charitable giving by rich states to poor ones. Factors such 
as recipient needs, donor interests, and recipient merits have consistently been raised in the 
literature to explain foreign aid allocation patterns. For higher levels of development impact, 
recipient needs and merits have been more effective than when donors allocate aid on the basis 
of selfish interests (Kilby & Dreher, 2010). Considered from the donors’ perspective, recipient 
needs often included the alleviation of the lack of resources in recipient countries, increasing the 
level of human development in terms of literacy, life expectancy, and so on. Scholars working on 
aid allocation soon started to question the belief that aid was simply “help for others” (Abbott, 
1970: 1216). Early studies contrasting models of recipient needs with models of donor interests 
were those of McKinley and Little (1979) and Maizels and Nissanke (1984). Later, distinguishing 
between donor interests and recipient needs became common practice.  
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A key innovation in the aid allocation literature involves the introduction of recipient merits to 
reflect upon the quality of governance in recipient states. Aid is considered more effective in 
states with good economic and political environments (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). Although the 
level of respect for human rights is one aspect of recipient merit, scholars began considering its 
impact on aid allocation around the 1980s (Cingranelli & Pasquarello, 1985; Lebovic, 1988; 
McCormick & Mitchell, 1988; Poe, 1991, 1992). With the end of the Cold War, studies on 
Western aid’s “democracy promotion” in recipient states, which included human rights 
promotion and protection, became mainstream. Most of these studies, however, focused on the 
US. This is understandable given the fact that the US was the largest aid provider in democracy 
assistance during that era (Wondwosen, 2013: 994). The findings of Poe (1992) and Abrams and 
Lewis (1993) show that the US’s foreign aid program uses aid to reward nations for promoting 
human rights. Poe and Sirirangisi (1993) have stated that human rights abuse has been an 
important determinant of the US's aid to Africa, but recipient needs were somewhat outweighed 
by the former's strategic and political interests.  
Focusing on the effectiveness of aid in promoting human rights, Regan (1995) has found that aid 
has no impact on improving the level of human rights in recipient states. In contrast, Dunning 
(2004) has found that aid to Africa has been effective in promoting human rights, but only in 
recent times. Zanger’s (2000) analyses of multiple donors show that good governance (as in 
respect for human rights, democratic structure, and military spending) do not influence aid 
allocation. Lebovic and Voeten (2009) have asserted that influential donor states often coerce 
multilateral agencies to retract aid from recipients with high levels of human rights violations, but 
the same donors do not apply these aid sanctions bilaterally. Nielsen (2013) has argued that 
donors impose aid sanctions as a way of punishing repressive states but do so selectively on those 
with whom they do not have political ties. Likewise, Wondwosen has argued that democratic 
reversals and human rights abuses in recipient states can result in the reduction or cessation of 
aid “when the recipient states are neither economically nor strategically valuable to the Western 
donors”(2013: 993).   
As shown above, the scholarship on the place of human rights on the aid allocation agenda is not 
consistent. The popular convention, however, seems to be that aid is effective when allocated to 
states with higher levels of democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights (Burnside 
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& Dollar, 2000; Svensson, 1999). According to Carey (2007: 450), respect for human rights has 
appeared repeatedly in the policy statements by OECD donors since the early 1990s. This, 
however, does not seem to hold in the case of aid to African states, where most of the top 
recipients lack genuine democratic institutions and demonstrate poor human rights practices. 
Early studies on aid to Africa strongly reject donors’ claim that the aid was driven by humanitarian 
needs (Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998). Alden (2000) has argued that the US’s policy in Africa 
in the post-colonial period, for instance, was characterized by "neglect.” As Brown (2005) has 
noted, donors’ self-interest in guiding their aid allocation in Africa persisted even after the end of 
the Cold War. Of course, this is supported by other findings, and hence calls for a deeper 
introspection of the particularities of the recipients to comprehend the rationales for donors’ 
interest to invest more aid in them.   
Aid conditionality  
Efficient allocation should ultimately lead to the efficient utilization of aid. Hence, it is important 
to provide a brief overview of aid conditionality - the practice of attaching conditions with loans, 
debts, or development aid that donors use to attain the objectives of aid. While there is no 
consensus on the definition of conditionality, "the key element is the use of pressure, by the 
donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions 
are not met by the recipient" (Stokke, 1995: 11-12). Stokke (1995) has categorized aid 
conditionalities into first and second generations. Economic policy reforms, for instance, the 
conditions advanced by the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), are categorized as a first-
generation conditionality. SAPs constitute conditions that the Bretton Woods institutions, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), required to be fulfilled by 
borrowing states so as to be eligible to receive new loans or/and to decrease the interest rate 
on existing ones.  
Policy reforms that the SAPs tried to implement include currency devaluation, deregulation, and 
privatization. Due to severe criticisms of these programs, which have been in effect since the 
1980s, the WB and the IMF had to launch a new initiative, the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Initiative, which aims to address the lack of the country ownership problem of the SAPs. This 
logic drives the contemporary aid effectiveness agenda that encourages the harmonization of 
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development aid with the priorities of recipient states. Hence, donors increasingly pool funds in 
multi-donor funds, as they do under the Development Assistance Group (DAG) in Ethiopia, to 
reduce transaction costs to “get more for their money.” The DAG is a donor consortium that is 
composed of 30 bilateral and multilateral donor governments and agencies that provide assistance 
to Ethiopia. It was established in 2001 as a mechanism for dialogue between donors and the 
Ethiopian government to harmonize the mobilization of aid with the state’s development 
priorities. With a pooled fund, the DAG coordinates members’ support in the implementation 
of national development plans (e.g., Growth and Transformation Plan [GTP] I and II). Its 
secretariat is hosted by the United National Development Program’s (UNDP) Ethiopia country 
office.  
Second-generation conditionalities, on the other hand, aim at political reforms, including human 
rights and democratic reforms. They are usually captured by the rubric term of “good 
governance” (Wondwosen, 2013). The two generations of conditionality often go hand in hand; 
reforms in the governing structure of recipient states are needed for economic reforms to be 
effective. Many, however, have pointed out that aid conditioned on political reforms is prone to 
be selectively invoked on recipient states that are poor, aid-dependent, and strategically 
insignificant to Western donors (Carothers, 1999; Crawford, 1997, 2001). Bratton and Walle 
(1997) have stated that conditionality has failed to even sustain the limited political reforms 
witnessed in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, let alone result in an actual transition to a 
democratic form of government.  In her acclaimed book, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and 
How There is a Better Way for Africa, Moyo (2009) has argued that the aid conditionality regime 
resulted in undesired outcomes in Africa. Brown (2005) points to donors’ foreign policy interests, 
on top of other structural predicaments, as the cause of its ineffectiveness in the sub-Saharan 
African context. Briggs (2017) even questions foreign aid’s impact in alleviating extreme poverty, 
as his analysis shows that aid disproportionately flows to regions with the richest people and 
improves their lives. While some studies argue the opposite, their findings are context-bound. 
For instance, based on two cases in sub-Saharan Africa (Kenya and Malawi), Clinkenbeard (2004) 
has argued that aid conditionality can be effective in producing democratic reforms in aid-
dependent recipient states, but only when incumbent regimes are pro-West and have the intent 
of being integrated into the global economy.  
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The conversation on the need and effectiveness of conditionality is at the center of the 
contemporary discourse on aid, in which recipient ownership is increasingly considered as an 
important determinant for the effective utilization of aid. At present, donors are moving away 
from the “highly conditioned mindset of the structural adjustment era” (Manning, 2008: 3). The 
international aid system is focusing more on helping recipients build their capacity to be able to 
effectively use the aid allocated. This entails the harmonization of aid with their development 
goals, which have been codified in different international guidelines. The trend, however, is 
criticized for neglecting governance-related issues that are equally significant for aid effectiveness 
(Kaufmann, 2009). Youngs has stated that while the EU poses as a strong promoter of democratic 
values, “some of the most generous European aid increases in recent years have gone to 
authoritarian or semi-autocratic governments” (2008: 2). Ethiopia, for instance, is one of the top 
aid recipients in Africa, and the world for that matter, despite being at the heart of international 
scrutiny for its poor human rights practices. It has been successful in limiting interference from 
its Western donors (Borchgrevink, 2008). This is remarkably unconventional for a poor state 
with a Growth Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of 549.85 (in constant 2010 USD),11 and 
highly dependent on foreign aid, which accounts for a significant portion of its national budget 
(Alemu, 2009).   
2.2.3 Electoral authoritarian regimes  
Not all regime transitions in the post-Cold War setting lead to democracy. Some transitions in 
former dictatorial states, for instance, gave rise to what Levitsky and Way (2010) have referred 
to as competitive authoritarianism. This is a regime type that combines the electoral component 
of democracy with an underlying authoritarian character. The scholarship in democratic studies, 
for long, suffered from a “democratizing bias.” It conceived of the post-Cold War regime 
transitions as predictably transitioning to democracy, which was often referred to as the “third 
wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991). Soon, however, studies questioning the analytical 
lens used to study these transitioning regimes began to surface. Carothers (2002) has argued 
that, instead of transitioning to democracy, many post-Cold War regime transitions lead to a 
“political grey zone” (Carothers, 2002: 9) that is neither dictatorial nor headed towards 
                                                          
11 See at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD  
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democracy. Diamond (2002) refers to such regimes as electoral authoritarian, a pseudo-
democratic arrangement where authoritarian regimes, pressured by international and domestic 
actors, try to imitate democratic features such as elections. He categorizes these regimes into 
competitive and hegemonic variants. His study aims to develop a model to analyze flawed or 
manipulated elections, or what he calls “transitional elections.”  
Levitsky and Way (2010: 3) have called for a distinct conceptualization of competitive 
authoritarian regimes where elections are tainted by manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of 
state resources, and violence. By adding one more component to the “procedural minimum”12 
characterization of democracy - the existence of a reasonably level playing field between 
incumbents and oppositions, they argue that when the incumbent's manipulation of state 
resources and institutions is so intrinsic, the slope of the playing field would be unevenly skewed. 
Their addition tries to account for situations not captured by conventional democratic attributes, 
such as disproportionate access to the media and economic resources. However, the mere 
existence of such channels for the opposition to compete, although unfair, distinguishes 
competitive authoritarian regimes from purely authoritarian ones, which lack such an 
arrangement or elections are mainly used as an incumbent-legitimizing tool. Rooted in a logic that 
considers elections as an "institutional break" (Schedler, 2002: 103) from authoritarian rule in a 
path to democracy, Levitsky and Way’s (2010) minimalist definition of full authoritarianism 
includes various types of authoritarian regimes, ranging from closed regimes without democratic 
institutions, even nominal ones, to hegemonic regimes with bogus democratic institutions and 
practices, including elections.  
In hegemonic regimes, incumbents stand as candidates in elections “not to lose but to legitimate 
their continuity in office” (Schedler, 2002: 103). Elections are used as a mechanism of easing 
pressure for a regime change. To this end, such regimes use various manipulative techniques in 
articulating electoral safeguards to control the democratic uncertainty of elections or minimize 
the risk of defeat. These are what Schedler (2002) has referred to as “the menu of 
                                                          
12 This roughly includes four attributes: free, fair, and competitive elections; universal suffrage; protection of civil 
liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association; and the absence of non-elected authorities or religious 
bodies. 
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manipulation.”13  Though not the end in itself, he argues that such practice would hopefully create 
the path to an eventual institutionalization of electoral democracy. These regimes often use “nasty 
forms of negative campaigning” (Schedler, 2002: 109) and block alternative sources of information 
aiming to tint the image of the opposition and paint an ideal one for themselves. Levitsky and 
Way (2010: 7) write:  
In hegemonic regimes, elections are so marred by repression, candidate restrictions, 
and/or fraud that there is no uncertainty about their outcome. Much of the opposition is 
forced underground, and leading critics are often imprisoned or exiled.  
The situation in Ethiopia more clearly resonates with the features associated with hegemonic 
regimes than competitive authoritarian ones, in which there is a relatively broader political space 
for competition. Bach (2011) has argued that Ethiopia’s authoritarianism is rooted in its 
ideological orientation, which oscillates between revolutionary democracy and the procedural 
components of liberal democracy. Similarly, Clapham has stated that the current system of 
governance in Ethiopia is best described as “managed political order,” which “cannot be remotely 
described as democratic, in the liberal sense of the term” (2017: 77). Elections have been used 
to “fit with international standards” (Bach, 2011: 646). In other words, Ethiopia subscribes to the 
components of liberal democracy for legitimation purposes as the case for other hegemonic 
authoritarian regimes. The EPRDF government’s sense of “democracy” has its roots in Marxist-
Leninist traditions, specifically Vladimir Lenin’s concept of ‘‘democratic centralism.’’ In What Is to 
Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement, a pamphlet published in 1902, Lenin argues that a 
social revolution of the working class must be led by a group of elites or a vanguard party. This 
vanguard party would enjoy a hegemonic monopoly of power and function on the principle of 
‘‘democratic centralism’’ to avoid internal divisions. As it is being attempted in the contemporary 
international system, which is unreceptive of such ideologies, the Ethiopian version of 
revolutionary democracy portrays many ambiguities, to say the least. Kenya, however, the other 
                                                          
13 (1) electoral fraud - acts that involve bias in administering elections. (2) political repression - ranges of practices 
to curtail civil and political liberties. (3) manipulating the actor space – this is aimed at manufacturing the failure of 
the opposition via exclusion (usually by hand-tailored legal instruments to alienate/outlaw “unfriendly competitors” 
(Schedler, 2002: 106) and fragmentation. (4) manipulating rules of representation – the institutionalization of unfair 
electoral rules that give incumbents the upper hand in the translation of votes into seats in the legislature. (5) 
manipulating the issue space – the act of creating and/or manipulating societal cleavages to serve their political agenda. 
(6) unfair competition – unrestricted access to state resources and media. 
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case in the study, is described by Levitsky and Way (2010) as one of the 14 competitive 
authoritarian states in Africa. The remaining 13 are Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. As Diamond’s 
(2002) “electoral authoritarianism” encompasses both competitive and hegemonic authoritarian 
states, the study adopts this designation to provide some scope and meaning to the outcome of 
interest in state behavior in both of the cases it analyzes.   
Broadly speaking, the lack of a clear allegiance to a single ideological block and the practice of 
pragmatism are some of the major defining characteristics of the current authoritarian regimes. 
Krastev (2010: 18) has argued:  
The new authoritarian regimes’ lack of any ideology also partly explains why the 
democratic world is reluctant to confront them. They do not seek to export their political 
models, and hence they are not threatening. The new authoritarian regimes do not want 
to transform the world or to impose their system on other countries. So the axis of conflict 
today is no longer the free world versus the world of authoritarianism - it is rather the 
free world versus the world of free riding.   
Based on its analysis on the cases of Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, and Pakistan, Freedom House, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Asia (2009) argues that the new authoritarian 
regimes are more sophisticated than the classical ones with a toolbox of various ways to obstruct 
human rights and democratic development. These mostly include the use of restrictive legislation 
and the strategic use and control of popular discourse on conventional and social media platforms, 
as is the case in Ethiopia and Kenya. These states may, at times, advance a discourse that seems 
to have ideological roots, especially the earlier modern authoritarian states. But they usually do 
so for legitimation purposes. In his work that begins with a critic of modernization theory for its 
dichotomous understanding of regime types (democracy versus others) and missing a key 
ingredient for analysis, the role of Ideology, Soek-Fang (2006) stresses the legitimizing power of 
ideological discourse in the Asian context, where “legitimated authoritarianism” exists/ed. The 
analysis is based on Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony (1971), specifically on the role of 
consent and legitimacy. Here, we must note that contemporary authoritarian states often use 
such discourse when and if needed to advance certain policy objectives; pragmatism still prevails.  
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2.2.4 Civic space  
The Office of the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) defines the 
operating environment for civil society actors, or the civic space, as “the place civil society actors 
occupy within society; the environment and framework in which civil society operates; and the 
relationships among civil society actors, the state, private sector, and the general public” (2014: 
5). International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2018a: 7) defines civil society actors as 
“individuals and organizations acting collectively to advance their shared interests and/or the 
public good. Civil society lies outside of the family, the state, and the market, and embraces both 
organized structures and informal groupings of individuals”. These actors operate at all levels - 
local, national, regional and international - and include human rights defenders, human rights 
organizations, networks, social movements, community-based groups, faith-based groups, trade 
unions, professional associations, and so on (Office of the United Nations Higher Commissioner 
for Human Rights, 2014: 5).  
The shrinking of the civic space has been a troubling global topic in recent years. In much of the 
developing world, CSOs are often viewed as “dangerous enemies” (Ottaway, 2005: 130). A look 
at the annual reports of the World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS, 2015) on the 
status of civil society in the world is insightful. This space is under attack by governments that 
have begun using legislative and administrative obstacles to restrict or close the space altogether. 
According to OXFAM (2016), of the 136 restrictive laws introduced worldwide between 2012 
and 2016, 29 were in sub-Saharan Africa, where the task of holding governments to account has 
become increasingly difficult. Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash (2015: 420) refer to this trend as the “anti-
NGO global backlash,” as NGOs, both domestic and international, are the most visible actors in 
the civic space. States increasingly place tough regulatory oversight over NGOs to recover the 
“political ground ceded during the 1980s and 1990s” (2015: 420). In the last two decades, 39 of 
the world’s 153 low- and middle-income countries have adopted laws restricting the inflow of 
foreign aid to domestic NGOs (Dupuy, Ron, & Prakash, 2016). According to Maina Kiai, the 
former UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, 
the world has passed the point of talking about the “shrinking” of the civic space because “that 
space is long gone” (Kiai, 2016).   
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CIVICUS (2015: 78) identifies four categories of attacks on the civic space: the introduction of 
laws that limit freedoms of assembly, association and expression; the tightening of registration 
requirements; restrictions on the receipt of funding from foreign sources, which is often 
accompanied by rhetoric that frames CSOs that receive such funding as agents of foreign powers; 
and verbal and physical attacks by state officials, which may escalate to detention, imprisonment, 
and assassination. Similarly, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2016) classifies the 
constraints used by states to shrink the civic space into four groups: the proposal and adoption 
of restrictive CSO laws; the proposal and adoption of anti-protest laws; the closure, de-
registration and expulsion of CSOs; the adoption and manipulation of counter-terrorism laws 
and policies; and the adoption of laws and policies that restrict access to resources, particularly 
foreign funding. This publication further states that, between 2015 and 2016, “states have adopted 
64 restrictive laws, regulations, and other initiatives; these initiatives spanned all major regions of 
the world.” Howell, Ishkanian, Obadare, Seckinelgin, and Glasius (2008) write that counter-
terrorism measures that grow out of an ever-increasing concern for security serve as rationales 
for the crackdown on the civic space. 
According to Nielsen (2013), when human rights violations are widely publicized, aid donors are 
prone to take robust measures in the form of negative incentives, such as aid sanctions 
(suspension of ongoing disbursements or refusal of future funding).14 As the political cost of being 
associated with a repressive regime might be high in terms of compromising both international 
and domestic legitimacy, donors tend to take measures to ensure their citizens that their tax 
money is not used to support repression. This likelihood, however, is contingent on the extent 
to which the violations are communicated to the public by the media (see Van Belle, Rioux, & 
Potter, 2004). From practice, we are aware that international and domestic human rights NGOs 
and the media are the two prominent actors in transnational human rights networks. This fact is 
helpful in shedding some light on the motivation for authoritarian states to crack down on 
domestic civil society in general and human rights NGOs in particular and the independent media. 
                                                          
14 His findings show that countries that violate human rights are sanctioned under three circumstances. (1) when 
they do not have close political ties to aid donors, (2) when the violations have negative consequences for donors, 
and (3) when the violations are widely publicized to donors.  
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This act is the states’ attempt to create an environment in which human rights violations are 
under- or un-reported. 
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Chapter 3 
 Theory-building with Process-tracing  
3.1The process-tracing methodological approach 
The study uses process-tracing, an effective within-case methodological approach to establish 
causality. It is considered as “a powerful solution to the problems surrounding the discovery of 
causal relations” (Waldner, 2012: 66). In an endeavor to move beyond correlation, process-
tracing investigates causal mechanisms that link a cause with an outcome. Its distinctive suitability 
to provide causal explanations for puzzling case studies is a well-documented fact in 
methodological discussions. In addition to the account given for causal complexity (George & 
Bennett, 2005: 207), by the very merit of the approach, such a research design considerably 
minimizes the validity threats frequently associated with qualitative methods. Not only in process-
tracing studies, but also methodological approaches in any type of research must align with certain 
ontological and epistemological assumptions. This helps the different research processes be 
consistent with the overarching understanding of causation adopted by a study. It is, therefore, 
pertinent to state from the outset that this study follows a pluralist interpretation of 
methodology. This is an alternative to what is commonly referred to as the KKV approach, which 
seeks to have a singular or unifying methodological logic for all social science research, variance 
or case-based research designs alike.  
KKV are the initials of the three authors of Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994), a highly influential methodological book that attempts 
to transfer norms from covariation analysis into qualitative research. Works that are critical of 
this approach’s disregard for the distinctive features of qualitative research have led to the era of 
what Mahoney (2010) calls “a new methodology” in qualitative research, in which process-tracing 
methods have become one of the most prominent. This “new enthusiasm for qualitative 
methods” (Waldner, 2012: 66) displays the expiration of the perception whereby “case-study 
methods have traditionally been viewed as inferentially inferior to randomized experiments and 
statistical methods” (2012: 65). As a standalone research design, the logic process-tracing follows 
fundamentally differs from other methodological approaches that use covariation analysis 
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(George & Bennett, 2005: 207). It has its own ontological and epistemological foundations that 
view causality as a process rather than a manifestation of covariation between variables (Blatter 
& Haverland, 2014). Therefore, it follows what is popularly referred to as a "mechanistic” 
understanding of causality, where the focus is to unpack the black box between a cause and an 
outcome. This view goes beyond looking for a pattern in the regular association between 
variables. Hence, this study uses fitting terms, such as causal conditions (C) and outcomes (O), 
instead of dependent and independent variables.  
The recent epistemological shift in social science research advocates for the identification of 
mechanisms (M) in a causal analysis (Gerring, 2007: 5). Causation between a C and an O used to 
be understood as if C, then O. But now, causal analysis often starts with if C, through M, then O. 
This increases the validity of within-case inferences about the intermediating processes that 
contribute to outcomes. Due to lack of synthetic consensus on the meaning and purpose of 
explanations through causal mechanisms, it is imperative to reflect on this study’s standing point.15 
Disregarding the predominant trend in political science, in which causal mechanisms are either 
conceptualized in minimalist terms or as a chain of intervening variables or pathways, this study 
follows Beach and Pederson’s (2013, 2016) definition. After all, “the value of process-tracing is 
critically linked to how we conceptualize causal mechanisms” (Waldner, 2012: 67). Thus, a 
mechanism is understood as a system consisting of different parts with “productive continuity,” 
and each part is conceptualized in terms of entities/actors engaged in activities (Beach & Pederson, 
2013: 133). Productive continuity captures what Waldner refers to as “concatenation” - “the 
state of being linked together, as in a chain or linked series” (2012: 68). 
3.1.1 Theory-building process-tracing 
There is no single template for using process-tracing. It is thus pertinent to explicitly state the 
specific variant adopted by this study. This eases the conceptual and practical ambiguity 
surrounding its application, as its methodological foundations are still in development. In an 
attempt to provide a practical guide for its use, Beach and Pederson (2013) differentiate process-
tracing into three variants: theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining-outcome. They argue 
that, as different research situations call for different variants, the categorization clears up the 
                                                          
15 See Mahoney (2003) for various definitions of causal mechanisms.  
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"murky methodological guidelines" (2013: 9) that have come with the common perception of 
process-tracing as a single method. Most of the literature treats all process-tracing studies, both 
case-centric and theory-centric, as singular. There are, however, some that state how the term 
is used to lump together various methods. Waldner (2012: 67), for instance, refers to it as a 
“composite method.” Beach and Pederson (2013) argue that process-tracing involving the testing 
of the presence/absence and the functioning as theorized of a generalizable mechanism that had 
been deductively constructed (theory-testing) should not be considered the same as the one that 
traces case-specific processes that are peculiar to the case under investigation (explaining-
outcome). Similarly, it should not be equated with the one that tries to build a theoretical 
mechanism based on empirical insights from a case (theory-building).    
As stated in Chapter 1, the overall ambition of this study is theory-building, with the intention of 
furthering our understanding of the causal relationships of interest based on within-case evidence. 
Therefore, using the theory-building variant is the most logical methodological decision. 
According to Beach and Pederson (2013: 3):  
Theory-building process-tracing seeks to build a generalizable theoretical explanation 
from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the 
facts of a particular case. 
Theory-building process-tracing aims at building a middle-range theory. To do so, it starts with 
an analysis of an empirical material to identify a causal mechanism that links a cause with an 
outcome. This mechanism is expected to be present across a context-bound population of cases 
beyond the specific case under investigation. While the theory-testing variant also shares this 
theoretical ambition of tracing a generalizable causal mechanism, the underlying difference 
between the two rests on the precedence they provide for theory or empirical evidence. Theory-
building process-tracing uses empirical evidence to theorize a causal mechanism by inferring that 
what is found in empirical material depicts the observable implications of the mechanism at work. 
The order of the research process, however, is reversed in theory-testing process-tracing. 
Theory-testing process-tracing uses empirical evidence to test a theory about the presence or 
absence of a mechanism that is deductively hypothesized from existing knowledge. This enables 
theory-testing process-tracing to make within-case inferences about the functioning of the 
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different parts of the mechanism, or whether or not they functioned as expected; "[n]o claims 
can be made, however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome" (Beach 
and Pederson, 2013: 3). Similarly, no claims can be made in theory-building process-tracing “that 
the detected causal mechanism is sufficient to explain the outcome” (2013: 16). However, this is 
not the case with the widely used third variant, explaining-outcome process-tracing, which aims 
to provide a minimally sufficient explanation for an outcome in a single case. While the purpose 
of this variant distinguishes it from theory-building process-tracing, the inductive nature of both 
variants has led to the common confusion of the two.  
According to Derek Beach, the theory-building process-tracing variant is the least developed and 
applied.16 Therefore, he suggests that scholars be more intuitive and imaginative in their 
formulation of a theory from empirical evidence to enhance its application in the future. He 
further equates this endeavor with “trial and error.” In light of this gap for methodological 
contributions, the inductive approach used by this study to develop a context-bound theory of a 
mechanism, with a middle-range generalizability, has the potential to significantly optimize the 
variant’s practical application. Previous studies that have tried to use a similar approach include 
Janis’s (1982) theory of a mechanism that he refers to as Groupthink. The case of a historical 
fiasco, the Bay of Pigs, was the puzzle that led him to wonder “how could a bright, shrewd men 
like John F. Kennedy and his advisors be taken by the CIA’s stupid, patchwork plan?” (Janis, 1982: 
vii). He used five case studies of historical fiascoes under five US administrations to study the 
impact of psychological processes in small groups on foreign policy decision-making. He used the 
Groupthink mechanism to link poor decision-making by a small group of policymakers to policy 
fiascoes. 
3.2 Causal explanations  
By focusing on causally relevant attributes of the concepts, this section presents the 
conceptualization and observable manifestation of the C, the two parts of the M and the O.17 In 
                                                          
16 Derek Beach, Lecture (Process Tracing Methodology II - Evidence and Empirical Testing in Practice), European 
Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Summer School in Methods and Techniques, Central European University 
(CEU), Budapest, Hungary, 28 July - 13 August 2016.  
17 See Beach & Pederson (2016) for guidelines on concept structure for case studies in general and process-tracing 
studies in particular. 
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the part that conceptualizes the different parts of the M, entities/actors and their activities are 
written in bold. This depiction emanates from the way the study comprehends mechanisms – a 
system with different parts in which entities/actors engage in activities. Given the advice provided 
for the reversed order of research processes in theory-building process-tracing, observable 
manifestations should come first, followed by the conceptualization in the table below. However, 
the following presentation, which is easier to follow, is used instead. 
 Causal condition (C) 
Transnational human 
rights pressure at critical 
political junctures 
Mechanism (M) Outcome (O) 
Authoritarian 
entrenchment   Part I 
Counter-discourse and  
quiet diplomacy  
Part 2 
Regulatory 
crackdown 
C
o
n
c
e
p
tu
a
li
z
a
ti
o
n
 
A concerted effort by 
transnational human 
rights advocacy 
networks, essentially 
encompassing 
international and 
domestic human rights 
NGOs, to put pressure 
on advocacy targets 
(target state and 
donors) at critical 
political junctures with 
the intention of 
effecting a positive 
human rights change. 
Target states 
respond to the 
pressure by 
constructing 
counter-discourse 
while donors engage 
in quiet diplomacy.   
Target states 
embark upon 
regulatory 
crackdown to 
shrink or close the 
civic space.  
A relentless attempt to 
effectively 
institutionalize rule by 
law in an electoral 
authoritarian setting.  
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O
b
se
rv
a
b
le
 m
a
n
if
e
st
a
ti
o
n
 
Transnational human 
rights advocacy 
networks use various 
strategies to put a stop 
to human rights 
violations in target 
states during critical 
political junctures. 
They issue reports, 
hold press conferences, 
write letters, organize 
rallies, lobby policy 
makers of target states 
and/or donors, and so 
on. 
Target states 
construct a discourse 
that tries to discredit 
the credibility of 
transnational human 
rights advocacy 
networks and 
question their 
intentions. Donors, 
on the other hand, 
show less sensitivity 
to use their leverage 
to push target states 
to comply with 
international human 
rights norms.  
Target states pass 
vaguely and broadly 
worded, and 
repressive, legal 
instruments to 
restrict or stop the 
activities of civil 
society actors 
(both individual 
activists and 
CSOs). This mainly 
takes the form of 
anti-terrorism laws, 
media laws, and 
civil society 
regulation laws. 
Target states carry out 
legalized actions that 
are often accompanied 
by administrative 
predicaments to 
systematically 
criminalize and/or 
incapacitate civil 
society actors (both 
individual activists and 
CSOs).     
Table 2. Conceptualization and observable manifestation of the C, the two parts of the M, and 
the O. 
3.2.1 Causal condition (C): transnational human rights pressure at critical political 
junctures  
Given the high regard accredited to the specification of temporal contexts within which processes 
of interest play out in studies that use the process-tracing methodological approach, identifying a 
critical juncture is needed as a commencing point of the processes between a cause and an 
outcome. According to Falleti and Lynch, a critical juncture is “defined ex-post as the starting 
point of a path-dependent causal process that leads to the outcome of interest” (2009: 1155). 
Critical junctures are “relatively brief periods of momentous political, social, or economic 
upheaval” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 349) “during which there is a substantially heightened 
probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest” (2007: 348). Hence, the study 
uses critical political junctures to be able to trace the impact of transnational human rights 
pressure on state behavior in the cases under investigation. The 2005 and the 2007/8 political 
crises in Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively, are identified as critical political junctures that jump-
started the processes of interest in the two cases. 
Transnational human rights pressure at critical political junctures is conceptualized as a concerted 
effort by transnational human rights advocacy networks, essentially encompassing international 
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and domestic human rights NGOs, to put pressure on advocacy targets (target state and donors) 
at critical political junctures with the intention of effecting a positive human rights change. As 
explained in detail in Chapter 2, the network conception of transnational human rights advocacy 
is adopted to capture the domestic-international dynamics of a human rights pressure and in 
recognition of NGOs’ role in this enterprise. The network conception of transnational human 
rights advocacy does not clearly distinguish the activities of domestic and international actors, 
which are considered to be a unified single entity (Burgerman, 1998). With information exchange 
at its core, the networking of these actors at the two levels is usually informal, and it does not 
advance a “sustained coordination of tactics” (Khagram et al., 2002: 7). To put a stop to human 
rights violations in target states during critical political junctures, transnational human rights 
advocacy networks use various strategies. They issue reports, hold press conferences, write 
letters, organize rallies, lobby policy makers of target states and/or donors, and so on. 
3.2.2 Outcome (O): authoritarian entrenchment   
The unintended negative outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior is 
conceptualized as a relentless attempt to effectively institutionalize rule by law in an electoral 
authoritarian setting. The typical way of defining rule by law is through the comparison with the 
rule of law. While rule of law aims to use legal frameworks to limit states’ power to infringe upon 
peoples’ enjoyment of their basic rights, rule by law is rather the use of repressive legal 
instruments to restrict peoples' enjoyment of their basic rights. Enabled by their repressive legal 
instruments, electoral authoritarian target states carry out legalized actions that are often 
accompanied by administrative predicaments to systematically criminalize or incapacitate 
individual activists and CSOs that operate in the civic space. As a result, they try to create an 
environment in which domestic human rights NGOs are incapacitated; international human rights 
NGOs are banned; the number of independent media outlets decreases; and independent 
journalists and human rights activists self-censor, are incarcerated, and flee target states. 
The word “entrenchment” is included to refer to the exacerbation of an authoritarian state 
behavior. The study does not claim exclusive causality between transnational human rights 
pressure at critical political junctures and authoritarian state behavior, which it recognizes to be 
an outcome of a conjunction of various factors beyond its scope. As explained in Chapter 2, the 
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concept of electoral authoritarian regimes is adopted. This is because both of the cases that the 
study uses to draw insights qualify to be classified as such. This regime type is a pseudo-
democratic arrangement in which authoritarian regimes, pressured by international and domestic 
actors, try to portray some democratic features, such as elections (Diamond, 2002).  
3.2.3 Mechanism (M)  
A schematically structured theory, either as an ex-ante or as ex-post of an empirical search, 
depending on the specific variant used, is an essential characteristic of the process-tracing 
methodological approach. In an attempt to answer the “how” research question, this section 
presents the mechanism that causally links the C and the O, arguing that, through a mechanism 
that has two parts with entities/actors engaged in activities, the pressure that transnational human 
rights advocacy networks put on advocacy targets (target state and donors) at the identified 
critical political junctures ultimately contributed to the unintended negative outcome of 
authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior. These parts are named counter-discourse and quiet 
diplomacy (taking place in conjunction) and regulatory crackdown. To establish a “productive 
continuity” (Beach & Pederson, 2013) between the two parts of the mechanism, narrating the 
causal story between the C and the O is useful. As shown in the table above, transnational human 
rights pressure at critical political junctures led to counter-discourse and quiet diplomacy, which 
in turn gave rise to the regulatory crackdown that ultimately contributed to the unintended 
negative outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior.  
Part 1: counter-discourse and quiet diplomacy 
Target states respond to transnational human rights pressure at critical political junctures by 
constructing a counter-discourse that tries to discredit the credibility of transnational human 
rights advocacy networks and question their intentions. The counter-discourse routinely 
critiques the sources from which network members draw evidence in support of their claims 
and frames their criticisms as a political attack under the pretext of human rights. Furthermore, 
the counter-discourse aims at legitimizing following legalized actions that are often accompanied 
by administrative predicaments. Donors, on the other hand, respond to the pressure by engaging 
in a quiet diplomacy. They show less sensitivity to use their leverage to push target states to 
comply with international human rights norms. For instance, they refuse to condition 
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development assistance to target states pending on improvements of human rights practices. In 
other words, they refrain from threatening to withhold or suspend aid.   
Part 2: regulatory crackdown 
Beyond engaging in a hardline counter-discourse against transnational human rights advocacy 
networks, target states embark upon a regulatory crackdown to shrink or close the civic space. 
To this end, target states pass vaguely and broadly worded, and repressive, legal instruments to 
restrict or stop the activities of civil society actors (both individual activists and CSOs). This 
mainly takes the form of anti-terrorism laws, media laws, and civil society regulation laws. 
3.2.4 Strategic importance: an aggregation of contextual factors 
The specification of contextual factors, or scope conditions, in which causal process plays out has 
been a widespread practice in both theory-centric and case-centric social research for some time. 
To clearly capture the causal impact of a mechanism, an account must be given of the contexts 
in which it is embedded (Hedströem & Ylikoski, 2010). These are defined as “the relevant aspects 
of a setting (analytical, temporal, spatial, or institutional) in which a set of initial conditions leads 
to an outcome of a defined scope and meaning via a specified causal mechanism or set of causal 
mechanisms” (Falleti & Lynch, 2009: 1152). A context is not considered a causal agent on its own 
but as a condition that affects how a causal condition, or a mechanism, contributes to an outcome. 
To this end, and with the aim of shedding light on why the processes of interest played out the 
way they did in the cases under investigation, an analysis of the contextual factors that have a 
conditioning impact on the workings of the two parts of the mechanism, and hence the outcome, 
is conducted. The study aggregates these various, and often interlinked, systemic and case-specific 
contextual factors and refers to them as strategic importance. Those that are analytically relevant 
to the objective of the study are accounted for. 
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Analytically 
relevant 
contextual 
factors  
Systemic contextual factors 
(international and regional level-of-analysis) 
Case-specific contextual factors 
(domestic level-of-analysis) 
▪ Alternative powers and the “new scramble” 
for Africa 
▪ “Security complex” and the war on terror in 
the Horn of Africa (HOA) 
▪ Political capital 
▪ Economic progress and potential 
 
Table 3. Systemic and case-specific contextual factors. 
Observable manifestations  
Alternative powers and the “new scramble” for Africa 
With the emergence of alternative global powers such as China, aid recipient states are provided 
with some policy space to maneuver the terms and outcomes of their engagements with donors. 
The fact that the alternative powers have a different approach to development cooperation from 
the traditional/Western donors limits Western donors’ leverage. Because the aid conditionality 
that they may attach pending on improvements of human rights practices, or the robust measures 
that they may threaten to take, such as suspension of aid or the severance of diplomatic relations, 
can be counterbalanced by the alternative powers. 
“Security complex” and the war on terror in the HOA 
Given the multifaceted security concerns, the international community advances a policy of 
avoiding state collapse in the HOA region. Hence, the human rights agenda is not a priority, 
especially with regards to states that are considered to be the “oasis of stability” in an otherwise 
“politically unstable,” “volatile,” and “conflict-ridden” region. The security complex intensifies in 
the context of the war on terror, where the order of the day seems to favor outsourcing the 
task to regional powers. 
Political capital   
As maintaining partnerships with states that have high esteem among their peers is often 
considered a valuable asset for diplomatic alliances in intergovernmental platforms, the lower 
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sensitivity of donors to check human rights situations in Ethiopia and Kenya is conditioned by 
their influential standing in regional and continental affairs. 
Economic progress and potential 
The economies of Ethiopia and Kenya are the top-performing ones in Africa. This fact, in addition 
to their possession of untapped natural and human resources, underscores their potential to be 
viable development partners in donors’ eyes, which explains their reluctance to use their leverage 
in pressuring these states to comply with international human rights norms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Schematic summary of causal explanations.     
3.3 The search for empirical evidence  
3.3.1 Case selection and the research process  
The different research processes in this study were not linear/sequential in the sense that the 
research design, data-collection, and data-analysis have not chronologically followed one another. 
As is the case for most qualitative studies, especially for the ones that aim at theory-building, 
there was a constant back-and-forth in the process. This is mostly due to the inductive nature of 
the research endeavor that was born out of the puzzle - the case of Ethiopia and the regional 
domino effect it has had (see section 2.1 in Chapter 2). First, the study outlined the two parts of 
the mechanism that causally link the transnational human rights pressure at the identified critical 
political juncture and the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in the 
Counter-discourse 
Authoritarian 
entrenchment 
Regulatory 
crackdown 
Quiet-diplomacy 
Strategic 
importance 
 
Transnational 
human rights 
pressure at critical 
political junctures 
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behavior of the Ethiopian state. Then, it tried to see if the insights gained from the Ethiopian case 
can be used to provide an explanation for other cases within a similar context. A case selection 
strategy that took into account a multitude of methodological as well as contextual factors was 
used to select the case of Kenya. Methodologically speaking, the case selection strategy of most 
process-tracing studies focuses on the similarity of cases in causally relevant conditions. This 
purposive case section, among other aspects, considers the presence of the C and the O and the 
similarity of cases in analytically relevant aspects of contextual factors.  
The study argues that the C and the O are also present in the case of Kenya. Transnational human 
rights advocacy networks pressured target actors during a critical juncture of interest - the 
2007/8 political crisis, and the following developments, such as the ICC proceedings. With regards 
to the O, there is a relentless attempt to effectively institutionalize rule by law. The Kenyan state 
is engaged in legalized actions that are often accompanied by administrative predicaments to 
shrink the civic space. Kenya follows in the footsteps of Ethiopia, participating in the regional 
trend of authoritarian entrenchment. Furthermore, the case of Kenya fits within the range of the 
contextual factors identified for the Ethiopian case. Besides methodological rationales, Kenya 
conforms to the conventional characteristics of a vulnerable target state. While it might not be 
as vulnerable as Ethiopia in the material dimension18, it is quite vulnerable in the social dimension. 
It is a state that seems to care about its international legitimacy, and it is a party to many of the 
core international human rights instruments.19 Moreover, its constitution is the most progressive 
in Africa and has its own chapter (4) for the bill of rights. All of the above-mentioned 
considerations suffice to establish the causal homogeneity needed in the two cases.  
Adding another case study to examine the explanatory relevance of the insights drawn from the 
case study of Ethiopia upgrades the study from one that provides an explanation for a puzzle to 
                                                          
18After the recalculation of its GDP in 2014 with updated data from the better performing sectors - agricultural, 
manufacturing, telecommunication, and real estate, Kenya has become a middle income economy. Foreign aid only 
represented 16 percent of the government's total budget in 2013/14. Even still, it ranks ninth among the top 10 ODA 
recipients from DAC members (OECD – DAC, 2017). Furthermore, it is very much dependent on non-budgetary 
aid in the area of security and justice, for instance.  
19 Kenya has ratified the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the ICERD, the CEDAW, the CRC, and the CRPD. It has also ratified 
regional treaties such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa, and Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples' Rights.  
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one that offers a context-bound theory of a mechanism with a middle-range generalizability. This 
can help show why and how transnational human rights pressure defeats its very purpose of 
effecting a positive human rights change, even when applied to target states that are seemingly 
vulnerable. As this entails a detailed within-case analysis, it would not have been manageable to 
have additional case studies. As with the Ethiopian case, a critical political juncture - the 2007/8 
political crisis in Kenya, is identified to analyze the impact of the pressure applied by transnational 
human rights advocacy networks on state behavior. To this end, broad and diverse within-case 
“mechanistic evidence” (Beach & Pederson, 2016), or what Brady and Collier (2004) have 
referred to as “causal-process observations” about the processes contributing to the outcome 
of interest, are used in triangulation.20 For better organization, the analysis of those processes in 
the two cases is presented together thematically throughout the dissertation.  
Last, an explanation to justify the choice of the phrase “the Horn and East Africa” in the title is 
presented in the following. A minimal geographical understanding of the HOA notes that it 
comprises four states in the north-eastern tip of the African continent, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, and Somalia. The Greater HOA, however, adds the other members of the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)21 (South Sudan, Sudan, Kenya, and 
Uganda) to the list. Similarly, an ambiguity in clearly delineating the states that constitute 
East/Eastern Africa exists due to the overlapping membership of the states in various regional 
organizations. Generally, membership in the East African Community (EAC) is considered a 
marker of the states that belong in the region. The EAC is an intergovernmental regional 
organization composed of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. As this 
study bases its analysis on the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya, it is imperative to delineate a 
geographic scope that would encompass both cases. Using the term “the Greater HOA” would 
have done so, but again there is no consensus on the states that compose it. Thus the reference 
to the Horn and East Africa is used as a geographic marker for the part of the world from which 
this study draws insights.  
                                                          
20 Causal-process observations are information, mostly qualitative in nature, about the processes that substantiate 
causal claims.  
21 IGAD is a regional organization that aims at assisting its member states in their efforts to achieve food security 
and environmental protection; promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs; and 
economic cooperation and integration. 
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3.3.2 Data-collection and sampling  
Different primary and secondary sources of empirical observation are used to gather evidence. 
Here, the term observation means raw empirical data, which is turned into evidence after a 
proper evaluation of its content and accuracy (Beach & Pederson, 2013: 120). For instance, 
“account evidence” can be gathered from both secondary sources (e.g., newspapers) and primary 
sources (e.g., interviews) (Beach & Pederson, 2013: 123). Attributable to the deterministic 
approach to explanations in studies that use the process-tracing methodological approach22, rich 
data is required to provide a comprehensive explanation of the processes between a causal 
condition and an outcome. Hence, both field and archival research strategies were employed.  
Conducting field research in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Nairobi, Kenya, was more of a necessity 
than a choice. For one, as the study presents a line of reasoning contrary to the established 
convention in the scholarship, it has to depend on primary data uncovered by data collection 
tools such as interviews with experts and the analysis of documents. Second, with cases such as 
Ethiopia, where human rights issues have already attained a taboo-like status, there is a scarcity 
of scholarly literature on the subject. Thus, semi-structured expert interviews were conducted. 
As it blends the characteristics of unstructured and structured interviews, a semi-structured 
interview template provides enough room to probe follow-up questions while avoiding the risk 
of detouring from the relevant issues of interest (King & Horrocks, 2010). Furthermore, the study 
draws evidence from secondary sources such as books, journal articles, working papers, media 
sources, and so on.  
Purposive and snowball/chain-referral sampling techniques, both non-probability sampling 
approaches, were used to select the subjects for the semi-structured interviews. Purposive 
sampling refers to a deliberate selection of interview subjects in light of prior knowledge and the 
objective of the study. Snowball/chain-referral sampling, meanwhile, is a technique in which the 
researcher requests the suggestion or recommendation of other (potential) interview subjects 
from the initially identified ones. These techniques’ merit in minimizing the risk of excluding key 
interview subjects is the rationale behind Tansey’s (2007) advice for the use of non-probability 
                                                          
22 Whether causality should be understood in deterministic or probabilistic term is a major ontological discussion in 
the philosophy of science. In short, ontological determinism implies that “given a set of initial and scope conditions, 
an outcome was bound to occur” (Waldner, 2012: 69). 
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sampling approaches in process-tracing studies. Additionally, as the major aim of the study is 
building a context-bound theory with middle-range generalizability rather than making law-like 
generalizations, the sampling of interview subjects need not be based on the logic of randomness.   
Similar to most qualitative studies, the major consideration taken into account for sampling the 
interview subjects was diversity. The study selected experts with varying positions with regards 
to the research agenda to account for different stakeholders’ positions. For instance, by 
considering a political position as a dimension that can capture diversity, it included the positions 
of both state officials and elites from the opposition. This practice, which is considered to be a 
triangulation technique by itself, increases the reliability of interview observations as sources of 
evidence.  
3.3.3 Field research: some observations 
Three rounds of field research and 60 semi-structured expert interviews were conducted. The 
two rounds of field research (January/February 2016 and September 2016) took place in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, while the third (October/November 2017) was in Nairobi, Kenya. Of the total 
60 interviews, 50 were in-person interviews conducted during the field research, and the 
remaining 10 were conducted over Skype or phone. All interviews, both in-person and otherwise, 
were conducted between January 2016 and March 2018. The experts for the semi-structured 
interviews were mainly civil society actors, including representatives of international and 
domestic human rights NGOs, human rights activists, journalists, opposition personalities, 
political and legal analysts, academics and other stakeholders. Moreover, state officials from 
concerned ministries and departments and representatives of the donor community were also 
interviewed.  
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Interview information Numbers 
In-person interviews in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 21 
In-person interviews in Nairobi, Kenya  29 
Total in-person interviews 50 
Skype/phone interviews 10 
Total interviews 60 
Table 4. Summary of interview information.  
With regards to the field research in Ethiopia, conducting interviews with officials from the 
country’s top aid donors, such as the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the WB, was one of the 
planned empirical activities. However, the selected individuals in all the three agencies declined 
consent for the interviews; the promise of confidentiality and the anonymized use of interview 
information failed to change their minds. In an email response, a senior official at USAID Ethiopia 
stated that the topic of human rights considerations in the context of aid allocation is "too 
sensitive" to be associated with, especially at that point in time. The field research in 
January/February 2016 coincided with the height of the Oromo protests that began in mid-April 
2014 with the government’s announcement to implement the Addis Ababa Integrated Regional 
Development Plan. The plan proposed the expansion of facilities to areas in the outskirts of the 
city lying within the Oromia Regional State. This was followed by the government’s crackdown, 
which included extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests. The mishandling of the situation, 
especially the one that resulted in a stampede that took the lives of many at the Ireecha festival, 
led HRW to refer to 2016 as the “year of brutality” (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Following the 
widespread political protests, a state of emergency was declared that authorized the military to 
enforce security nationwide in October 2016. The state of emergency enacted sweeping, vaguely 
worded restrictions on a broad range of activities. It denied freedom of expression, association, 
and assembly, and access to information, among many other aspects. It also legitimized many of 
the security force’s abusive practices, such as arbitrary detention, and restricted the habeas corpus 
rights of the detained. While the state of emergency was officially withdrawn in August 2017, it 
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was reinstated in February 2018 to again be withdrawn in June 2018. This condition considerably 
exacerbated the climate of fear and explains the refusal of the selected individuals from USAID, 
DIFID, and the WB to participate in interviews. In light of this, officials from the DAG and the 
EU were interviewed to account for the views of the donor community.  
Instead of a setback, the above-mentioned challenge is considered supporting evidence for the 
arguments of the study. An extensive climate of fear exists in which people are terrified to talk 
about issues even remotely related to human rights, and this is particularly apparent when 
approaching actors in the civic space. Self-censorship by civil society actors, especially those that 
work on governance-related issues, including human rights, is rampant. Given the astutely crafted 
legal instruments that can easily incriminate individuals for exercising their seemingly legitimate 
rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly, this is understandable. In order to 
address this concern, a consent form was prepared for interview subjects who would prefer 
confidentiality and the anonymized use of interview information in publications and presentations 
that would arise from the study. Those who requested anonymity were asked if they had a 
preferred designation to refer to them; some made suggestions such as "human rights worker," 
while the rest did not show specific preferences. This proposition was, however, not presented 
for interview subjects who agreed for their identities to be revealed. As expected, most of the 
interview subjects in Addis Ababa asked for anonymity. The identities of 15 of the 21 interview 
subjects from the in-person interviews in Addis Ababa are anonymized throughout the 
dissertation. 
To show the deeply entrenched climate of fear in Ethiopia, the case of two interview subjects 
who requested anonymity is therefore presented. International Human Rights Worker 123 and 
224 are the designations used to refer to them throughout the dissertation. International Human 
Rights Worker 1 refused recording his voice, fearing the possibility that the information he 
provided would reach the eyes and ears of those in power and used against him. Similarly, 
International Human Rights Worker 2 said, “They wouldn’t say this in public but I have been 
privately warned that if I go [to Ethiopia], I would not be able to come back.” In a stark contrast 
with the field research experience in Ethiopia, the interview subjects in neighboring Kenya were 
                                                          
23 In-person interview, January 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
24 Skype interview, September 2017. 
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quite open to discussing the issues of interest and beyond. Only 1 interview subject out of out of 
the 29 in-person interviews in Nairobi requested confidentiality and the anonymized use of 
interview information.  
 
Figure 5. Anonymity of interview subjects. 
The dissimilarity in the exercise of freedom of expression in the two cases is nothing short of 
astonishing. Compared to Ethiopia, where information blackout seems to be effectively 
institutionalized, there is extended media freedom in Kenya. Kenya scores 58 out of 100 (on a 
scale of 0 = most free, 100 = least free) on Freedom House’s (2017a) Freedom of the Press 2017: 
Press Freedom Dark Horizon report. This gives it the net freedom status of “partly free,” while 
Ethiopia has the net freedom status of “not free,” as it scores 86 out of 100. While the report 
mentions the government’s growing intolerance of an independent media and its legalized 
attempts to limit the space needed for its proper functioning, it acknowledges that the media in 
Kenya can still perform critical reporting. This is in direct contrast to how the report describes 
the situation in Ethiopia: “Ethiopia’s media environment is one of the most restrictive in sub-
Saharan Africa.” The above statement, however, should be interpreted in relative terms. The 
media freedom in Kenya is still questionable by international standards and even considered to 
be under “unprecedented attack” (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2018d). The 
Kenya Communications Authority’s decision to shut down three television stations while they 
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broadcasted the swearing-in ceremony of Raila Odinga, the opposition leader, as “the people’s 
President” on 30 January 2018 is a case in point. 
Three research challenges are worth mentioning with regards to the field research in Nairobi, 
Kenya. The first was the coincidence of the field research with the October 2017 re-run of the 
National Election. The Kenyan Supreme Court had nullified the previous election in August 2017 
on grounds of electoral irregularities, the first ruling of its kind on the African continent. There 
were many uncertainties surrounding the legitimacy of the re-run election, if not the legality, as 
the opposition had boycotted it. Given the looming possibility of political violence, personal safety 
was a major concern at the time. The second research challenge was gaining access to interview 
subjects as a foreign researcher in a state undergoing a different critical political juncture than the 
one being studied. Hence, I had to use my personal network to arrange meet-ups with potential 
interview subjects, at least for the first few. Then, the snowball/chain-referral sampling technique 
was used to select the remaining interview subjects. The third research challenge was the time-
consuming administrative procedures to access state officials for an interview. This was 
experienced to a degree incomparable with the field research in Ethiopia. The state officials in 
Ethiopia were relatively willing to participate in interviews; they saw it as an opportunity to tell 
their side of the story. Their counterparts in Kenya, however, used various procedures to avoid 
the interviews. One senior official at Kenya’s Ministry of Finance said, “As a political scientist, you 
should know that bureaucracy is a necessary evil.” This statement was made to justify his decision 
to consult his colleagues before signing a permit that would allow an expert from the department 
that he leads to become an interview subject for the study.  
The last, but certainly not the least, field research observation is the gender dimension of the 
interview sample. Of the total 60 interview subjects, women constitute only 12; 10 were 
interviewed in-person during the field research in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, and the remaining 2 
were interviewed over the phone. One similar trend among all the women interview subjects 
was the fact that they all talked less than their male counterparts.  
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Chapter 4 
Connecting the Dots:  
Transnational Human Rights Pressure at Critical 
Political Junctures and Authoritarian 
Entrenchment  
This chapter presents the association between transnational human rights pressure at critical 
political junctures and the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in state 
behavior. Connecting the dots between the causal condition and the outcome is important to set 
the scene for the discussion in the following chapter of the two parts of the mechanism that 
causally link the two. This study argues that the pressure that transnational human rights advocacy 
networks applied to target actors (the target states and donors) during the 2005 and 2007/8 
political crises in Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively, contributed to a relentless attempt to 
effectively institutionalize rule by law. Transnational human rights advocacy networks, especially 
domestic CSOs and individual activists, who played an active role in applying pressure during the 
identified critical political junctures were made victims of the subsequent legal and administrative 
retributions. In the case of Ethiopia, they were considered to have provided sympathy and 
support to the opposition political parties, while those who asked for accountability for the 
2007/8 post-election violence are targeted in Kenya.  
The 2005 political crisis in Ethiopia is presented in the following. The overview of the political 
crisis is followed by an analysis that connects the dots between the pressure placed on advocacy 
targets during this critical political juncture and the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian 
entrenchment in state behavior. This is followed by a similar discussion of the 2007/8 political 
crisis in Kenya. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on some contrasts in otherwise 
similar trends across the two cases.  
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4.1 The 2005 political crises in Ethiopia: the pressure on advocacy targets 
and its impact 
The political crises that followed the May 2005 national elections had a massive repercussion in 
shaping the dynamics of the relationship between the state and civil society in Ethiopia. 
Wondwosen (2009: 1602) has written, “though the relationship between the ruling EPRDF party 
and the civil society from 1991 to 2005 was not smooth, it reached a freezing point during the 
2005 elections.” This was the first time that the civil society played a decisive role in the 
democratization process in the country, he argued. Of all the contributions made by the civil 
society to the electoral process at the time, providing voter education to the public and 
conducting election observation were the major ones. Furthermore, the effective reporting of 
the unfortunate incidents, both during the lead-up to the election and in its aftermath, 
exacerbated the already existing revulsion of the government towards the then-vibrant, in relative 
terms, domestic CSOs. This became apparent when the government began referring to them as 
“the opposition in disguise” (Human Rights Council, 2011: 3). Beyond engaging in a hardline 
counter-discourse that often bordered name-calling, this build-up explains the consequent 
crafting of a regulatory framework hostile to their survival.  
The EPRDF coalition-run government in Ethiopia astutely structured its legal landscape to no 
longer make it convenient to monitor, document, and report on its human rights practices. As 
noted in Chapter 2, the CSP, which was passed into law in 2009, is a case in point. The CSP 
incapacitated domestic CSOs via provisions that invite undue government interference and the 
imposition of severe funding restriction. Yacob Hailemariam, Ph.D., retired professor of law at 
Norfolk State University and the former senior prosecutor for the ICC for Rwanda, referred to 
Ethiopia as “a police state” in which people are arrested arbitrarily and made to survive by the 
will of the government. 25 The constitution, he said, especially the provisions that deal with human 
rights, has been roundly violated. Similarly, an independent journalist who wishes to remain 
anonymous, and who is hereafter referred to as Journalist, shared his views on what he 
considered “a progressive increase in the legal violation of human rights” in Ethiopia.26 The 
                                                          
25 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
26 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
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following excerpt from the interview with an academic and legal practitioner who wishes to 
remain anonymous, and who is hereafter referred to as Academic and Legal Practitioner, 
summarizes the above-discussed points.27     
The EPRDF is a pro in the practice of rule by law. Its laws are exclusionary. […] What 
the laws seem to have in common is the fact that they criminalize acts that the 
government does not like. The state literally uses laws for oppression, and punishments 
are often disproportionally high. […] The scope of the criminal law expanded so much 
so that there is almost nothing that can be considered not to be criminal. If they do not 
like you, they will tailor a criminal law for you. 
4.1.1 The political crisis  
Although the human rights situation in Ethiopia has been in the spotlight of international scrutiny 
for some time, reports that portray a worsening situation increased after the 2005 political crises. 
Aalen and Tronvoll (2009) contend that the 2005 elections ultimately moved Ethiopia towards 
authoritarianism. In the figure down below, the Polity IV scale shows that 2005 marks the year 
when Ethiopia’s Polity2 scores dropped from 1 to -3, where it has remained through the present. 
This indicates a shift towards more autocratic tendencies by the EPRDF coalition, which has been 
in power since 1991.  
 
Figure 6. Ethiopia’s Polity scores (1995-2017).28 
                                                          
27 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
28 Note: based on data from Polity IV Project, which captures political regime characteristics on a 21-point scale 
ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Source: Centre for Systematic Peace 
(2017).  
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The run-up to the elections witnessed what seemed to be an open political competition that was 
unprecedented in Ethiopia’s long history. To mention some of such indicators, the opposition 
parties were allowed to debate the ruling coalition on issues in discussion forums, and they were 
given air-time to campaign in the state-owned media outlets. Soon after, however, a disheartening 
reality brought a shock to those who had waited for the electoral outcome with great optimism. 
After the disputed election win of the EPRDF was announced, dissatisfied citizens showed their 
anger by staging a demonstration in the streets, in which the police responded with live 
ammunitions. A Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, which was established in December 2005, 
reported the deaths of 193 civilians and six members of the security forces. Following the report, 
which exposed the use of excessive force by the security forces, some members of the 
Commission, including the Chair and the Deputy, fled the county “citing political intimidation and 
harassment by the ruling party” (Smith, 2009: 876).  
Besides the post-election violence that ultimately claimed the lives of civilian demonstrators close 
to a couple of hundreds, the election process itself was highly disputed (Ishiyama, 2007). The 
National Electoral Board of Ethiopia tried to ban domestic CSOs from election observation, 
claiming that they were overstepping their mandates, and it took into account the government’s 
accusation that the CSOs were acting in support of the opposition (Wondwosen, 2009: 1602-
1603). The CSOs challenged the decision in court and managed to have it overruled. As the 
Court’s decision came too late, most of the CSOs were not able to mobilize and act in time. In 
an interview with the Voice of America in 2005, Ana Gomes, the head of EU’s observation mission, 
one of the few international observers allowed to observe the elections, stated that the elections 
did not meet international standards. She has said,  “We have a ruling class which is very smart 
in using politically correct rhetoric pretending that they want democracy, but judging from the 
actions that are documented in the report [by EU’s observation mission], that is not happening” 
(VOA, 2010).  
“Politically motivated” detention and then trial of opposition party leaders, journalists and human 
rights defenders followed the political crisis. This has been the major subject of reporting by 
international members of transnational human rights advocacy networks such as AI and HRW. 
The detainees were accused of treason, outrage against the constitution, and other capital charges 
for allegedly inciting the post-election street demonstrations. While the most prominent civil 
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society leaders were later acquitted of the charge of committing outrage against the constitution, 
which would have resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment or death, they were still accused 
of attempting to unconstitutionally seize power through street violence. AI considered most of 
the detainees to be prisoners of conscience who exercised peaceful dissent using their legitimate 
rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly. It thus advocated for their immediate 
and unconditional release.  
With regards to the detainees for which the government had incriminating evidence, particularly 
concerning their involvement in violence, AI urged for them to be charged with a recognizable 
criminal offence and to be given a fair and prompt trial or otherwise be released. Unfortunately, 
this activity was banned in July 2007. AI produced several reports with thorough analyses of the 
trials in addition to its occasional press statements. Moreover, it reported on the pardon process, 
which took place separately from the formal legal procedures. Amnesty International (2011a) has 
provided a detailed explanation about the pardon process that contains both the Amharic and 
English versions of the letter sent to the then-Prime Minister by the detainees attesting to, and 
apologizing for, their “mistakes.” Similarly, HRW closely monitored and reported on the facts 
and the fates of the detainees. Cases in which detainees were forced under duress to make self-
incriminating confessions were reported.  
Domestic human rights NGOs were also active in the lead-up and during the election. They 
organized discussion forums, provided voter education to the public, and deployed election 
observers to monitor the electoral process. The same is true for the post-election period. They 
extensively criticized and reported on the post-election violence, where the government security 
used excessive force on civilian demonstrators who were protesting against an alleged electoral 
fraud, and the followed “politically motivated” trials of opposition leaders, journalists, and human 
rights defenders.  
A report produced by the Government Communications Affairs Office (GCAO) (2015: 35) 
referred to what happened in 2005 as “the first crisis that put to test the durability of the federal 
constitutional system.” Similarly, a human rights lawyer who wishes to remain anonymous, and 
who is hereafter referred to as Human rights lawyer 1, said, “2005 changed everything, including 
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the country’s profile and the public’s mind-set.”29 Mesfin Woldemariam, Ph.D., retired professor 
of geography and philosophy at Addis Ababa University, explained how the crises changed the 
regime’s attitude, including its sensitivity to the opinion of the international community.30 He said, 
“They are no longer sensitive” and commenced an open defiance of international human rights 
norms. He then explained how the political crisis further pushed the regime away from liberal 
ideals such as the freedom of the press and the need for an active civil society. In addition to 
harassing domestic CSOs and individuals that the government sees as threats, he said it also tries 
to alarm the international community with a discourse that aims at institutionalizing a perpetual 
fear. The regime claims that the world would be in danger without its “anti-terrorism crusade” 
in the HOA region, he added.  
Journalist I took a broader perspective and discussed “the legal tampering” with the meaning and 
substance of normative concepts such as human rights after the 2005 political crisis. He said that 
the moral demarcation of what is good and bad has been re-visited; some rights that used to be 
considered human rights are no longer treated as such. He mentioned the right to protest, the 
right to privacy, the rights of people in custody, and others as examples. The laws passed after 
the year 2005 often have provisions that go against the constitution, the ultimate law of the land, 
which declares that other laws or customary practices that are in direct contravention to it would 
be nullified, which is sadly not the case, he said. Similarly, Jon Abbinik, Ph.D., professor of politics 
and governance in Africa at Leiden University, mentioned how public demonstration is “re-
defined” as an act that is undesirable and predictably violent.31   
Some of the advocacy strategies used by transnational human rights advocacy networks at the 
time of the crisis were not well received by the EPRDF government. For instance, the application 
of leverage politics was considered to have contributed to the temporary tension between the 
government and its major donors. Even the donor community acknowledges how pertinent the 
2005 political crisis was in re/defining their relationship with the Ethiopian government. 
Reproaching the use of lethal force against civilian demonstrators, multilateral and bilateral 
Western donors such as the EU, the WB, the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden suspended direct 
                                                          
29 In-person interview, September 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
30 In-person interview, February 2016, Hawassa, Ethiopia. 
31 Skype interview, October 2017.  
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financial assistance to the federal government of Ethiopia (Human Rights Watch, 2010a; Youngs 
2008: 8). A senior official at the EU Delegation to Ethiopia who wishes to remain anonymous, 
and who is hereafter referred to as Senior Official at the EU Delegation to Ethiopia, stated: 
The EU and the rest of the donor community, including EU member states, changed the 
mechanisms of their support to Ethiopia as a direct result of the activities during the 
election. I would say the situation is not yet back to where it would have been in 2003, 
for instance. So there is a continuing effect from 2005, which reflects our position on 
democracy and human rights in Ethiopia.32  
The seized funds, however, were soon resumed through local administrative channels. Youngs 
(2008: 8) has written that the EU Commission “resumed full funding as soon as the government 
agreed to (a non-committal) dialogue with the opposition. Italy increased aid threefold in 2006. 
Even much UK aid was in practice soon being spent in much the same way as before the 
elections.” According to OECD’s data, while the total aid commitments to Ethiopia from 
multilateral donors dramatically decreased to 360.21 million in 2005 from 1,309.1 million in 2004 
(in constant 2016 USD), they again increased to 1,728.61 million in 2006. The adjustment of 
funding through local administrative channels can be considered to have defeated its purpose, as 
the local governing structure is under the influence of the ruling EPRDF coalition. In political 
arrangements in which the influence from the center descends to the lowest administrative 
channels possible, the prospect of such measures in safeguarding against the political capture of 
aid appears slim. In the words of Academic and Legal Practitioner, “following the change in the 
flow of aid, the regime made sure that the lower administrative channels are filled with its cadres 
so as to continue business as usual.” Negasso Gidada, Ph.D., a Former President of Ethiopia 
(1995-2001), believes that this change in funding contributed to the worsening of the situation by 
failing prey to the entrenched culture of corruption in the lower administrative channels.33  
Similarly, Wondwosen (2009: 1609) has argued that donors’ change of strategy, for example by 
channeling aid through the civil society sector, may explain the government’s quest to incapacitate 
the sector to ensure that donors have no option other than channeling aid through the state.   
                                                          
32 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
33 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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Many of the interview subjects expressed that the outcome of the election was an utter surprise 
to the government. A legal practitioner and human rights activist who wishes to remain 
anonymous, and who is hereafter referred to as Legal Practitioner and Human Rights Activist, 
said that the ruling coalition made an error of judgment of its domestic legitimacy by 
underestimating the opposition groups as insignificant.34  That is why, relatively speaking, it opened 
up the political space for different voices in the pre-election period. A similar statement was made 
by Merera Gudina, Ph.D., opposition politician and professor of political science at Addis Ababa 
University, who explained how the government was aiming at creating an image of a functioning 
democracy.35  However, he said, the result ended up shocking it to its core by threatening its 
power. In the words of Mesfin Woldemariam, “they did not expect that the opposition would 
have a chance at a landslide victory.” Legal Practitioner and Human Rights Activist referred to 
the outcome of the election as “a wake-up call” for the government, making it aware that if such 
an incident were to happen again, it would not stop at being a wakeup call; it would probably be 
more. Hence, various discursive, legal, and administrative instruments started to be introduced 
to avoid or minimize the likelihood of “the most embarrassing political move of all times” - an 
incumbent refusing to give up power after an electoral defeat, he said. As rights-related discourse 
usually starts with transnational human rights advocacy networks and what they report as a point 
of reference, he believes that this has made domestic human rights NGOs victims of the 
government’s “overreaction.”36 He also said that, if not for the role such organizations played 
during the days of the political crisis, the government would not have gone to the extent of 
putting in place “discriminatory laws”. As Wondwosen (2009: 1609) puts it: 
[…] [D]ue to the active and independent role of the civil society in the 2005 election, 
for the first time in the history of the nation, a high voter turnout was recorded, and 
opposition parties were able to score electoral victories that stunned the ruling party. 
Since then, the government has been contemplating either to fully control or neutralize 
the civil society so that it will not create a “problem” in the future elections. 
                                                          
34 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
35 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
36 This statement resonates with the phrase Jon Abbinik, Op. Cit., used to describe the role of transnational human 
rights advocacy networks, both international and domestic members. He said, their role was “not system 
threatening”.   
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According Human rights lawyer 1, some developments resembled a flicker of democratic practice 
in the period before 2005. This view is shared by a former senior official at the Ethiopian Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC) who wishes to remain anonymous, and who is hereafter referred to 
as Former Senior Official at the EHRC.37  He mentioned the 1995 Constitution as an example 
that showcases how much better, in relative terms, the period before 2005 was. Beyond the 
grant of human rights, the Constitution also details the mechanisms and institutions, such as the 
EHRC and the Office of the Ombudsman, that would later be organized for its proper 
implementation.  
4.1.2 Connecting the dots   
Asked whether there is a direct link or causality between the pressure put on target actors during 
the 2005 political crisis and authoritarian entrenchment, the relentless attempt to effectively 
institutionalize rule by law, Academic and Legal Practitioner stated:  
The link between the pressure applied in 2005 and the laws that are passed in the recent 
years is causal. There is no other explanation. Of course, there were few ground works 
before. […] I admit that the government already had a repressive character before 2005, 
but the pressure applied then is responsible for the entrenchment of the repression that 
we see today. The tools were in a box before, but now they are out in the open, being 
used.  
Similarly, Human Rights Lawyer 1 said, “the causality is not a claim; it is a fact,” and the best way 
to observe this would be to compare the time before 2005 with the time after. He mentioned 
how the number of independent publications and CSOs tremendously deteriorated to the point 
of non-existence after 2005. Furthermore, the fact that government officials, including the late 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, have admitted that they learned a lot from what has happened 
clearly features the causal link, he added. This view is also shared by Merera Gudina, who stated 
that he has no doubt about the causality. He sees the recent legal and administrative changes as 
one of the many instruments that the regime uses to suppress dissent of any kind to ensure its 
staying in power for as long as possible. For Legal Practitioner and Human Rights Activist, the 
                                                          
37 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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causality can easily be perceived by paying attention to the processes, including the timing, 
through which the recent restrictive laws came about. We can clearly see, he argued, that they 
all followed the 2005 political crisis.  
Many of the interview subjects agreed that, although the pressure was expected to result in a 
positive change in state behavior, this has not been the case. Journalist said, “Reports on people 
getting killed get out. But then, nothing happens.” Most of the interview subjects agreed that the 
impact of the pressure went beyond a null effect; it contributed to the unintended negative 
outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior via a relentless attempt to effectively 
institutionalize rule by law. In the words of Academic and Legal Practitioner, “absolutely no 
positive impact whatsoever.” The intention of the pressure was not to produce negative 
consequences, which makes it unintended, he added. Pressuring the government to share its 
power with the opposition, and to investigate and take action against the human rights violations 
perpetrated by its security forces, were some of the intentions.  
The relationship between the Ethiopian government and the civil society in general and domestic 
human rights NGOs in particular has always been adversarial (Dupuy et al., 2015: 424). On the 
Enabling Environment Index developed by CIVICUS in 2013, Ethiopia ranks 102 out of 109 states 
with a score of 0.36.38 Based on these statistics, it is fair to say that Ethiopia is a state with one 
of the least enabling environments for civil society. CIVICUS (2015: 86) states that Ethiopia has a 
“highly repressive” environment, in which actors in the civic space are often criminalized. The 
following excerpt from Government Communication Affairs Office’s (2010b) response statement 
to Human Rights Watch’s (2010a) report portrays how the EPRDF government views civil 
society: 
It is common knowledge that many NGOs in Africa are bank-rolled by foreign sources 
mainly to serve as Trojan horses for rigid neoliberal interest groups that seek [to] detect 
African politics. It has all too often been the case that diehard neoliberals underwrite 
                                                          
38 On a scale of 1= most enabling, 0 = least enabling, the index measures governance, socio-cultural and socio-
economic environments that affect the capacity of citizens (individually and collectively) to engage in the civil society 
sector. For further information, see at: http://www.civicus.org/eei/  
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these organizations through which they try to leverage Africa’s leaders and run the 
gauntlet against any governments that dares [to] resist their ideological preference.  
For Former Senior Official at the EHRC, the state-civil society relationship in Ethiopia is based 
on what he referred to as “mutual distrust.” For long, the EPRDF government has accused 
domestic human rights NGOs of providing “unsubstantiated” accusations to their international 
counterparts. The events in the lead-up and aftermath of the 2005 national elections, however, 
are believed by many interview subjects to have been responsible for triggering the systematic 
and legalized repression of the sector. The government was convinced that CSOs are nothing 
but the “opposition in disguise” (Human Rights Council, 2011: 3). According to Dereje (2011: 
805), the long-established consideration of NGOs as “a bastion of opposition sympathizers” was 
institutionalized after the 2005 political crisis to deny the legitimate role of civil society in various 
economic and democratic processes. Beyond engaging in a counter-discourse that aims to 
discredit their credibility, the government radically altered the country’s regulatory framework 
to systematically criminalize and/or cripple domestic human rights NGOs.  
Following the 2005 political crisis, “the EPRDF initiated a range of institutional regulations and 
legislation geared at restricting democratic space in the country and undermining the 
constitutional protection of human rights on a long-term basis” (Aalen & Tronvoll, 2009: 199). 
Of all the restrictive legislation passed in recent years, the CSP’s impact on domestic human rights 
NGOs is a case in point. This Proclamation is often highlighted as the major source of the 
repression on the sector. As explained in Chapter 2 (section 2.1), Article 14(5) of the CSP states 
that domestic organizations that receive more than 10% of their funding from abroad - Ethiopian 
Resident Charities/Societies and international organizations - are not allowed to conduct activities 
related to human rights, women’s rights, children’s rights, disability rights, citizenship rights, 
conflict resolution, or democratic governance. Hence, several organizations forfeited their 
mandate to work on issues with no reference to human rights, and those that struggle to continue 
had to scale dawn their operations, lay off their workforce, and close offices. Furthermore, they 
operate in a considerable climate of fear. In the words of the second human rights lawyer 
interviewed for the study who wishes to remain anonymous, and who is hereafter referred to as 
Human Rights Lawyer 2, “after the taking effect of the CSP, let alone collaborating with 
international human rights NGOs that are often portrayed as enemies of the state and its 
Page | 64 
 
developmental endeavors, we are terrified to even converse about the law and the impact it has 
had on our work.” 39  Journalist stated that, even if human rights violations are rampant in Ethiopia, 
no one is there to report them. He said, “the domestic human rights organizations are in short 
of the financial capabilities needed and the international ones lack the mandate to do so.” The 
excerpt from the interview with Human Rights Lawyer 2 presented below summarizes the points 
made above:   
As the advocacy in 2005 was perceived by the government to have negatively affected 
the image of the country, the whole civil society sector came to be perceived as a threat. 
Even organizations working on development issues were increasingly embedding their 
work in human rights with a rights-based approach to development. This, however, 
changed right after the taking effect of the Proclamation as it dictates to withdraw any 
rights-related wording unless one wants to exclusively work on human rights and be 
registered as an Ethiopian Charity or Society.  
For a practical grasp of the impact, let us consider the case of the Human Rights Council (HRCO), 
one of the few remaining domestic organizations mandated to work on human rights issues. 
HRCO was quite active during the course of the 2005 national elections. According to 
Wondwosen (2009: 1602), the two most important civil society organizations that played a 
significant role in the elections were the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA) 
and the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO). EHRCO was the former name of HRCO. 
During the re-registration process, the Civil Society Agency (CSA) - a body created by Article 
103(1) of the CSP to oversee its implementation - ordered the Council to change its name - omit 
the prefix “Ethiopian” from its title. The Council equates this with “the loss of a brand” (HRCO: 
7). Article 57(6) of the CSP states that a domestic organization must have presence in at least 
five regional states if it has a “federal character and nomenclature”, which the Council failed to 
maintain due to the funding restrictions imposed by the Proclamation. 
During the run-up to the 2005 elections, HRCO provided voters’ education to the public, which 
significantly contributed to raising the public’s political consciousness. On top of deploying 
election observers to monitor the electoral process, it has also investigated human rights 
                                                          
39 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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violations perpetrated before, during, and after the elections. It has published and disseminated 
its findings as reports, some of which were used by the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the 
UN Human Rights Council. UPR is a mechanism that reviews the human rights situations of all 
member states of the UN. It has also sent alerts to the donor community through their Embassies 
and Delegations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, requesting intervention to stop the human rights 
violations being perpetrated at the time of the political crisis. According to Mesfin Woldemariam, 
it was not just HRCO but other domestic human rights NGOs were also vibrant. However, right 
after the election, he added, “they started to slowly die to reach to their current non-existent 
status.” The excerpt from the interview with Human Rights Lawyer 2 presented below shows 
the hardship faced by organizations that chose to maintain their human rights mandate by re-
registering as Ethiopian Charities/Societies.  
Following the law, we were forced to raise funds from within the country, which was very 
tough. We didn’t have the mechanisms and even the mind-set to do that. It was more of 
a trial and error at first. We were trying things that others were trying, and we soon 
realized that funds are needed to raise funds. Hence, we had to reduce activities such as 
research and awareness creation. This is affecting our advocacy work, as all of these 
activities need to go hand in hand to realize the change we want to bring. And, rights-
related topics are not that attractive, as service provision for example, to our society. This 
has made it challenging to market our cause. 
Sisay (2012: 380) states that the CSP “impede the ability of CSOs to deal comprehensively with 
issues that lie in the intersections between human rights, governance, and development.” Asked 
about the routine criticism on the CSP’s adverse effect on the number of organizations that work 
on rights-related advocacy, a senior official at the CSA who wishes to remain anonymous, and 
who is hereafter referred to as Senior Official at the CSA, said that he would not be able to 
comment about this as it needs a proper comparison, which he thinks to be inapplicable in this 
case. He said that the sector lacked a clear system of organization before the CSP went into 
effect. Hence, a claim either about an increase or a decrease of their number cannot be made.  
The statement of Otsieno Namwaya, a Kenya researcher at HRW, captures the CSP’s adverse 
effect on international human rights NGOs. He simply said, “We do not have access to 
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Ethiopia.”40 Similarly, International Human Rights Worker 2 explained how challenging it is for 
international human rights NGOs to access Ethiopia, “where there is hardly any independent 
media and functioning CSOs.” By enforcing a legal framework that debilitates domestic human 
rights NGOs’ ability to network with their international counterparts, the government tries to 
sever transnational networking. “Before the law, our relationship with international actors, both 
international human rights NGOs and other actors, was good. After the law, however, all our 
international relations are almost totally severed,” said Human Rights Lawyer 1. This situation 
increasingly contributes to an information blackout - the going under-reporting or lack of 
reporting of human rights violations. 
4.2 The 2007/8 political crisis in Kenya: the pressure on advocacy targets 
and its impact  
Though the magnitude may not be equivalent to that of Ethiopia, the unintended negative 
outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior is also present in Kenya, where there 
is a relentless attempt to effectively institutionalize rule by law. The Kenyan government carries 
out legalized actions that are often accompanied by administrative predicaments to systematically 
criminalize or incapacitate civil society actors. Felix Kyalo, country representative for Kenya at 
the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) said that the law is being used “to 
achieve illegal ends.”41 The fact that something is legal does not make it right, he added. There 
exists a persistent harassment of CSOs and individual activists that have tried to pressure target 
actors during the 2007/8 political crisis and the subsequent developments, such as the ICC 
proceedings. The incumbent President, Uhuru Kenyatta, and his Deputy, William Ruto, were 
persecuted by the ICC on charges of crimes against humanity for their alleged involvement in 
organizing and financing the ethnic and political violence during the 2007/8 political crisis.  
During the field research in Nairobi, the processes that constitute the two parts of the mechanism 
used to explain the Ethiopian case (counter-discourse and quiet diplomacy, and regulatory 
crackdown) were observed at work. Hence, the trend is similar. Kenya clearly follows in the 
footsteps of Ethiopia, even if it is not yet quite the same. According to Herman (2014), the 
                                                          
40 In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
41 In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
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crackdown on the civic space in Kenya “followed a sadly well-worn script developed by 
authoritarian states, which are more inclined and better equipped than ever to export ‘worst 
practices’ when it comes to repressing civil society and silencing dissent.” This statement refers 
to Ethiopia’s practice of rule by law and how that serves as a blueprint for other states in the 
region that emulate its ways. In the words of Morris Odhiambo, regional project director of East 
and Horn of Africa at Freedom House, “Kenya is definitely part of the regional trend.”42 Henry 
Maina similarly said, “Kenya has been a good student of Ethiopia.” 
The relationship between the current government in Kenya and the civil society is often labeled 
“adversarial” as the actors in the latter often report facing harassment, intimidation, and threats 
from the former. The government, for its part, often accuses the civil society of being “too 
political.”  Civil society actors, however, argue the contrary. As Suba Churchil, president at the 
Civil Society Reference Group (CS-RG), has explained, civil society actors have learned from 
experience that if they do not assume an active role in the political processes that determine who 
takes political offices, they might end up with a leadership that wants to revoke their rights to 
freely operate.43 The roots of the current antagonistic relationship between the government and 
the civil society can be traced back to the disputed 2007 presidential election and the ethnic and 
political violence that followed. Odhiambo (2017: 11) states that the legacy of the 2007/8 political 
crisis defines the contemporary relationship between civil society and the Kenyan government. 
On the Polity IV scale, Kenya’s Polity2 scores dropped from 8 to 7 in 2007. The “vilification of 
CSOs” can be traced to their active involvement in documenting the human rights violations 
during the political crisis (Odhiambo, 2017: 11). Furthermore, their role in the subsequent 
developments, especially in the calls for accountability for the atrocities perpetrated such as the 
ICC proceedings, explain why the regime treats the civil society as its enemy. Government 
officials often use phrases such as “the evil society” to refer to the civil society in Kenya, and they 
often argue that they are tools of Western forces because they depend on foreign funding. The 
statement made by the Deputy President, William Ruto, in 2011, captures the dynamics of the 
state-civil society relationship in Kenya. He said, “NGOs should stop interfering with government 
                                                          
42 In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
43 In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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matters, writing letters to their donors abroad to support the ICC intervention and compiling 
reports about post-election violence. It is none of their business” (Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
The civic space in Kenya has considerably shrunk after Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto took 
office in 2013. The two campaigned for and won the March 2013 presidential election on a joint 
Jubilee Coalition ticket.44 By presenting the case of Kenya along with the cases of Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Cambodia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Turkey, and Thailand to showcase a trend in the 
increase of a crackdown on the civil society, CIVICUS (2015: 78) states, “[T]he main agency that 
is worsening conditions, in these states, is the state.” Kenyatta and Ruto assumed office while 
being persecuted at the ICC (on two separate, though related, cases) on charges of crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed during the 2007/8 political crisis. Kenyatta had been charged with 
five counts of crimes against humanity, including murder, forcible transfer of population, rape, 
persecution, and other inhumane acts. Ruto, on the other hand, was charged with murder, 
forcible transfer of the population, and persecution. There were three counts of crimes against 
humanity in total.   
Both of these high-profile cases were later dropped, much to the dismay of many who hoped 
that the ICC’s involvement would address the entrenched culture of impunity in Kenya. 
Insufficient evidence due to lack of co-operation from the Kenyan authorities in providing the 
information needed to examine the extent of his involvement, among other factors, led to the 
withdrawal of the case against the President in December 2014. The charges against William Ruto 
and his co-defendant, Joshua Arap Sang, were similarly vacated in April 2016 for lack of evidence. 
Witness tampering was reported in both cases. Alleged intimidation and the use of bribes to 
force witnesses to change their testimonies, or withdraw from being witnesses altogether, were 
reported. Furthermore, the government has been accused of ignoring the harassment of, and the 
threats against, human rights activists and journalists who were perceived to be in cooperation 
with the ICC process.   
                                                          
44 The Jubilee Coalition was created by the coming together of four political parties - the National Alliance, the 
United Republican Party, the National Rainbow Coalition, and the Republican Congress Party. 
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4.2.1 The political crises and the ICC’s involvement  
Deep-seated issues involving access to land and other resources, and the history of violence, 
accompanied by the culture of impunity, are often used to explain the roots of the 2007/8 political 
crisis.45 Ndungu Wainaina, executive director at the International Center for Policy and Conflict 
(ICPC), explained how the elite often try to manipulate these structural grievances to advance 
political ends.46 The immediate trigger of the crisis, however, was the alleged rigging of the 
December 2007 presidential election. Following the announcement of his re-election by the 
Electoral Commission of Kenya, the then-incumbent Mwai Kibaki was sworn in the very same 
day, a move that led the supporters of the opposition candidate, Raila Odinga, to start protesting 
the results by accusing the government of rigging the election. This was followed by extrajudicial 
killings by the security forces and ethnic-based attacks and reprisals from both sides of the political 
divide. While political violence has long been part of the electoral processes, the 2007/8 political 
crisis “was by far the [deadliest] and the most destructive violence ever experienced in Kenya” 
(Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, 2008: VII). 
After conducting 200 interviews with various stakeholders in January and February 2018, HRW 
identified the different patterns of violence during the political crisis (Human Rights Watch, 
2008b). First, there were extrajudicial killings by the state security forces, who used live 
ammunition against unarmed demonstrators and bystanders. The security forces were also 
accused of inaction to stop the commission of various human rights violations by the public. The 
second pattern of violence identified involves the organization of ethnic-based attacks and 
reprisals, otherwise called “revenge attacks.” Opposition supporters attacked ethnic Kikuyus and 
others who they assumed to have voted for the Party of National Unity (PNU), the incumbent 
Mwai Kibaki’s party. The Kikuyus are the largest ethnic group in Kenya to which Mwai Kibaki 
belongs to. Violence of this kind was largely planned and organized by local representatives of the 
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), the then-opposition leader Raila Odinga’s party. This 
                                                          
45 In an attempt to give explanation to how and why violence has become a way of life in Kenya, CIPEV (2008: 21-
36) lists four underlying factors. These are: the deliberate institutionalization of violence as a means to political 
power; the growing personalization of presidential power and the deliberate weakening of public institutions; 
historical injustices revolving around access to land and other resources; and the prevalence of poor and unemployed 
youth ready to join militias and organized gangs. 
46 In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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was followed by reprisal attacks by a Kikuyu militia known as Mungiki on non-Kikuyus who were 
perceived to be the supporters of the opposition. Violence of this kind was largely planned and 
organized by local representatives of the PNU. The political and ethnic violence was accompanied 
by sexual violence against both women and men. The sexual violence involved rape (gang and 
individual) and genital mutilation, most of which was ethnically driven. Hundreds of victims still 
suffer from the physical, psychological, and social repercussions of the sexual violence that they 
experienced during the political crises. While the government had announced a fund aimed at 
providing restorative justice for the victims of the violence in March 2015, this has not been made 
available. 
The National Accord, which established a coalition government between the PNU and the ODM, 
was signed on 28 February 2008, facilitated by the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, a group 
of mediators designated by the AU and led by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. In 
the coalition government, Mwai Kibaki remained as the President, while Raila Odinga took the 
newly established office of the Prime Minister. Another important outcome of the negotiations, 
specifically the agreement signed on 4 March 2008, known as Agenda Item 4, is the establishment 
of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), also known as the Waki 
Commission, as it was chaired by the Hon. Mr. Justice Philip N. Waki, a judge of Kenya’s Court 
of Appeals. The Commission was mandated to investigate into “the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the violence, the conduct of state security agencies in their handling of it, and to 
make recommendations concerning these and other matters” (Commission of Inquiry into Post-
Election Violence, 2008: VII).  
In its 529-page report that appeared in October 2008, the Commission reported the death of 
1,133 people (between 27 December 2007 and 29 February 2008), of which 405 were shot dead 
by the police. The report also documented 117,216 cases of property destruction and 3,561 
injury cases. As a recommendation, the report proposed the establishment of a Special Tribunal 
(the Special Tribunal for Kenya) to prosecute the individuals most responsible for the violence. 
The report detailed procedures to be followed for the establishment of the suggested Special 
Tribunal with a timeline. However, if the Special Tribunal fails to commence functioning as 
envisioned, the report included a self-triggering mechanism whereby the matter would be 
referred to the ICC. It suggested that a list containing the names of those suspected to be the 
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most responsible for the atrocities perpetrated be forwarded to the Special Prosecutor of the 
ICC (Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, 2008: 473). While the coalition 
government agreed to the establishment of the suggested Special Tribunal, this failed to 
materialize in the stated timeline. Following the failure of the bills that were taken to the 
Parliament for this purpose, a sealed envelope with a list of the most responsible suspects was 
handed to the ICC in July 2009. Then, an official investigation by the ICC was launched in March 
2010. On 8 March 2011, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II summoned six individuals, in two separate 
cases, to appear before the Court. The conditions of these summons remained throughout the 
duration of the proceedings. Unlike arrest warrants that impose obligation on authorities of state 
parties to arrest individual suspects, summons by the ICC impose obligation on the individuals to 
appear in court.  
In the case concerning the opposition supporters’ actions against the supporters of the 
government, William Ruto, Henry Kosgey, and Joshua Sang were charged with three counts of 
crimes against humanity, while in the case concerning the government supporters’ action against 
the opposition, Francis Muthaura, Uhuru Kenyatta, and Mohammed Ali were charged with five 
counts of crimes against humanity. After the suspects’ voluntary appearance at the initial hearing 
and the confirmation of charges hearings, in April and September 2011, respectively, the charges 
against Henry Kosgay and Mohammed Hussein Ali were declined. And the charges against Francis 
Muthaura, Uhuru Keynyatta, William Ruto, and Joshua Arap Sang were confirmed. The incumbent 
President, Uhuru Kenyatta, and his Deputy, William Ruto, who came to power in 2013 after 
campaigning on a joint ticket, were on different sides of the political divide during the 2007/8 
political crisis. At the time of the summons to appear, Kenyatta was Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Finance from Mwai Kibaki’s side, while Ruto was a Minister of Higher Education, 
Science, and Technology, and a Member of Parliament representing ODM. 
The ICC is an international tribunal for individuals charged with grave crimes such as genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crime of aggression.47 The ICC sits in the Hague, 
Netherlands and was founded to address the global impunity crisis. A judicial process that is out 
of reach to leaders, who often find ways to avoid domestic persecution, serves as a last resort 
                                                          
47 See at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/about  
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for victims and survivors of human rights violations. The Rome Statute, a treaty adopted in July 
1998 to establish the Court, came into force in July 2002, and the ICC has been operational ever 
since. By becoming party to the Rome Statute, States become a member of the ICC. At present, 
there are 123 member states, including Kenya, which ratified the Rome Statute in 2005. The ICC 
only steps in when national authorities are either unwilling or unable to prosecute individual 
criminals. The Court prosecutes individuals referred to it by a state party that the investigation 
concerns (where the suspected individuals are citizens of a state party or the crimes of concern 
are committed with in the territories of a state party), or if the UNSC refers the case. The Kenyan 
cases are the first ones in the history of the ICC in which the ICC prosecutor took the initiative 
to submit an application to the Court requesting authorization to start a formal investigation. All 
precedent cases were either referred by a state party or by the UNSC.  
4.2.2 Connecting the dots   
Civil society was quite instrumental in the mediation process that ended the 2007/8 political crisis. 
Had it not been for the pressure, especially from the vibrant local CSOs, “Kenya would have 
gone to the dogs, said George Morara, deputy chair at the Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights (KNCHR).48 He believes that if it were not for the role of civil society actors, Kenya would 
not have had the Panel of Eminent African Personalities to mediate the power-sharing. He said, 
“They played a big role in putting pressure on the political belligerents to come and sit at the 
table.” Here, the role of the Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ) is a case in point. 
Right after the violence broke, 30-plus legal, human rights, and governance organizations 
mobilized into what has become the KPTJ, which began its operation by documenting the violence 
to conduct evidence-based, and robust international and regional advocacy. 
According to Njonjo Mue, senior advisor at the KPTJ, “the international media was presenting 
the violence as just another case of African ethnic bloodletting,” and “the government at the time 
was presenting the crisis as a minor blip, which they were perfectly able to handle.”49 KPTJ’s 
contribution was paramount in at least two regards. First, it made the case that the violence was 
not just an ethnic conflict but rather a political crisis that had acquired ethnic proportions. Second, 
                                                          
48 In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
49 In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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it underscored to the international community that the political crisis needed intervention. In 
addition to reaching out to the diplomatic community in Narobi, Kenya, the KPTJ undertook 
regional and international advocacy to lobby international organizations and individual 
governments with leverage to effect change. “We went to Addis Ababa, London, Brussels, New 
York, and Washington D.C. trying to mobilize international public opinion, […] and that paid 
off,” said Njonjo Mue. The KPTJ was able to have a meaningful impact because it capitalized on 
its members’ thematic competence. Samwel Mohochi, executive director at the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ-Kenya) said, “some are good in documenting and others in advocacy, 
and we also have institutions that are good at service delivery.”50 
Mike Gachanja, deputy director at the Center for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW), 
emphasized the civil society’s role in documenting the various rights abuses during the political 
crisis. He said, “Most of the evidence used by the ICC was based on civil society research.”51 The 
documentation also helped the ICC in locating key witnesses and survivors of the political crisis. 
“We were able to share our documentation with the ICC, and the research we did on sexual 
violence during the crisis informed one of the chapters of the Commission’s [Waki] report,” said 
Mike Gachanja with regards to the contribution his organization made. In a nutshell, the 
documentation enabled the different actors who wanted to address the situation to gain a better 
understanding of the context and the extent of the political crisis, he added. Similarly, Teresa 
Omondi, executive director at the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA-Kenya), stated that her 
organization, which provides legal aid to women, has also informed the sexual violence chapter 
of the Waki Commission’s report.52 Henry Maina, on the other hand, talked about the advocacy 
that was done outside of the public domain. Attempts were made to advise the embassies of 
foreign governments on ways of influencing the situation. He mentioned few cases of deportation 
based on the information provided by the civil society actors about the whereabouts of the family 
members of the influential individuals from both sides of the political divide.  
                                                          
50 In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
51 In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
52 In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Page | 74 
 
“Absolutely,”53 “of course,”54 “definitely,”55 and “exactly”56 were some of the responses given to 
the question about the causality or the existence of a direct link between the pressure applied to 
target actors during the 2007/8 political crisis and the relentless attempt to effectively 
institutionalize rule by law. According to George Morara: 
 There is no way that we can distinguish the active role of these organizations in trying 
to seek international accountability to local crimes with the hostility that they are 
experiencing now. There is a direct link. It is not even a matter of speculation. 
He then explained how the Kenyan government is not even on friendly terms with his 
organization, the KNCHR. The KNCHR is a national human rights institution established in 2010 
in line with the Paris Principles. He added, “They say it is a bad Commission because we had 
worked closely with the victims of the 2007/8 violence to compile a report that the ICC made a 
lot of reference to.”  
Njonjo Mue believes that, had it not been for the intervention and commitment of civil society 
actors, the efforts to deal with the 2007/8 political crisis would have ended the way the others 
before it had. The perpetrators of the human rights violations during the 1992 and 1997 political 
violence were not persecuted for their crimes. As Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election 
Violence (2008: 16) explains, a culture of impunity has become “the order of the day in Kenya.” 
“A commission comes and makes some sort of report; after a couple of months, it is forgotten 
and life moves on,” said Njonjo Mue. Civil society’s role in the inclusion of what is referred to as 
Agenda Item 4 as one of the four main agendas in the National Accord is often hailed as 
paramount. Otsieno Namwaya has stated that the first three agendas were the only ones that 
the negotiating parities were interested in incorporating in the Accord. He said, “it is the 
collaboration of international and local human rights organizations that forced Agenda 4 on the 
table.”  
                                                          
53 Njonjo Mue, Op. Cit., and George Morara, Op. Cit. 
54 Ndungu Wainaina, Op. Cit. 
55 George Kegoro, Op. Cit., and Felix Kyalo, Op. Cit. 
56 Suba Churchil, Op. Cit.  
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Agenda Items 1, 2, and 3 concerned ending the political crisis. Agenda Item 4, on the other hand, 
tried to address the underlying causes of the political crisis, including the impunity problem and 
issues related to historical injustices. Additionally, as already stated, the Waki Commission is one 
of the outcomes of Agenda Item 4. In addition to the above-discussed role in informing its report, 
civil society was directly involved in the works of the Commission to the extent of providing 
secretarial support. The Secretary of the Commission, and one of the interview subjects of this 
study, George Kigaro, had to take a leave of absence from ICJ-Kenya, the organization he worked 
for at the time, to serve in the Commission. As Njonjo Mue explained, once the Commission 
was established, the civil society made sure that it was filled with “people who were interested 
in justice as opposed to people who were looking for an opportunity for a three-month-long 
contract.” When it became clear that the Special Tribunal would not be formed, the civil society 
“kept the ball going towards the ICC.” He then explained the civil society’s involvement in the 
ICC process, and how this ultimately made the sector a target of retribution by the people who 
were being prosecuted by the Court. He said:  
We supported the ICC. We helped with the analysis and protected some witnesses before 
the ICC process kicked in with witness protection. We did a lot of advocacy in the 
international forums from the AU to the UNSC. In doing so, we developed very powerful 
enemies, especially the ones that joined forces and ran for the presidency.  
Similarly, Suba Churchil stated, “We have no apologies to make. It is true that we secured 
witnesses that we thought were at risk. We relocated them and placed them in safe homes.” 
Kenyatta and Ruto’s Presidential campaign in 2013 was heavily focused on the ICC process, or, 
in the words of Kenyatta, the “nightmare” (BBC, 2016). They often referred to the Court as a 
tool of Western imperialism aimed at compromising Kenya’s sovereignty. Over the course of the 
proceedings, there had been reports of intimidation, harassment, and threats towards human 
rights defenders in general and people who were perceived to be in cooperation with the ICC in 
particular. In fact, they explicitly hinted during the campaign that they would crack down on the 
civil society if given the opportunity to assume political office. The manifesto of the Jubilee 
Coalition titled Transforming Kenya: Securing Kenya’s Prosperity (2013- 2017), which was released 
ahead of the March 2013 election, stated that if elected, the Coalition government would:   
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Introduce a Charities Act to regulate political campaigning by NGOs, to ensure that they 
only campaign on issues that promote their core remit and do not engage in party politics. 
This will also establish full transparency in funding both for NGOs and individual projects 
(The Coalition, 2013: 65).  
Furthermore, the manifesto, which is structured along three pillars – unity (umoja), economy 
(uchumi), and openness (uwazi), vowed to create a “Charities Agency” that would address the 
budgetary allocation of the NGO sector. This explains the persistent attempts to amend the PBO 
Act of 2013, which has not yet become operational despite court rulings that call for its 
commencement. Civil society actors were actively involved in an umbrella network titled the 
Civil Society Reference Group (CS-RG) in drafting the Act.57 It thus has various provisions that 
would improve the civic space when and if it is implemented. The PBO Act was signed into law 
in January 2013 by the then President - Mwai Kibaki. Implementation was, however, delayed due 
to the March 2013 election that brought the incumbent President and his Deputy. The two have 
“a bile against the civil society actors,” whom they accuse of having taken them to the ICC, said 
George Morara. Hence, when they came to power, they started their relentless attempts to 
amend the PBO Act rather than giving it a commencement date. As George Morara explains:  
The former president left a very good framework for moving the relationship between the 
NGOs and the government to a much better and more productive space. The current 
government has actually ensured that they roll back. They have never operationalized the 
Act even when the court told them to operationalize. They ignored the court blatantly. 
[…] If that Act is operationalized, it will bring about an element of mutual collaboration. 
The government doesn’t want mutual collaboration between itself and the NGO sector. 
What the government wants is to crush the NGO sector. 
There had been several attempts by the Jubilee government to amend the PBO Act. Had these 
attempted amendments passed as law, the proposed limit on foreign funding of up to 15%, for 
                                                          
57 CS-RG was established in 2009, and it brings together a diverse array of CSOs both in orientation and level of 
operation. It currently has 212 Kenya based member organizations that work on issues ranging from humanitarian 
and human rights to development on community, national, regional and international levels. As stated in its current 
5-year strategic plan (2016-2020) and as explained by its President, Suba Churchil, in an interview for this study, the 
Group aims at advocating for an enabling policy and legal environment for the civil society; promote mutual 
protection and self-regulation; and provide different trainings aimed at capacity building of its member organizations.  
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one, would have had the same devastating impact on domestic CSOs as in Ethiopia. George 
Morara referred to the suggestion on the funding restriction as “self-imposed sanction” in a state 
where many people are the direct beneficiaries of the NGO sector. “The same government that 
is heavily reliant on foreign borrowing is going for the peanuts of a sector that is holding it to 
account,” he added. Furthermore, the suggested expansion of the government’s control would 
have incapacitated the sector by putting it under direct government surveillance. According to 
one unpublished report by the Fund for Global Human Rights, quoted in Herbert (2015), while 
the actions of CSOs (including demonstrations, campaigns, and lobbying) have thus far been 
successful in opposing the attempts to amend the PBO Act, “it is clear that both legislative and 
non-legislative attempts to close space will continue moving forward.” This sentiment is also 
shared by CIVICUS (2015: 89), which states that, given the government’s track record, the fear 
remains that future attempts would be made to introduce such amendments. Furthermore, the 
fact that the Jubilee party has the majority in the current Parliament increases its legislative 
powers, which it can misuse against “entities that it doesn’t like,” said George Kegoro, executive 
director at the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC).58 
In the words of Otsieno Namwaya, “if they manage to pass the amendments, it will affect all of 
us, both domestic and international organizations.” He believes that consequences from the 
connotation of a “foreign agent” on the status of organizations receiving more than 15% of their 
funding from foreign sources would be devastating. “CSOs that would be classified as such might 
be barred from working on governance-related issues,” as has happened in Ethiopia, he added. 
He further stated how easy it would be to tailor assaults directly to those who are viewed as 
threats once they are identified and labeled. He too believes that the government has not given 
up. He said, “They will try to make some attempts again at trying to introduce new legislations 
and intensify the administrative measures to clampdown on the CSOs”. 
According to CIVICUS “even when they fail to pass into law, these attempts exert a chilling effect 
and encourage a climate of self-censorship” (2015: 89). Furthermore, the government can still 
use administrative predicaments to make the civic space inhabitable, to say the least. Due to 
various legal and administrative bottlenecks put in place by the government, CSOs in Kenya face 
                                                          
58 In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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de-registration and freezing of assets. Many interview subjects explained how state institutions 
are used to perpetrate the crackdown on the civic space. According to Njonjo Mue, “there is an 
instrumentalization of institutions that should have been independent.” Similarly, Mike Gachanja 
stated that the government is on a “witch hunt” against CSOs that work on human rights and 
governance-related issues. These assaults are often executed by the NGO Coordination Board, 
a government body responsible to regulate the NGO sector.  
The Board uses state institutions, such as the Kenyan Revenue Authority and the security forces, 
to justify the assaults that range from raiding premises and confiscating documents to de-
registration of CSOs with accusations of tax evasion, support for terrorism, and so on. In 
December 2014 alone, the Board de-registered more than 500 organizations, froze their assets, 
and revoked the work permits of their foreign employees (Onyango, 2015). By using the Security 
Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014, which was signed into law by the President a few days earlier, 
the Board accused some organizations of having links with terrorist groups. The rest were 
accused of failing to submit financial records and other acts. The affected organizations took the 
matter to the High Court of Kenya claiming that the action was unconstitutional. As a result, 179 
CSOs got reinstated in January 2015 (Herbert, 2015).  
Soy Cherutoh Mercy, legal officer at the NGO Coordination Board, on the contrary, stated that 
the Board only operates with in its mandate that it derives not just from the NGO Coordination 
Act of 1990, which established the Board, but also from what she referred to as “the terms and 
conditions.”59 This is a document that highlights the requirements that need to be fulfilled by 
NGOs for registration. She said, “We need to make sure that organizations are in compliance 
with the Act and the terms and conditions” and stressed the need to regulate the sector to 
restrict “regulatory mischiefs.” She stated that failing to file an annual report is the most common 
offence that the Board often finds, which it punishes with measures that may amount to 
suspension or de-registration. Here, an excerpt from the interview with Felix Kyalo helps counter 
her statement. Kyalo explained how the Board stepped beyond its mandate in dealing with his 
organization, the IDLO, an intergovernmental organization that works to promote the rule of 
law. He said: 
                                                          
59 In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Page | 79 
 
Intergovernmental organizations are registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not 
with the NGO Board. But the NGO Board, on a letter sent to the media instead of our 
office, said that the Ministry cancelled our country agreement and we no longer have a 
legal status to operate in the country unless we register with them. There is no legal way 
that an intergovernmental organization would register under an NGO regime. This is just 
an illustration of how the government misuses [the system] to target organizations it 
believes are not supportive of its agenda.  
Another example of the Board overstepping its mandate is the 15 August 2017 de-registration of 
the Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG) over claims that it was operating illegally. 
AfriCOG is not registered under the NGO Coordination Act of 1990, hence, it is not 
administered by the Board. It is registered under the Companies Act as a Company Limited by 
Guarantee.60 In a letter addressed to the Directorate of Criminal Investigation, the Board asked 
for the immediate closure of the organization until it acquires a certificate of registration and the 
arrest of its directors. Furthermore, the Board asked the Central Bank of Kenya to freeze the 
accounts of AfriCOG. This came a day after the Board’s second attempt to de-register the KHRC. 
Eventually, the judiciary overruled the de-registration of both organizations.    
To conclude, examining the regulatory crackdown is important to clearly comprehend the 
unintended negative outcome of the pressure applied to target actors during the 2007/8 political 
crisis. The PBO amendments, the Security Laws (Amendment) Act, the Kenya Information and 
Communication (Amendment) Act, and the Media Council Act infringe upon human rights across 
the board. Violations of rights such as the habeas corpus rights of the detained; freedom of 
expression, association, and assembly; and the rights to privacy are some of the major rights 
under threat. Moreover, the government also practices inaction to systematically crack down on 
the civic space, forgoing its responsibility to provide protection for civil society actors. The 
government is often accused of continually ignoring, and at times encouraging, threat, 
intimidation, and attack of human rights defenders and journalists who were perceived to have 
supported the ICC investigation. According to Freedom House (2016), in Kenya, “journalists are 
                                                          
60 There are various legal regimes for the registry of CSOs in Kenya. To mention some, NGOs are registered under 
the NGO Coordination Act, Companies Limited by Guarantee are registered under the Companies Act, Societies 
are registered under the Societies Act, and Trusts are registered under the Trustees (Perpetual Succession) Act.  
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routinely beaten, intimidated, and threatened by both state and non-state actors, and at least 19 
cases were reported in the first half of 2015 alone.” Hate campaigns on social media by 
government supporters targeted individuals and CSOs who advocated for international 
accountability mechanisms. It was a deliberate use of state machinery to expose those who stood 
firm against the atrocities of the 2007/8 political crisis. The circulation of their identities on social 
media endangered their lives, and the “attack continues to follow them to date,” said George 
Morara. 
4.3 Contrasts in an otherwise similar trend  
There are some variations in the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya, which otherwise follow a similar 
trend. In contrast to the situation in Ethiopia, where there is no practical separation of power 
between the three branches of government, the judicial branch in Kenya is fairly independent. It 
has continued to overrule the attempts by the executive branch to shrink the civic space. Here, 
the Supreme Court’s ruling to nullify the results of the August 2017 presidential election on 
grounds of electoral irregularities is worth noting. This decision is the first of its kind in the 
African continent that has set a precedent for a judiciary acting independently, as it should, not 
just in Kenya and Africa but worldwide. In neighboring Ethiopia, however, all three branches of 
government are controlled by the ruling EPRDF coalition. 
Ethiopia follows a parliamentarian state structure in which the party with the majority of the seats 
in the legislature forms the executive branch. The EPRDF claimed to have won 100% of the seats 
in the legislature in the last 2015 national elections, and there is thus not even a single member 
of an opposition political party in the legislature. It would be implausible to expect an executive 
and a judiciary formed from such a legislature to have an independent standing. The legislature 
often endorses the Prime Minister’s recommendations for the positions of the President and Vice 
President of the Federal Supreme Court. Unlike Ethiopia, where the executive branch has a 
significant say in the appointment of judges, Kenya has experimented with a merit-based system 
after the promulgation of its 2010 Constitution. The President appoints the Chief Justice and 
Deputy Chief Justice from the candidates recommended by the Judicial Service Commission. The 
fact that this process is transparent significantly limits the executive’s influence over the judiciary. 
As explained by Henry Maina, what differentiates Kenya from Ethiopia are the checks and balances 
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inherent in the state structure, “a luxury that Ethiopia does not have,” he said. Similarly, Abdul 
Noormohamed, program officer at Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa, has said:  
The good thing is that, at least in Kenya, we still have a functioning judiciary. It is not the 
best in the world, but it functions. People can go to the court and say, this is a bad law, 
and it goes against our Constitution, and there are judges who would listen to that. […] 
It could be a lot worse. We could be in places where people do not have this opportunity 
at all.61  
As Jon Abbinik puts it, the Kenyan political system is more open than the one in Ethiopia. 
International Human Rights Worker 2 made a similar statement, noting, “there are many voices 
still speaking out [in Kenya], which is sadly not the case in Ethiopia.” This sentiment is also shared 
by the individuals interviewed from state agencies. For instance, Joash Dache, secretary/chief legal 
officer at the Kenya Law Reform Commission (KLRC) 62 affirmed that “Kenya’s civil society still 
has a strong voice, compared to other places.” 63  
Another contrast voiced by many interview subjects is the trust the civil society sectors in 
Ethiopia and Kenya have for their respective National Human Rights Institutions. KNCHR 
commands legitimacy in the eyes of the public and is viewed as a credible partner by the actors 
in the civic space. This, however, is not the case with its counterpart in Ethiopia – the Ethiopian 
Human Rights Commission (EHRC), which is often accused of being affiliated with the 
government. The EHRC was established in July 2002 to protect, monitor, and promote human 
rights in Ethiopia. The public does not have a trust in the EHRC as an independent promoter and 
protector of human rights. George Morara, said that the independence of the KNCHR in Kenya 
comes from the rigorous and merit based appointment process of its commissioners. The process 
is open to public scrutiny, and there are constitutional safeguards in place for the proper 
functioning of the Commission. Unlike the Standing Committee, the predecessor of the KNCHR, 
whose leadership was directly appointed by the President, “our loyalty lies to the Constitution 
                                                          
61 In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
62 KLRC is a state agency that was established in 2013 with the mandate of reviewing the laws of Kenya to ensure 
their compatibility with the Constitution.  
63 In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
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of Kenya,” he added. The KNCHR was established in 2010 by Article 59 of the Constitution of 
Kenya.  
As the discussion in this chapter established an association between the causal condition and the 
outcome by connecting the dots between transnational human rights pressure at critical political 
junctures and the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior, 
the next proceeds to present the two parts of the mechanism that causally link the two.  
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Chapter 5 
The Mechanism at Work  
This chapter presents the mechanism that causally connects the transnational human rights 
pressure at identified critical political junctures and the unintended negative outcome of 
authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior in the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya. Through a 
mechanism with two parts, the pressure transnational human rights advocacy networks applied 
to target actors (target states and donors) during the 2005 and 2007/8 political crises in Ethiopia 
and Kenya, respectively, contributed to a relentless attempt to effectively institutionalize rule by 
law. Part 1 of the mechanism is called counter-discourse and quiet diplomacy (taking place in 
conjunction), and Part 2 is named regulatory crackdown. A detailed analysis of the observable 
implications of these parts in the two cases is presented in the following. Each part concludes 
with some reflective analysis.   
5.1 Counter-discourse and quiet diplomacy (Part 1) 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the target states responded by constructing counter-discourse while 
donors responded by engaging in quiet diplomacy. These two processes, which constitute part 1 
of the mechanism, make the claim that the relationship between transnational human rights 
pressure at the identified critical political junctures and the unintended negative outcome of 
authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior in the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya is causal. The 
counter-discourse by these states tries to discredit the credibility of transnational human rights 
advocacy networks and question their intentions. The target states frame human rights criticisms 
as a political attack disguised as human rights concerns. Furthermore, the counter-discourse aims 
to legitimize subsequent legalized actions that are often accompanied by administrative 
predicaments. This process takes place in conjunction with donors’ lowered sensitivity to use 
their leverage in pushing the target states to comply with international human rights norms. 
Donors often refuse to condition development assistance to the target states pending on the 
improvement of human rights practices. They do not threaten to withhold or suspend aid, or to 
sever diplomatic relations. Donors prefer to practice quiet diplomacy. Instead of taking the 
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aforesaid measures, they say, they prefer to raise human rights concerns in the political dialogues 
they undertake with the target states outside of the public domain. 
5.1.1 The counter-discourse  
As explained in Chapter 2, contemporary authoritarian states use legitimizing discourse to sustain 
their rule in the international system. They often do so, when and if needed, to impede human 
rights and democracy. The counter-discourses of Ethiopia and Kenya accuse transnational human 
rights advocacy networks of using human rights criticisms as a pretext to propagate their 
clandestine political agendas and tarnish their reputation. Members of transnational human rights 
advocacy networks, both international and domestic, are portrayed as agents of neo-colonialism 
and/or neo-liberalism. This line of reasoning also has proponents in scholarly debates, especially 
among scholars who use analytical frameworks inspired by Marxist thought (see Petras & 
Veltmeyer, 2001).  
According to Petras “NGOs foster a new type of cultural and economic colonialism” (1999: 434). 
Nasir (2014) has argued that this is not a new phenomenon and has in fact always been the case: 
“NGOs have always been a continuation of imperial power, being created and staffed with 
colonial administrators in the wake of countries winning their independence.” NGOs’ allegiance 
to neo-liberal establishments and foreign funding makes them nothing more than agents that 
facilitate the exploitative integration of the developing world to the neo-liberalist macro-
economic order (Petras, 1999). Their goal is to distract the masses from pursuing the "big 
picture," that is, the struggle to control the basic means of production and wealth (1999: 436). 
This defeats the purpose of promoting the essential organizational culture needed for democracy 
to flourish (Wallace, 2009: 203). Such discourse often groups different types of NGOs together, 
thus running the risk of conflating operation NGOs with advocacy NGOs. Operation NGOs 
mainly design and implement development-related projects, while advocacy NGOs try to advance 
certain causes in effecting policy changes in their favor. Furthermore, this discourse disregards 
the variation within each type. Advocacy-oriented international human rights NGOs vary with 
regards to membership, organization, and advocacy and fundraising strategies, at the very least. If 
we take the case of HRW and AI, for instance, even though both advance the same cause, they 
differ in organization: AI is a membership organization, while HRW is not.  
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This discourse is often invoked by states that are in the spotlight of international scrutiny for 
their poor human rights practices. In Ethiopia and Kenya, members of transnational human rights 
advocacy networks are accused of an ideologically driven vendetta and serving as political 
instruments of “foreign forces.” Government Communication Affairs Office (2010b) states that 
organizations such as HRW are the “paid domestic lackeys” of “diehard neoliberals” that aim at 
“micro-managing” the politics of African countries. The Ethiopian government already considers 
neo-liberalism to be a dead-end for Africa’s development (see Meles, 2006, 2012). This discourse 
is used to justify funding restrictions on domestic CSOs that are referred to as “the opposition 
in disguise” and “the evil society” in Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively. As Davinder Lamba, 
director at the Mazingira Institute, says, these states do not differentiate civil society from the 
opposition; rather, they see civil society as a political group operating in the civic space.64  Senior 
Official at the CSA said that that the only way to maintain Ethiopia’s peace and development is 
by avoiding reliance on foreign funding attached to policy prescriptions, especially on political 
issues. This discourse is codified in Ethiopia’s CSP as a justification for the imposition of funding 
restrictions on domestic CSOs that address rights-related advocacy. The Ethiopian government 
often argues that, by ordering Ethiopian Charities/Societies to generate 90% of their funds within 
the country, it aims to minimize foreign intervention in domestic affairs. Government 
Communication Affairs Office (2010b) states:  
[…] [T]he FDRE government has made any foreign-funded NGOs’ intervention in 
domestic politics illegal. This irrevocable decision has made it impossible for fanatical 
neoliberal groups such as Human Rights Watch to manipulate Ethiopia's political process. 
[…] [The] chance for backseat-driving Ethiopian politics through the NGOs that 
neoliberals bankroll has now been lost forever. 
The same is true for Kenya, where this discourse was in full force during the anti-ICC campaign. 
The government’s diplomatic campaign for a collective African withdrawal from the ICC was 
couched in this language. As discussed in Chapter 4, the anti-ICC campaign extended to whoever 
was thought to be in collaboration with the ICC, and domestic CSOs were the prime targets. 
Here, the proposals to limit domestic CSOs’ foreign funding to 15% in the attempted PBO 
                                                          
64 In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
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amendments is a case in point. According to Odhiambo (2017: 11), the question that needs to be 
answered is the following: “Why [do] the same governments receive funding from foreign 
governments for projects or as direct budget support?” Similarly, Human Rights Lawyer I, in 
reference to the CSP Proclamation in Ethiopia, mentioned how ironic it sounds for a state that 
overwhelmingly depends on foreign aid to expect domestic NGOs to raise 90% of their funds 
domestically, when it is known that the task is impossible. If it was possible, he argued, the 
government would have been self-reliant. If we are to take a lesson from these attempts to 
incapacitate the domestic CSOs in Ethiopia and Kenya, it is that CSOs’ advocacy is a threat to 
those in power, triggering the backlash against them (Odhiambo, 2017: 11). 
Both Ethiopia and Kenya have tried to factor in issues related to development and terrorism into 
their counter-discourse against transnational human rights advocacy networks. An unpublished 
report by the Fund for Global Human Rights, quoted in Herbert (2015: 11), states that recent 
discourse by the Kenyan government “has blamed NGOs for hindering development, insinuating 
that they have stolen money and exist only to criticize.” Portraying CSOs as anti-development is 
also the case in Ethiopia's counter-discourse. Another similar trend in both cases is the use of 
terrorism in the counter-discourse to justify legalized actions to systematically criminalize the 
actors in the civic space. Given the states’ history of terrorist attacks, it is true that terrorism is 
a legitimate national security threat to both Ethiopia and Kenya. However, the global revulsion 
of terror is exploited to perpetrate human rights abuses at home. Both use the terrorist label as 
a pretext to punish domestic dissent. Terrorism threats are often invoked to justify restrictions 
to the freedom of expression, association, and assembly. The restrictions are often framed as 
counter-terrorism strategies against the terrorist organizations, such as Al-Shabaab, in the region 
(Herbert, 2015: 11). 
5.1.1.1 Ethiopia’s counter-discourse  
While the EPRDF government alleges that all human rights criticisms promote defamation, 
including the US Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, its 
responses are particularly harsh to members of transnational human rights advocacy networks. 
These responses, mostly in forms of press statements, are exceedingly hardline, filled with 
categorical rejections and often border on name-calling. The government claims that it is the 
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victim of human rights criticisms due to its pursuance of a different development strategy other 
than the neo-liberal model (Government Communication Affairs Office, 2015). This refers to its 
current experiment with the developmental state model, to which it attributes its economic 
success. Ethiopia’s economy is one of the top-performing economies in Africa (see Chapter 6, 
section 6.2.2). Some, however, argue that the developmental state model is used as “a ‘buzzword’ 
to attain political ends in Ethiopia” (Routley, 2014).  
A developmental state is characterized by a strong public sector to facilitate speedy economic 
growth and the industrialization needed for development (Mkandawire, 2001). This leaves 
insignificant room for civil society to flourish; this model is “suspicious of the independence of 
civil society” (CIVICUS, 2015: 87-88). Political rights and civil liberties are often crushed as the 
model tries to champion economic growth by overlooking their relevance (Leftwich, 1995). 
Furthermore, they are often treated as luxuries that must be put on hold until after the much-
needed economic success is achieved. According to CIVICUS (2015: 88), 
[…] [T]he argument that democracy can be delayed until everyone has enough to eat 
may seem seductive, but the experience of China’s model suggests that democracy is 
something that repressive rulers endlessly seek to defer.  
While Ethiopia, like a few other African states such as Botswana and South Africa, claims to 
pursue a slightly different version, the democratic developmental state, the attainability of a fully 
functioning democratic developmental state is contentious (Gumede, 2009). This is a model that 
aims to avoid the pitfalls of both liberal democracy and the developmental state. Its coupling of 
economic development with some procedural components of democracy is being used as a major 
source of legitimacy by the EPRDF government (Bach, 2011). The government argues that, at 
least on rhetorical grounds, withholding democratic rights until a developmental takeoff point, as 
the East Asian developmental states did, would have a chilling effect (Government 
Communication Affairs Office, 2015).   
Given the various peculiarities of the developmental success in East Asian economies, some even 
doubt the possibility of replicating the developmental state model in the African context, let alone 
coupling it with functional democratic ideals (Musamba, 2010). The nature of the African states, 
which is usually characterized by neo-patrimonialism and incompetence in generating 
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developmental outcomes, is said to make it improbable to replicate the model in African context 
(Mkandawire 2001, 2010). Furthermore, the increasing liberalization of the global economy is 
thought to have a counter-productive impact (Wade, 2003). The model’s need for a state that is 
autonomous from societal pressure, or “semi-democratic” (Meles, 2012: 167), has led to its 
common association with authoritarianism. Nevertheless, given the model’s emphasis on social 
justice, its advocates underscore its particular suitability to transform the poor socio-economic 
realities of the Global South.  
Human Rights Lawyer 1 noted that a weak and subordinate civil society is "a good political 
strategy" as it creates the illusion of an open civic space: “They let you exist and make your 
existence miserable at the same time.” He then explained how Ethiopia uses the mere existence 
of domestic human rights NGOs as evidence to argue that it has not completely closed the civic 
space. Here, the practice of domesticating foreign funds is a case in point. As of the past few 
years, the EPRDF government has started signing bilateral agreements with some donors to 
consider the aid they give to domestic CSOs as part of the 90% of the funding that they are 
required to raise domestically. The EU's Civil Society Fund is an example. Moreover, the EHRC 
has channeled funds to some domestic CSOs through an initiative called the Democratic 
Institutions Program (Sisay, 2012: 381). According to Human Rights Lawyer1, besides ensuring 
that the civil society does not completely vanish, this arrangement gives the government the 
upper hand in dictating who receives what and how much. This involvement in the decision-
making process concerning the allocation of funds, he added, also benefits government-affiliated 
organizations that are often disguised as part of civil society. Domestic state funding, especially in 
authoritarian contexts, often leads to a loss of trust from the public, as CSOs are considered to 
be co-opted by the state. This is the rationale that led CIVICUS (2015: 156) to conclude, “in 
repressive contexts, domestic state support simply cannot be a viable option for change-seeking 
CSOs.” 
According to Former Senior Official at the EHRC, the developmental state model creates an 
environment in which institutions that base their work on liberally inspired ideals are 
discriminated against because they are considered to carry “the liberal West’s ideological 
baggage.” And this, he added, often leads to the establishment of restraining legal and 
administrative procedures. The EPRDF government believes that a neo-liberal state would not 
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be able to deliver much-needed socio-economic development in Ethiopia. According to 
Government Communication Affairs Office (2015), due to its excessive emphasis on first-
generation rights, a neo-liberal state would have a catastrophic outcome if applied in a state with 
a previously privileged social stratum with a considerable head start, as in Ethiopia. Hence, the 
“existential necessity” resonates with a strong developmental state that is “committed to end 
poverty as a precondition of full exercise of any named universal right” (2015: 19). For Negasso 
Gidada, this ideological stance, which often claims that the regime and its supporters are the only 
champions of development, has led to the dichotomized re-configuration of the Ethiopian society:  
There is the EPRDF and what they call forces of development such as the women and 
the youth that they have organized in leagues, the micro and small-scale enterprises, the 
filthy rich that are loyal to the regime, and so on. The remaining part of the society is 
what they often label with terms such as anti-development, rent-seekers, agents of the 
West, and so on. 
Except for rare occasions, the EPRDF government had been unresponsive to transnational human 
rights criticisms until recent years. It believed that it would be better off ignoring such “groundless 
fabrications” than engaging in “needless” controversies (Government Communication Affairs 
Office, 2009: 3). It views the reports of transnational human rights advocacy networks as an 
“obstructionist meddling in its internal affairs, often disguised as a right-protection intervention” 
(Government Communication Affairs Office, 2015: 30). Of course, it is not legally obliged to 
respond to such reports. Under international law, Ethiopia is only required to respond in the 
form of state reporting to the international and regional human rights treaty-monitoring bodies 
to which it is a party. A senior official at the EHRC, who wishes to remain anonymous, and who 
is referred to as Senior Official at the EHRC, stated that this emanates from the very premise of 
the international human rights law, which places the primary responsibility of human rights 
promotion and protection on state parties themselves. The response statements that the 
government seldom offers thus balance the information provided to the general public (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The EPRDF government views engaging in a normative debate with 
human rights organizations as “politically irrelevant,” said Jon Abbinik.  
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In recent years, however, the government has had a change of heart with the escalation in 
potential damages of the advocacy strategies employed by transnational human rights advocacy 
networks. It claims to have found it imperative to tell its side of the story to the “misinformed” 
global public and to defend itself against a “political campaign” against it (Government 
Communication Affairs Office, 2009). The state officials interviewed for the study, including 
Getachew Reda, acting Minister at the time of the interview of the Government Communications 
Affairs Office (GCAO), stated that keeping quiet in the face of the countless accusations of human 
rights abuses created the impression that the government is guilty of the claimed wrongs.65 It thus 
revoked its earlier stance and began issuing response statements, no matter how infrequent. 
Nevertheless, it still limits its responses to the reports of “selected few” (Government 
Communication Affairs Office, 2009: 3).  
In relative terms, the government seems to respond more to HRW’s reports than any other 
international human rights NGO with a similar mandate. This might be due to its utilization of 
potentially damaging advocacy strategies. HRW often reports on sensitive issues that range from 
elections-related human rights violations to the “political capture” of development aid and abuses 
by security forces. Besides GCAO, which was established in 2009 with one of its mandates being 
national image-building, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) also provides official responses. 
Moreover, the Ministry of Federal Affairs and some Ethiopian embassies in Western countries 
have also responded on several occasions. These responses are usually publicized by the state-
owned media outlets. The Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporate has aired several documentaries 
and press statements refuting cases of human rights violations over the years.  
The substance of the government’s response to all human rights criticisms is analogous; critiquing 
the methodology employed to investigate the reported violations seems to be the starting point. 
The government often claims that the reports are exclusively based on hearsay provided by 
opposition parties, terrorist organizations, and domestic and international NGOs with the 
apparent agenda of painting a disturbing portrait of the county’s state of affairs. Furthermore, the 
government frequently accuses all reports of one-sided reporting and of not incorporating its 
accounts into the accusations they document. Government Communication Affairs Office (2010a: 
                                                          
65 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
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7) has referred to this as an “elementary sense of fairness.” The government accuses all critiquing 
organizations of a “vitriolic campaign against Ethiopia” with “blanket allegations and downright 
lies” (Government Communication Affairs Office, 2010b). 
In addition to the counter-discourse, there were some contentious incidents between the 
government and international human rights NGOs. For instance, on 27 August 2011, AI’s 
delegation was ordered to leave the country amid an investigation, and two political oppositions 
with whom the delegation was in contact with were imprisoned on terrorism charges (Amnesty 
International, 2011b). Even though the government stated that the arrest of these men had 
nothing to do with their meeting with AI delegates, many, including AI itself, believe that the 
action could not simply be a coincidence. Merera Gudina, who was just pardoned at the time of 
writing after a yearlong detention on terrorism charges himself, said, “their only wrong was 
meeting with Al's delegates, nothing else.” As far as the domestic human rights NGOs are 
concerned, they are subjected to various forms of harassment, intimidation, and imprisonment, 
either arbitrary or legalized with laws that criminalize acts that can conventionally pass for human 
rights advocacy. 
Government Communication Affairs Office (2015) is the government’s most thorough response 
to the accusations of human rights violations voiced by what the text refers to as “overzealous 
international NGOs and think tanks.” This 166-page-long text provides a detailed response to 
the most frequent human rights criticisms, ranging from restrictive laws to development-related 
human rights abuses. With regards to research-informed and detailed responses on specific 
human rights abuse allegations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s (2008) 47-page-long response text 
provided for HRW’s (2008c) report stands out. The response was issued after an inquiry team 
conducted an on-sight investigation into the alleged violations documented in HRW's report. The 
team claimed to have uncovered several factual errors in HRW's report. Although the 
government has been categorically rejecting all reports, HRW’s (2010b) report, Development 
without Freedom: How Aid Underwrites Repression in Ethiopia, seems to have received strong 
momentum in its eyes. The press statement issued by MOFA following the report referred to it 
as an attempt to “blackmail the international community” through deception (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2010). Realizing the gravity of the accusation, the government rushed to discredit it via 
several channels, which included the Ethiopian embassies abroad issuing response statements in 
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their own right. Moreover, the government tried to vindicate itself by referring to DAG’s report, 
which contested the accusations.  
In spite of what seems to be a complete antagonism to allegations of human rights abuse, 
Ethiopia’s counter-discourse, on several occasions asserted that it is not aimed at denying its 
limitations concerning human rights promotion and protection. The argument is that, given the 
country’s status as an infant democracy, it is no surprise that shortcomings manifest in meeting 
global standards. Further, this should not make the whole system a failure but rather a work in 
progress. Government Communication Affairs Office (2015: 21) invokes the inclusion of the 
incumbent regime’s deeply rooted “undemocratic historical inheritance” and the country-specific 
contextual factors in any assessment of human rights progress, or the lack thereof, in Ethiopia. 
This refers to the country’s history with dictatorial and monarchical state structures with roots 
extending to the time of the ancient civilizations.  
5.1.1.2 Kenya’s counter-discourse  
Unlike Ethiopia, where the relentless attempt to effectively institutionalize rule by law in 
criminalizing or incapacitating the actors in the civic space appears to have succeeded, Kenya’s 
counter-discourse seems less successful in the practice of a categorical dismissal. As Njonjo Mue 
puts it,  
When domestic civil society is weak, and an international actor produces a critical report, 
it is easy to dismiss it as not being grounded in fact. But Kenya is different. We have a 
very vibrant civil society. When AI or HRW produce a report, it is usually backed by what 
the domestic human rights organizations have already been reporting on, making it 
difficult for the Kenyan government to categorically reject allegations as if that was the 
only report that talks about the issue.  
Concerning the substance of the responses, especially to international human rights NGOs, 
George Kegoro refers to them as the "blanketing" of all criticism with one approach: "the Kenyan 
government paints all external actors, whether governmental or non-governmental, with the 
same brush. It is the same Western, white, imperialist interest.” This "blanketing" of all actors as 
if they belong to one group at times extends to multinational corporations and international 
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organizations. Regarding a question on having a channel of communication to receive responses 
from the Kenyan government, Otsieno Namwaya, Kenya researcher at HRW, said, “If we have 
collaborated with a local actor, they prefer writing a response to a local than to us.” However, 
there were times that the government responded to HRW, he added. He recounted the case of 
a recent HRW report on the freedom of expression, saying, “They responded and we had 
discussed, but there was no follow up […] Everything they promised they would do, they never 
did.”  
In order to trace the counter-discourse that followed the transnational human rights pressure at 
the 2007/8 political crisis, we must factor in ICC’s involvement. As Zahid Rajan, executive editor 
at Awaaz Magazine, explains, the civil society was equated with the ICC, and “they were being 
demonized with the same amount of hatred.”66  The government often referred to the ICC with 
derogatory phrases such as “a toy of declining imperial powers” (Human Rights Watch, 2016). 
Besides using it as a justification for the retributory legalized and administrative actions against 
individuals and CSOs that supported the ICC, Kenya has also used this discourse to launch a 
diplomatic campaign against the ICC at intergovernmental platforms, such as the AU. Felix Kyalo 
explained how the government used its diplomatic power to discredit the ICC and the civil 
society: “They campaigned against what they refer to as ‘a web of evil society’ with a regime-
change agenda.” This rhetoric persists through the present.  
Before the collapse of the ICC cases, the Kenyan government made various failed attempts to 
halt the process. To mention a few, the Kenyan National Assembly voted to withdraw Kenya 
from being a state party to the Rome Statute in December 2010, an appeal was made to the 
UNSC in February 2011 to defer the trials, and an application was filed at the ICC's Pre-Trial 
Chamber II to stop the process on grounds of inadmissibility. Furthermore, the government 
campaigned at the AU to push for a collective withdrawal of the African members of the ICC. 
Although this failed to materialize, AU's extraordinary session on 12 October 2013 passed a 
resolution calling upon the ICC to suspend the cases of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto until 
they complete their terms of office and requested a grant of immunity for sitting heads of states 
from such prosecution in the future. Kenya has managed to be at the forefront of the counter-
                                                          
66 In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
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discourse against the ICC that painted the Court as “anti-African,” disproportionally targeting 
Africa and its leaders. It is true that the ICC cases so far have mainly focused on Africa, which 
created an opportunity for authoritarian African regimes to frame their resistance to the Court 
as part of a struggle between the West and the rest. But one must be reminded that African 
states constitute the largest share of the states that have ratified the Rome Statute. Furthermore, 
three of the African cases in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, 
and Uganda were referred to the Court by the states themselves.  
In a nutshell, the discourse about the ICC as an imperial project imposing its normative values on 
Kenya has had a trickledown effect on domestic human rights NGOs that are seen as proxies for 
transnational human rights initiatives. During their election campaign in 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta 
and William Ruto accused the civil society actors of betrayal by collaborating with a Court aimed 
at compromising Kenya’s national interest. They accused CSOs of serving the interest of their 
“neo-colonial masters” as they heavily depend on external funding. Samwel Mohochi described 
how the civil society's involvement in the ICC process brought the sector into direct conflict 
with the individuals who were being prosecuted at the Court. He said accusations such as "a 
foreign agent" and "puppets of foreign powers" that are aimed at delegitimizing their work, and 
the subsequent regulatory attempts to shrink the civic space show the "grudge" of the accused 
that happen to hold the highest office in government. He gave an example of a failed court case 
in which actors in the civic space contested the fitness of the two individuals running for the 
presidency while being accused of crimes against humanity. The case based its arguments on 
chapter six of the Constitution, which discusses leadership and integrity. The case was eventually 
dismissed on a technicality but remains pending in the Court of Appeal, as the two individuals 
have filed a bill of costs to be paid by the accusers. Mohochi said, "This shows the vengefulness 
of the individuals. Now that they are in government, they are using the government machinery 
to vilify those individuals and organizations" whom they accuse of taking them to the ICC.   
George Kegoro sounded pessimistic about the effectiveness of naming and shaming those in 
power in Kenya. Being put in the position of a pariah would not shame the President and his 
Deputy, he said. “They do not care because they have been there before. They can ride it again 
and use it for domestic support the way they have done it before,” he added. The fact that 
transnational human rights pressure is more effective in states that are concerned about their 
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international standing validates this point. Similarly, Peter Kiama, executive director at the 
Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU), stated how the President and his Deputy used 
international pressure to their advantage by framing it as an attack on the sovereignty of the state 
- a strategy that has worked "beautifully" for them.67 He said, “they rode on this rhetoric and 
assumed power.” They then consolidated their position and made sure the ICC process 
collapsed, he added. This situation leads Henry Maina to feel that Kenya follows in the footsteps 
of the other states in the region that seem not to worry about their international reputation: 
“Look at Burundi, look at Eritrea […] They do not care” about their international legitimacy and 
thus openly violate human rights.  
5.1.2 The quiet diplomacy  
Due to their ability to positively influence recipient states’ human rights policies and practices, by 
attaching the fulfillment of conditionality to improvements in human rights practices, 
traditional/Western donors have been the major target of transnational human rights pressure. 
This strategy of leverage politics is conventionally expected to be effective in states that are 
assumed to be vulnerable targets. As discussed in Chapter 2, leverage politics entails the practice 
of persuasion and pressuring influential governments or international/regional institutions to 
effect favorable policy change (Kick & Sikkink, 1998). However, this has failed to materialize in 
the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya, where human rights practices and donor support appear to exist 
at odds with each other. Donors show less sensitivity to the pressure placed on them by 
transnational human rights advocacy networks to use their leverage in pushing these target states 
to comply with international human rights norms. They often refuse to condition development 
assistance on the target states pending on the improvement of human rights practices. They do 
not threaten to withhold or suspend aid or to serve diplomatic relations over human rights 
violations. Donors prefer to practice quiet diplomacy, raising their human rights concerns in the 
private political dialogues that they undertake with the target states outside of the public domain.  
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5.1.2.1 Donors and Ethiopia  
According to Fantini and Puddu (2016: 91), Ethiopia, the “donor darling,” is a typical example of 
foreign aid’s adverse effect in sustaining authoritarianism. Transnational human rights advocacy 
networks often try to practice leverage politics by calling upon Ethiopia’s major donor 
governments and multilateral agencies. By doing so, they try to indirectly pressure the 
government to comply with international human rights norms. They persistently report on the 
“political capture” of development aid to underwrite the government’s “reign of repression.” 
Furthermore, they accuse donors of being reluctant to publicly acknowledge or condemn the 
violations, let alone thoroughly investigate them. On occasions when they have investigated, 
donors have been accused of “overlooking evidence” (Oakland Institute, 2013) and not acting 
upon confirmatory results.  
The Ethiopian enigma 
While they have been accused of financing human rights violations through the government’s 
effort to strengthen its power, donors continued making aid disbursements. Rawlence (2012) 
refers to this puzzle as “the Ethiopian enigma.” International Human Rights Worker 1 explained 
how this situation disappoints those working in the human rights sector; they expect donors to 
be responsible and innovative in integrating and supporting human rights in their development 
assistance to Ethiopia. As the human rights agenda is part of the broader governance discourse 
that the Western donor community routinely advances elsewhere, this stance on Ethiopia shows 
a double standard at play. It seems as if donors turn “a deaf ear” to the deteriorating human 
rights situation in Ethiopia (Human Rights Watch, 2008c: 118). A statement made by Merera 
Gudina captures this practice:  
Though they may not openly acknowledge this, they somehow established a tacit 
understanding with the government that they would not bring up human rights issues as 
long as the regime delivers well on the war on terror. […] The West pretends to not 
know and see when it comes to atrocities being perpetrated by pro-West African dictators. 
The account of a senior official at the DAG who wishes to remain anonymous, and who is 
hereafter referred to as Senior Official at the DAG, validates the above statement concerning the 
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existence of a “tacit understanding” between the donor community and the Ethiopian 
government.68 He said that donors’ relationships with the government are based on mutual trust, 
and the government sees the donors as neutrals with no ulterior agenda other than supporting 
its developmental priorities. The officials interviewed from the donor community underscored 
the point that they have formal channels of communication with the government, or what they 
refer to as “constructive dialogue,” individually and collectively as part of the DAG, in which they 
raise governance-related concerns and more. Senior Official at the EU Delegation to Ethiopia 
stated that EU’s aid to Ethiopia is based on the condition that it is accompanied by a political 
dialogue on issues that concern either party, including human rights issues. Further, he said that 
this is incorporated in every discussion on a range of issues. The other official interviewed from 
the EU Delegation to Ethiopia who wishes to remain anonymous and is hereafter referred to 
Official 2 at the EU Delegation to Ethiopia, reinforced this point.69 She referred to the Cotonou 
Agreement as the basis to raise human rights concerns that are often flagged by transnational 
human rights advocacy networks.70   
Under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU is required to undertake regular political 
dialogues on a variety of issues, including human rights. All the interview subjects from the donor 
community, however, admitted that the EPRDF government at times openly refuses to embrace 
their recommendations. On such occasions, they said, they often end up agreeing to disagree. In 
the words of Senior Official at the DAG, “after all, Ethiopia is a sovereign state, and we are not 
here to dictate what it should and should not do.” By recalling the consultation donors had with 
the government before the launching of GTP II, this official went on to say,  
He [the prime minister of Ethiopia] said yes on A, B, C, and D and no on some other 
issues that he didn’t agree with. […] If I put on a different cap, then, I would say, you 
bring your money and align it to the priorities of the government. If you don’t, you can 
take your money.  
                                                          
68 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
69 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
70 The Cotonou Agreement was a partnership agreement signed in Cotonou, Benin, on 23 June 2000 between the 
EU and 79 states from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific regions. Stating equality of partners and global 
participation as its fundamental principles, the Cotonou Agreement entered into force in April 2003. 
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While the government’s effort to institutionalize information blackout in its quest to stem the 
criticism on its poor human rights practices can be mentioned as a factor contributing to donors’ 
inaction, this does not present the complete picture. The donor community is aware of the 
deteriorating human rights situation in Ethiopia. Merera Gudina said, “The regime is doing what 
it wants without a care in the world and with the acute knowledge of donors, who are well aware 
of what is happening as we are, if not more.” Mesfin Woldemariam also said, “the government 
has decided to not care about what the West may say or do.” In order to understand where 
Ethiopia acquires this leverage to stand against transnational human rights pressure, and Western 
donors’ reluctance to be the expected “norm entrepreneurs” in promoting and protecting human 
rights, examining the systemic and case-specific contextual factors is helpful. This study aggregates 
and refers to these factors as strategic importance, which are presented in Chapter 6.  
Though not as a statement in their official capacity, some of the interview subjects from the donor 
community pointed to the geo-political positioning of Ethiopia as a factor contributing to what 
seems to be preferential treatment by donors. For instance, the other official interviewed from 
the DAG who wishes to remain anonymous, and who is hereafter referred to as Official 2 at the 
DAG, stated that various factors can affect the inflow of aid into to a certain recipient state. And 
its geo-political positioning and the peace and security role that Ethiopia plays in the region “might 
be the reason that has led many to believe that it is being treated differently,” she added. While 
they do not openly agree with the routine criticism of transnational human rights advocacy 
networks that the donor community treats Ethiopia differently because of these factors, 
statements like those mentioned above can be considered an implicit admittance. Asked directly 
if donors treat Ethiopia differently, Senior Official at the DAG stated, "As it is contextual, you 
can never have one-size-fits-all approach to development. So I will not say that one is treated 
differently. […] It is all contextual based on country norms and traditions.” 
Donors continued allocating more aid to a regime at the forefront of international criticism for 
its poor human rights record. It also vocally experiments with a development trajectory, the 
developmental state, that is considered a competing alternative to the liberal agenda that its top 
donors that happen to be Western subscribe to (Dereje, 2011). While the international human 
rights regime hails the indivisibility of all human rights - economic, social, cultural, political, and 
civil - the EPRDF government officially embraced a development model that aims at the reverse. 
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As explained earlier in the chapter, the developmental state model tries to champion economic 
growth by overlooking the relevance of political rights and civil liberties (Leftwich 1995: 418).  
Top Bilateral Partners  USD (m) Top Multilateral Partners USD (m) 
United States  610.3 World Bank 847.6 
United Kingdom  466.3 African Development Bank 222.0 
European Union 170.8 Global Fund 182.7 
Japan 146.6 GAVI 101.0 
Canada  128.9 UN Funds and Programs 80.1 
Table 5. Ethiopia’s top bilateral and multilateral donors for 2012/13.71 
The discussion in the following focuses on the human rights violations that the donor community 
is accused of sponsoring and its complicity. Rawlence (2016) claims, “There is almost no 
government activity in Ethiopia that is not underwritten by foreign money.” Nevertheless, donors 
are reluctant to address the human rights violations in which they are directly or indirectly 
implicated, let alone take robust measures to address the wide-ranging human rights violations. 
International Human Rights Worker 2 stated, “We have tried to share lots of information that 
we have not published for the protection of informants, but they do not seem to be interested.” 
Here, the political capture of development aid and the accompanying accusation of contributing 
to forced relocation are cases in point. By substantiating its allegations with the testimonies of 50 
individuals, Human Rights Watch’s (2010b) report details how development aid is politically 
captured to cement the EPRDF coalition's grip on power. Cases in which access to donor-funded 
resources such as loans, seeds, fertilizers, and other agricultural inputs were withheld from 
farmers who were critical of the government's policies have been documented.  
The Case of Promotion of Basic Services (PBS) 
The PBS is a multi-donor supported nationwide development program that has been severely 
implicated in overlapping with the Villagization Program, a relocation program run by the 
                                                          
71 Source: Development Assistance Group (2017).  
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government that is accused of perpetrating wide-ranging human rights abuses. Various donors 
including the WB, the DFID, and the EU supported the PBS through block grants to regional 
governments to improve access to basic socio-economic services. Although the government 
claims that the aim of the Villagization Program is to bring dispersed households in marginalized 
regions into villages to facilitate basic infrastructure and socio-economic services, different 
reports argue to the contrary (Cochrane & Skjerdal, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2012; Oakland 
Institute, 2013). People have been forcibly relocated without consultation or compensation to 
new villages that often lack adequate food and fertile land, and basic services such as healthcare 
and educational facilities. Furthermore, human rights violations such as beatings, arrests, and 
torture are reported to have accompanied the forced relocations. Various reports accuse that a 
portion of the fund from the PBS was diverted to finance the Villagization program.  
Following the persistent calls by transnational human rights advocacy networks to look into these 
allegations, donors have undertaken some “investigations.” Some examples include the multi-
agency donor mission to the Gambella region in February 2011 with a follow-up in June 2012, 
the joint DFID and USAID visit to South Omo in January 2012, DAG’s trip to the OMO Valley 
in August 2013, and another DAG visit to the OMO Valley and Bench Maji in August 2014. What 
all these “investigations” seem to have in common is a statement declaring that the allegations 
could not be substantiated by the visits (Department for International Development & United 
States Agency for International Development, 2012; Department for International Development, 
United States Agency for International Development, United Nations, & Irish Aid, 2012). In a 
testimony to the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Felix Horn, Horn of Africa researcher 
at HRW, questioned the very approach donors use in these visits (Human Rights Watch, 2014). 
He argued that the assessments that donors have made so far have not provided a safe 
environment in which victims of violations could testify without fear of retaliation.  
International Human Rights Worker 2 states, “These visits happen through official channels, and 
we have received lots of reports that the local officials usually go to the villages and tell the people 
what to share and what to keep quiet about.” Therefore, he does not agree with calling these 
visits “investigations.” The failure to prepare a comprehensive public report is the other most 
voiced criticism of these visits. The argument made by Senior Official at the DAG, however, 
contradicts what has been discussed so far. While he acknowledges the possibility of such 
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“contradistinctions in development work” as valid, he believes that transnational human rights 
advocacy networks often blow them out of proportion. He said not to forget the fact that they 
too “have a job to do” and interests to advance.  
To summarize, due to the accusation of funding human rights violations, donors have been 
subjected to various kinds of scrutiny. For instance, an alleged victim of the Villagization Program 
filed a lawsuit against the DFID at the UK High Court. This seems to have triggered the 
Department’s decision to withdraw support from the PBS. It shifted to other, less controversial 
programs while the overall aid flow to Ethiopia remained unaffected. In a statement published on 
its webpage on 26 February 2015, however, the DFID claims the opposite, stating that its decision, 
which it calls “transition in approach” was informed by its recognition of “Ethiopia’s growing 
successes.” This created the need for “transitioning support towards economic development to 
help generate jobs, income, and growth.” Moreover, the people affected by the same Program 
filed a formal complaint with the WB’s Inspection Panel, an internal accountability mechanism. 
Although the Panel’s report invoked the non-political mandate of the WB as a rationale for not 
thoroughly investigating the alleged human rights violations linked to the Villagization Program, it 
confirmed the existence of an “operational link” between the WB projects in Ethiopia and the 
Villagization program (Inspection Panel-World Bank, 2014) 
Do donors look beyond numbers?  
International Human Rights Worker 2 said that donors often do not look beyond numbers. On 
the surface, it seems that the world has moved away from a need-based approach to development 
towards a rights-based one. However, the reality makes one question whether this actually is the 
case. Looking beyond GDP and accounting for non-economic indicators is supposedly a better 
measure of the degree of human progress. This invokes the aligning of development with human 
rights. Amid such a shift of understanding in development, Ethiopia advances a development 
model that hails the significance of economic development over human development. The 
perception of Ethiopia as a promising development partner due to its economic progress helps 
to explain its “donor darling” status. As displayed on WB’s website, Ethiopia’s economy 
experienced growth averaging 10.5% per year from 2005/6 to 2015/16; it is expected to become 
a middle-income economy by 2025. According to Dereje Feyissa, Ph.D., senior advisor at the 
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International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI), donors do not want to dismay Ethiopia by entangling 
their development work with human rights conditionality, and they seem to be in what he refers 
to as “a beauty contest” to be a part of the story, in case it succeeds.72   
While the abovementioned figure contributed to its consideration as one of the fastest-growing 
economies in the world, Ethiopia still ranks as one of the worst in the Human Development Index 
(HDI), a composite measure of progress that accounts for non-economic social indicators on life 
expectancy and education, in addition to income per capita indicators. This index classifies the 
states of the world into four categories: very high, high, medium, and low human development 
groups. The Human Development Report 2016 categorizes Ethiopia in the low human development 
group with an HDI value of 0.448, which is below the mean for sub-Saharan Africa (0.523), and 
ranks it 174 out of 188 states (United Nations Development Program, 2016). As already stated, 
Ethiopia claims to owe its economic success to the developmental state model, which is an 
ideological rival to the liberal democratic model to which its major donors subscribe. Clapham 
(2017: 97) captures this irony:  
Running contrary to the ‘Washington Consensus’ model that equated economic 
development with the creation of liberal democratic political structures designed to assure 
the accountability of the rulers to the ruled, the Ethiopian developmental state project 
might have been expected to attract the hostility of the developed industrial states and 
international financial institutions. […] In fact, this did not occur, and Ethiopia was able 
to draw on high levels of external assistance.  
5.1.2.2 Donors and Kenya  
While Kenya had aimed at becoming a middle-income economy by 2030, which was stipulated 
both in the Jubilee manifesto of 2013 and the Kenya National Vision of 2008, it managed to 
become one in 2014. This was announced after its GDP was recalculated with updated data from 
the better-performing sectors: agricultural, manufacturing, telecommunication, and real estate. It 
is, therefore, less dependent on aid for direct budget support, which constituted only 16% of the 
government’s budget in 2013/14. Even so, according to OECD – DAC (2017), Kenya ranks ninth 
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among the top 10 ODA recipients from DAC members. Furthermore, it is heavily dependent on 
various non-budgetary supports, especially in the area of security and justice. According to 
Bachmann and Hönke (2010), following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, donors have shifted their focus 
to capacity-building of the security sectors of the states in their engagement in the region. They 
increasingly frame counter-terrorism initiatives as part of the broader peace and security agenda. 
The blurring of the boundary between development and security assistance is popularly referred 
to as the “securitization of development.” Donors’ policy is "modified to combine diplomacy, 
defense, and development in addressing weak state capacities and instability in otherwise 
marginalized regions" (Bachmann and Hönke 2010: 98).  
According to Collius Aseka, technical assistant at the Aid Effectiveness Secretariat (AES), 
development aid in Kenya can either be in the form of budget and non-budget support, and the 
former is minimal, as stated above.73 Many donors prefer to do what he referred to as 
“appropriation in aid”: they hold the funds in trust of the government while making a contract 
with companies to carry out projects, such as infrastructural projects. “All the paperwork goes 
through the government, including the budgeting and the process of disbursement,” he said. As 
is the case with the DAG in Ethiopia, Kenya’s donors coordinate their support under the Donor 
Coordination Group (DCG) with WB as the permanent co-chair. This practice is in line with 
international aid effectiveness guidelines that call for the coordination of support to reduce 
transaction costs.  
DCG is comprised of 17 bilateral donors and multilateral agencies, including Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Spain, the UK, the US, 
and the African Development Bank (AfDB), the EU, the UN, and the WB. A sub-group called the 
Aid Effectiveness Group (AEG) includes the 17 members of the DCG and the Kenyan government 
and serves as a platform for information exchange on best practices and emerging challenges. 
AEG is supported by the Aid Effectiveness Secretariat (AES), which is based in the Kenya’s 
Ministry of Finance. AES is the focal point that brings together the donors and the government 
concerning technical and policy dialogues regarding development effectiveness. 
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Donors’ irony: “peaceful elections” versus “free and fair elections”  
The ideals that they preach in the North are not what they practice in the South. The 
standards that they give themselves are not the standards they would want us to enjoy. 
They think we are entitled to lower standards, and their strategies of development 
cooperation have moved resources from non-state actors to states. They have lost their 
credibility and leverage they would have had. […] Western countries have been 
supporting the government irrespective of what the government has been doing. 74   
According to Njonjo Mue, as long as their strategic interests are intact, “donors are not bothered 
about the quality of the democracy that is being served here.” He believes that Kenya is on the 
path of joining the regional trend of carrying out “sub-standard elections”:  
We have seen that in Uganda next door, where any sort of election seems acceptable to 
them. In Rwanda, where no one really bothers too much about that. […] Our colleagues 
around the region have been telling us that we are the last pillar standing.  
Similarly, Otsieno Namwaya recounted the EU’s stance during the ICC process as an example to 
explain how the donor community values stability above all else. He said, "They were complaining 
that the ICC issue had destroyed their relationship with the government and affected their 
various interests within the country.” They wanted to normalize relations with Kenya as quickly 
as possible and move on, he added. Njonjo Mue discussed donors’ shifting of sides after the 
election of the President and his Deputy in 2013; donors warned that electing ICC inductees 
would have consequences. But once the two candidates won the election, the donors “needed 
to find a way of dealing with the new reality.” Over the course of several years, he said, they have 
managed to “turn the ship around” to fully embrace the leadership. He then went on to offer his 
general views on the position of donors with regards to the civil society:  
If you are too vocal against the government, they would not tell you to your face that they 
would not fund you but you would walk around a bit before you find a partner who wants 
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to fund you in that kind of work. […] As the civil society, we do not think that they are 
credible partners, and the opposition had dismissed them as enablers of dictatorship. 
Ndungu Wainaina explained donors’ irony by discussing some events that took place before the 
October 2017 re-run of the presidential election. Some members of the civil society and the 
opposition, which had boycotted the election, voiced their concerns over the ability of the 
Electoral Commission of Kenya to undertake the re-run election. The core structural problems 
that resulted in the nullification of the previous election were not addressed at the time, he said. 
Therefore, some members of the civil society wanted “the process problems” to be addressed 
before having another election. But both the donor community and the government were 
determined to have the election regardless: “They just wanted an election, an election of any 
kind. They wanted to get it over with,” he added. He finds it irresponsible to opt for such a stance 
in states such as Kenya, where incumbents use elections as a legitimizing tool.  
Suba Churchil extended his analysis to the changing global dynamics, which he referred to as “the 
shift in the priority of donors.” As they increasingly prioritize trade and security interests as 
opposed to good governance, he said, the conventional strategy of pressuring a target state via 
donors no longer works. Similarly, Felix Kyalo discussed the factors that have contributed to the 
“gradual shift” in the priority of donors by taking into account the impacts of various systemic 
factors at the international level. Asked whether donors bring up human rights concerns in the 
dialogues that they have with the government, Sandra Diesel, head of cooperation at the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA-Kenya), stated that they mainly use the 
DCG platform for information exchange, not as a space to discuss “such issues.”75 Sweden is the 
current co-chair of DCG along with the WB, the permanent co-chair. Sandra Diesel went on to 
say that, as a member of the EU, Sweden may address human rights issues collectively with the 
other EU members. Asked whether donors treat Kenya differently, she said, “I can only speak 
for Sweden, and we do not.” 
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The case of security funding  
Western donors such as the US and the UK, Kenya’s former colonial master, are the major 
donors supporting its security sector. Various reports accuse Kenyan security agencies, which 
are funded by these donors, of perpetrating grave human rights violations within and outside the 
country. Transnational human rights advocacy networks have called upon these donors to 
condition their assistance with human rights promotion and protection and push for 
accountability for the violations being perpetrated. George Morara described incidences in which 
the KNCHR received reports of the donor-funded Kenyan defense forces committing various 
kinds of human rights violations in neighboring Somalia. However, the donors claim to follow 
what they refer to as "Leahy laws," which prohibit the funding of a military that commits grave 
human rights violations, he said. Furthermore, various cases have linked the donor-supported 
Kenyan security forces and innumerable human rights violations within the borders of Kenya. The 
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), established in 2003, has been implicated in various human 
rights violations in the context of anti-terrorism operations. Support for the Unit is mostly 
provided in terms of equipment and training. According to Open Society Foundations (2013: 17), 
the Unit received 10 million USD in funding from the US alone in 2003, and it has received massive 
amounts of support ever since.  
Donors have been the target of transnational human rights pressure to re-evaluate their support 
of the Kenyan security forces, especially those that are directly implicated in the perpetration of 
grave human rights violations, such as extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances. Their public 
response to the accusation of complicity with the commission of human rights violations is usually 
a statement saying that they will address the matter in their discussion with the government. But 
there is hardly any visible outcome with this quiet diplomacy. In the words of Otsieno Namwaya, 
this approach is referred to as “quiet” for a reason: it takes place outside of the public domain, 
and no one can be sure that it does take place at all.  
The UK and the US would tell you that they are funding the Kenyan police, including the 
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit. But they say they also fund the Independent Policing Oversight 
Authority so that the police do not overstep their mandate. […] Every time the 
Commission [KNCHR] came out and said that people have been killed, the UK and the 
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US do not want to hear that. I think if there was a way to tell us not to release those 
reports, they would. 76 
In December 2014, Al-Jazeera aired a documentary titled Inside Kenya’s Death Squads, in which 
members of the different police units, who often work in collaboration, admitted to routinely 
executing extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances.77 They said these gross human rights 
violations are meticulously planned by high-ranking government officials in Nairobi and are mostly 
carried out against alleged terrorists. Due to the high risks, Al-Jazeera concealed the identities of 
those who spoke in the documentary. The interviews with the families of the victims show that 
the terrorist label has provided the government a "scapegoat" to legally violate human rights with 
impunity.   
Kenyan authorities have been accused of failing to investigate such allegations and bring those 
responsible to account. Further, they are often criticized for not fully implementing the reforms 
promised, following the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, to improve oversight and 
accountability of the police and security forces. In a report titled The Error of Fighting Terror with 
Terror, which was released in September 2015, the KNCHR documented over 120 cases of grave 
human rights violations against individuals and groups suspected of terrorism. These included 
arbitrary arrests, extortion, illegal detention, torture, extrajudicial killings, and forced 
disappearances. KNCHR reported that these “counterterrorism operations” are “widespread, 
systematic, and well-coordinated” by the Kenyan security forces, which include Kenyan Defense 
Forces, the National Intelligence Service, the Kenya Wildlife Service, county commissioners and 
their deputies, chiefs, and various units of the National Police Service, including the ATPU. These 
operations mainly target ethnic Somalis and Muslims. The report states that this profiling along 
ethnic and religious lines is against international human rights norms and often fuels further 
radicalization, making it ultimately counter-productive.  
5.1.3 Counter-discourse by donors?  
After expressing how utterly ineffective quiet diplomacy is as an approach, International Human 
Rights Worker 2 stated that witnessing donors replicate the same rhetoric that the target states 
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77 See at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUjOdjdH8Uk  
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use in their counter-discourses is worrisome. Often, members of the donor community make 
statements that resemble what the target states portray in their counter-discourses. After 
referring to the perception of donors treating Ethiopia differently as “rubbish,” Senior Official at 
the EU Delegation to Ethiopia stated:  
They [International human rights NGOs] are not doing their job. They have been paid by 
the international community to do a job that they are failing at. If they were not failing, 
then, there would not be a zero impact. They are taking our money and spending it on 
themselves. […] HRW, in my view, is a broken tool, which is failing to achieve what it 
should for the international community and providing good evidence of the human rights 
situation from all aspects. […] HRW, Amnesty and Oakland, and most other 
international human rights organizations have taken a one-sided approach to Ethiopia. 
They are providing evidence which is less useful to us than it should. 
Similar to the counter-discourse of the Ethiopian government, this official then questions the 
methodology that transnational human rights advocacy networks use. He mentioned the non-
physical presence of international human rights NGOs in Ethiopia as a reason for what he 
considers one-sided, biased reporting. He said this fact makes their significance to the donor 
community “of little value.” Such reasoning seems to blame international human rights NGOs for 
not working on the ground, to mean not having an in-country office. But the fact of the matter is 
that they cannot have a physical presence even if they want to. According to the CSP, human 
rights work can only be undertaken by an Ethiopian Charity/Society - an organization that is 
“wholly controlled by Ethiopians” and raise 90 percent of its funds from within the country. This 
clearly excludes international human rights NGOs. Similarly, Official 2 at the EU Delegation to 
Ethiopia mentioned this as a ground for not having a working relationship with international 
human rights NGOs. She, however, went on to say that the EU looks at their reports as “one of 
the many sources” that it takes into account in its own analysis of raised concerns. Then, the 
Union takes up the issues in the political dialogues that it has with the government.  
The same is true for Kenya. According to Otsieno Namwaya, Kenya Researcher at HRW, donors 
are at times defensive regarding the accusations of funding repression rather than trying to 
investigate them. Recalling a recent encounter with the UK when researching extrajudicial killings 
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and forced disappearances of people linked to Al-Shabaab, he said, “They said we were lying” and 
argued that the police units that they support are clean, while evidence shows the opposite. 
Regarding the US, he said, they were willing to have a discussion and asked to be provided with 
evidence. Then, they said to take the matter to the Kenyan authorities and have an investigation 
of their own. “I do not think that they did,” he added.  
Apart from funding these regimes, Western donors provide support to what Terrence Lyons, 
Ph.D., associate professor of conflict analysis and resolution at George Mason University, referred 
to as the “symbolic front.”78 US President Barack Obama’s state visits to both Ethiopia and Kenya 
before the end of his term can be referred to as evidence of this claim. He had skipped both 
states during his previous visit to sub-Saharan Africa at the beginning of his term, which was seen 
by many as a way of sending a message that the US does not want to be associated with human 
rights violators, at least in the public realm, which later proved not to be the case. As Terrence 
Lyons explained, donors need to be mindful of what their actions say. Going on state visits would 
give these regimes the stamp of approval for the international legitimacy that they seek, he added.  
As presented above, both the counter-discourses of Ethiopia and Kenya are in clear contradiction 
to liberal democratic values. This might come as a surprise given the fact that doing so defies the 
proclaimed stance of their major donors, who happen to be Western, and the international 
organizations under their substantial influence. Both Ethiopia and Kenya are among the largest 
recipients of security assistance in the continent, and donors refuse to condition assistance to 
these governments on the improvement of human rights practices. This puzzle can only make 
sense if we consider the systemic and case-specific contextual factors that the study aggregates 
to refer to as strategic importance that are presented in Chapter 6.  
5.2 Regulatory crackdown (Part 2) 
This section presents part 2 of the mechanism, regulatory crackdown, which causally connects 
transnational human rights pressure at critical political junctures with the unintended negative 
outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior in the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya. 
Following the two preceding processes that constitute part 1 of the mechanism, counter-
                                                          
78 Skype interview, September 2017.  
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discourse and quiet diplomacy, the target states embarked upon a regulatory crackdown to shrink 
or close the civic space. Ethiopia and Kenya passed repressive legal instruments in the form of 
anti-terrorism laws, media laws, civil society regulation laws, and so on to restrict or stop the 
activities of civil society actors (both individual activists and CSOs).  
By enforcing legal frameworks that aim to incapacitate domestic human rights NGOs, the 
governments in Ethiopia and Kenya try to sever transnational networking processes, particularly 
the much-needed information exchange. Having a legally permissible environment is important to 
establish and sustain transnational human rights networks. Furthermore, the progressive 
realization of a human rights norm-compliant state behavior is profoundly dependent upon the 
existence of an enabling legal framework. In the words of the third human rights lawyer 
interviewed for the study who wishes to remain anonymous, and who is referred to as Human 
Rights Lawyer 3, "civil society organizations are not enemies," and they can be partners in what 
these governments try to champion.79 Hence, they should be viewed in a positive light, and an 
encouraging environment should be created for their functioning, such as an enabling legal 
framework, she added.  
5.2.1 Sample legal frameworks in Ethiopia  
The regulatory crackdown to shrink or close the civic space has been the major subject of reports 
by domestic and international human rights NGOs. Beyond constantly rejecting allegations of 
human rights abuses, Ethiopia has altered the country’s regulatory framework to no longer make 
it convenient to monitor, document, and report on its human rights practices. The Charities and 
Societies Proclamation (CSP) of 2009, the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (ATP) of 2009, and the 
Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation (MMFIP) of 2008 are some of the accused 
legal frameworks. AI and HRW have reported that these laws, with the intention of silencing 
dissent and legalizing security officers’ acts that are clearly against international standards, are 
major threats to human rights promotion and protection in Ethiopia. A detailed discussion of the 
CSP and the ATP is presented in the following section. These two legal frameworks constitute 
what Human Rights Watch (2010b) refers to as “the architecture of repression.”  
                                                          
79 In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) 
The CSP was passed into law in February 2009 to regulate NGOs, mass-membership societies, 
charitable trusts, and foundations. It is, by far, the most reported-on subject by international 
human rights NGOs, including AI and HRW. These organizations have produced a detailed 
analysis of the Proclamation, an examination of its compatibility with international standards, and 
have offered recommendations for target actors, both the Ethiopian government and Western 
donors, ever since it was a draft (see Amnesty International, 2008). They have also submitted 
shadow or parallel reports to different treaty-monitoring bodies, urging them to pass country 
resolutions condemning the law, and lobbied donor governments and multilateral agencies to use 
their leverage in pushing for its amendment or repeal. HRW often says that the CSP is one of the 
most repressive civil society laws in the world.  
With provisions that invite undue government interference and the imposition of severe funding 
restrictions on domestic human rights NGOs, the CSP undermines independent human rights 
work in the country. As discussed in previous chapters, the CSP only permits “Ethiopian 
Charities/Societies,” organizations acquiring “not more than 10% of their funds from foreign 
sources” and “wholly controlled” by Ethiopians (Article 2(2)), to work on human rights, women’s 
rights, children’s rights, disability rights, citizenship rights, conflict resolution, or democratic 
governance (Article 14(5)). Moreover, the Proclamation is often used to justify the banning and 
asset freezes of various domestic CSOs (Tinishu, 2013). As a result, human rights NGOs have 
substantially decreased in number. Several have forfeited their mandate and shifted to activities 
with no reference to human rights work, and those that struggle to continue have had to reduce 
their functions, lay off their workforce, and close offices. 
The extensive powers that the Proclamation grants the Civil Society Agency (CSA) are as 
detrimental as the funding restriction on human rights work (Human Rights Council, 2011: 5). In 
light of Article 76(3(b)), the CSA has the power to decline renewing the license of a CSO that it 
considers to have violated any of the provisions in the Proclamation. As fulfilling all the provisions 
of the CSP is “nearly impossible,” the government has a legal ground to “arbitrarily dissolve 
organizations” (Human Rights Council, 2011: 6). Senior Official at the CSA said that the 
monitoring and evaluation department of the Agency evaluates the works of CSOs starting from 
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the plan of action that they submit at the beginning of the fiscal year and their budget. If the CSA 
is convinced that they operate against the law, it takes action depending on the degree of the 
offense, with the cancelation of their license to operate as the ultimate one. He then discussed 
the mechanisms presented to the affected CSOs, which he said to be "very much favorable" to 
Ethiopian Charities/Societies. Here, referring to an actual case would help paint a clear picture. 
Let us take the case of HRCO, an Ethiopian Charity/Society, to see if the procedures are as 
favorable in practice as claimed in the above statement.  
HRCO’s contingency funds in four private banks (9.5 million Ethiopian birr) were frozen by the 
order of CSA’s Director. In a letter sent to the Council, the CSA stated that HRCO cannot 
change into an Ethiopian Charity/Society while possessing the funds and assets that it received 
from foreign sources (Human Rights Council, 2011: 8). Even though many, including AI and HRW, 
stated that the action was a retrospective application of the law on funds received before it came 
into force, the funds were still frozen. HRCO then appealed to the Board of the CSA, which 
stood by the Director’s decision. According to Article 104(1-3), all CSOs may appeal to the 
Board of the Agency regarding a decision of the Director. However, the Ethiopian 
Charities/Societies are the only ones that can appeal against the decision of the Board to the 
Federal High Court. “If the affected CSO is an Ethiopian Resident Charity/Society, its case would 
be handled administratively,” said Senior Official at the CSA. HRCO, then, took the case to the 
Federal High Court, which upheld the decision of the Board during its hearing on 24 October 
2011 (Amnesty International, 2012: 14). Once again, HRCO appealed the Court’s decision to the 
Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court stating a fundamental error of law, which also 
upheld the decision of the Federal High Court. It is fair to say that the available mechanisms do 
not seem favorable to Ethiopian Charities/Societies, as claimed by Senior Official at the CSA. 
Another notable impact of the CSP is the institutionalization of a climate of fear in the civic space. 
Just after it was passed, many human rights activists fled the country; those who remain operate 
in fear, and they self-censor to avoid violating the provisions of the Proclamation. Article 77(3) 
prohibits CSOs from receiving anonymous donations and orders them to keep a record of 
donors’ identities. In a country where the government considers human rights organizations "the 
opposition in disguise," people hesitate to candidly provide support due to fear of governmental 
retaliation. The possibility of domestic fundraising is limited as it is, and this provision considerably 
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exacerbates the situation. Moreover, Articles 85 and 87 authorize the CSA to have unrestricted 
access to any document in a CSO’s possession. These provisions infringe upon the CSOs’ ability 
to practice the principle of confidentiality, which is indispensable for any human rights work. This 
would compromise the safety of victims and witnesses of human rights violations by putting them 
at risk of possible retribution. Furthermore, it is in direct contravention to the right to privacy 
enshrined in Article 17 of the ICCPR (Amnesty International, 2012: 8).  
While the government often claims that the CSP enhances the accountability and financial 
transparency of CSOs, both domestic and international members of transnational human rights 
advocacy networks often argue that the real intention in passing this piece of legislation is to put 
the civic space under direct government surveillance. Many of the interview subjects stated that 
the imposition of severe funding restrictions only on organizations that address human rights and 
governance shows the discriminatory nature of the law. According to Human Rights Council 
(2011: 4), ordering organizations to generate 90% of their income within a country where 
domestic philanthropy is known to be non-existent is an excuse to systematically eradicate 
independent human rights work.  
Furthermore, the application of the law makes one question its intention. If the intention is as 
the government claims, then why bend it, when and if needed? Why exempt some organizations 
from the negative impacts of the law? Sisay (2012: 381) mentions the cases of two domestic 
organizations that are allowed to work on human rights issues with unrestricted access to foreign 
funding, arguing that this is an arbitrary application as the law does not even hint at the possibility 
of such discretionary power to be applied to Ethiopian Charities/Societies. According to Article 
3(2)(b), the CSP provides the possibility of non-application of the law by virtue of an agreement 
with the government, only to international organizations. 
Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (ATP) 
The ATP was passed into law in August 2009 with a broad and vague designation of what 
constitutes an act of terror. After asserting how broad the ATP is, Senior Official at the EU 
Delegation to Ethiopia said that the EU is working with the government to “identify and tie up 
loose ends in the law.” In the words of Yacob Hailemariam: 
Page | 114 
 
The ATP is the biggest threat to human rights. It is a draconian legislation, which smashes 
human rights in every sense of the term. It is absolutely unimaginable in the 21st century 
that a country can enact a law like this. […] It is so broad that you can fit any activity 
into it.  
The ATP is often accused of using the terrorist label as a pretext to detain and charge opposition 
political party members and independent journalists. The trial proceedings of the individuals 
charged under this Proclamation, which are commonly referred to as the “anti-terrorism trials,” 
have been the chief subject of reporting by members of transnational human rights networks in 
recent years. There are cases in which political oppositions were kidnapped from other states to 
be persecuted under the law. Furthermore, journalists are routinely put on trial with the 
accusation of acts deemed to “encourage” or “provide moral support” to groups that the 
government considers terrorists. According to Article 6, this offense is punishable by 10 to 20 
years in prison. AI documented the detention of 108 opposition members and journalists charged 
with terrorism offenses in 2011 alone (Amnesty International, 2011c). According to the 
Committee to Protect Journalists and HRW’s research, Ethiopia is the leading incarcerator of 
journalists in Africa and has the most journalists in exile in the world next to Iran (Human Rights 
Watch, 2015). This resulted in the closure of various publications that were critical of the 
government. The media is a major partner in information politics, and this situation places serious 
strain on transnational human rights advocacy networks’ capacity to mobilize pressure against 
human rights violations. Furthermore, the Proclamation was used to convict the leaders of the 
Muslim protest movement, which took place in various parts of the country from 2012 to 2014, 
over perceived government interference in religious affairs. 
The different provisions in the ATP are in direct contravention of international standards. Besides 
allowing a crackdown on freedom of expression, association, and assembly, the ATP limits 
suspects’ right to due process of law. For instance, Article 20(3) allows terrorism suspects to be 
held up to four months in pre-trial detention. This contradicts Article 17 of the Federal 
Constitution of Ethiopia and Article 9 of the ICCPR; both call for the prompt charge or release 
of suspects in custody. The ATP enabled the arbitrary detention and poor treatment of individuals 
with alleged involvement with outlawed groups, which are labeled as terrorist organizations. 
These are the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), 
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and Genbot 7. The Ethiopian government is accused of using the outdated “imprison first, 
investigate later" approach (Human Rights Watch, 2008e) when it comes to people suspected of 
membership, support, and sympathy to these organizations. It is often reported that these rights 
abuses are part of a broader campaign to silence dissenting voices in the country.  
Cases in which individuals from the Oromo ethnic group are detained on suspicion of involvement 
with the OLF have been reported for some time. This, of course, has intensified with the labeling 
of the group as a terrorist organization, a leap many say gave the government a free pass to 
perform a heightened level of repression against the ethnic Oromos. According to AI, between 
2011 and 2014, “at least 5,000 Oromos have been arrested as a result of their actual or suspected 
peaceful opposition to the government” (Amnesty International, 2014: 8). Similarly, HRW often 
accuses the government of justifying the rights abuses and sustained intimidation of its critics in 
the Oromia region with the allegation of membership and support of the OLF (Human Rights 
Watch, 2005). As explained in Chapter 3, this abuse pattern is reported to have increased 
following the Oromo protests that have started with the introduction of the government’s 
masterplan to integrate parts of the Oromia Regional State with the federal capital of Addis Ababa 
in April 2014. Furthermore, various cases of arbitrary detention and extra-judicial killings in the 
Somali region on suspicion of involvement with the ONLF have also been reported. These 
violations are said to have intensified after the ONLF’s attack on the Obole oil installation in April 
2007, which took the lives of several Chinese and Ethiopian civilian workers.  
5.2.2 Sample legal frameworks in Kenya  
This section presents sample legal frameworks that are often accused of aiming at shrinking or 
closing the civic space in Kenya. These include the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012, the 
Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014, and the PBO amendments. Besides these laws, the 
Kenya Information and Communication (Amendment) Act of 2012 and the Media Council Act of 
2013, for instance, are some of the other laws that the interview subjects mentioned as having a 
similar impact. What all of these laws seem to have in common is the fact that their most limiting 
provisions are framed in the language of promoting national security. This is often justified within 
the context of the war on terror.  
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Prevention of Terrorism Act 
This Act was signed into law by President Mwai Kibaki in October 2012. As is the case with the 
Ethiopian ATP, this Act is often criticized for being overly vague, beginning with the definition of 
what constitutes the act of terrorism. It is broad enough to encompass ranges of acts listed under 
Article 2. After listing acts that would qualify as terrorism, Article 2(b) uses broad statements to 
define the act in terms of its aim. It defines terrorism as an act carried out with the aim of 
“intimidating or causing fear amongst members of the public or a section of the public,” 
“intimidating or compelling the Government or international organization to do, or refrain from 
any act,” or “destabilizing the religious, political, constitutional, economic, or social institutions 
of a country, or an international organization.”  
Open Society Foundations (2013: 61) states that the Act’s vague definitions of what constitutes 
the act of terror, its limits on due process of law, and its expansion of the security forces’ powers 
makes it susceptible to be used “as a tool against political opponents, civil society, religious and 
ethnic groups, minorities, and common criminals.”  To use the expression by Abdullahi Halakhe, 
East Africa researcher at Amnesty International (AI), “the state can frame any resistance in the 
language of terrorism.”80 The inclusion of two human rights organizations, Muslims for Human 
Rights and Haki Africa, in the official list of 86 individuals and groups accused of providing support 
for terrorism, announced by the government on 7 April 2015, is one example that shows how 
the law is used to target civil society actors. These CSOs are well known for documenting human 
rights violations committed by Kenyan security forces in counter-terrorism operations.  
Hereafter are discussed some of the most restrictive provisions in the Act. Article 35 allows 
limitations on specified fundamental freedoms that are clearly enshrined in the Constitution of 
Kenya. Among other reasons, this is to ensure “the investigations of a terrorist act.” The 
fundamental freedoms to be limited are the right to privacy; the rights of an arrested person; the 
freedom of expression, the media, and of conscience, religion, belief, and opinion; the freedom 
of security of a person; and the right to property. According to Article 3, the Inspector-General 
can make a recommendation to the Cabinet Secretary to designate a certain organization as a 
"specified entity." Acting on “behalf of,” “at the direction of,” or “in association with” another 
                                                          
80 In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
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entity designated as a “specified entity” suffices to be branded with the label. These vague 
statements enable the government to extend the terrorist label to CSOs for unknowingly 
associating with another entity that is already designated as such. Last, Article 33(10) allows the 
police to detain individuals in a pre-trial investigation for 30 days, which can be extended up to 
90 days. 
Security Laws (Amendment) Act 
This Act, which aims to amend various existing laws to advance Kenya’s national security, was 
signed into law by President Uhuru Kenyatta in December 2014. Since the time it was introduced 
as a Bill, the Act was accused of violating international standards and the bill of rights enshrined 
in the Constitution of Kenya. A further discussion of some of the most restrictive provisions in 
the Act is presented in the following paragraph.  
Article 4 of the Act, which amends the Public Order Act, empowers the Cabinet Secretary of 
Interior, appointed by the President, to make a decision on “the areas where, and times at which 
public meetings, gatherings, or public processions may be held.” This is a clear restriction on the 
freedom of assembly and association. Article 75, which amends section 30(a) of the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act, states that a person will be imprisoned for 14 years if he/she “publishes or 
utters a statement that is likely to be understood as directly or indirectly encouraging or inducing 
another person to commit or prepare to commit an act of terrorism.” Furthermore, amendments 
to section 30(f)(1) and (2) also prohibit the broadcasting of any information or pictures that 
would "undermine investigations or security operations relating to terrorism" without police 
authorization. This offense is punishable by up to three years of imprisonment or a fine of five 
million Kenyan shillings, or both. These broad and vague statements can be used to curtail 
freedom of speech. Article 77(d), which amends section 33 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
extends the pre-trial detention of terrorism suspects from 90 days to 360 days. Article 66, which 
amends Part V of the National Intelligence Service Act, defines “covert operations” as “efforts 
and activities aimed at neutralizing threats against national security.” It also grants extensive 
surveillance powers to security officials; for instance, the Director-General may authorize a 
covert operation "to obtain any information, material, record, document, or thing.” To this end, 
security personnel can “enter any place or obtain access to anything,” “search for or remove or 
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return, examine, take extracts from, make copies of, or record in any manner the information, 
material, record, documents or thing,” “monitor communication,” “install, maintain, or remove 
anything,” and “do anything considered necessary to preserve national security.”  
The Act faced strong opposition from the civil society sector and the opposition. Though civil 
society actors campaigned to stop the law, they only succeeded in obtaining some provisions to 
be ruled unconstitutional by the High Court of Kenya. In practice, the security forces still enjoy 
the excessive powers granted by the law. According to Suba Churchil, the law is thus misused to 
curtail fundamental rights and freedoms.  
The amendments to the PBO Act  
Several attempts have been made to amend this Act, which is yet to be operationalized. President 
Mwai Kibaki signed the PBO Act into law in January 2013. The implementation, however, was 
delayed due to the March 2013 presidential election that brought the current President, Uhuru 
Kenyatta, and his Deputy, William Ruto, to office. The new government should have made the 
law operational, but this has not yet happened due to a lack of political will. As discussed in detail, 
the two have campaigned by using a discourse that blames civil society actors for their indictment 
at the ICC. Despite various court rulings and a serious push, especially from the actors in the 
civic space, that call for the Cabinet Secretary for Devolution to officially announce the 
commencement date of the Act, this has not yet been successful. Rather than implementing the 
Act, the government has been relentlessly trying to amend it with provisions that clearly 
demonstrate aspirations similar to Ethiopia’s CSP. As discussed in Chapter 4, these attempts have 
so far not succeeded. Introducing a 15% limit on foreign funding and increasing the executive 
branch’s influence over the “Public Benefit Organizations Regulatory Authority” are some of the 
suggested amendments.  
When and if implemented, the PBO Act would create an enabling environment for CSOs in 
Kenya. Amongst other things, the Act would provide an opportunity for CSOs to self-regulate 
and partner with the government, and it would bring together all the CSOs that are registered 
under different legal regimes. There are various legal regimes for the registry of CSOs in Kenya. 
According to the ICNL (2018d), the term CSOs in the Kenyan context is used to refer to a range 
of organizations that operate between the realm of the individual and the state. Whereas the 
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term NGO refers to organizations registered with the NGO Coordination Board and governed 
by the NGO Coordination Act; other CSOs are registered with other legal regimes. Companies 
Limited by Guarantee are registered under the Companies Act, Societies are registered under 
the Societies Act, and Trusts are registered under the Trustees (Perpetual Succession) Act. The 
PBO Act of 2013 would replace the NGO Coordination Act, and all CSOs registered with 
different legal regimes would become “Public Benefit Organizations.” According to Article 5 of 
the PBO Act, a PBO would be “a voluntary membership or non-membership grouping of 
individuals or organizations, which is autonomous, non-partisan, non-profit making and which is: 
(a) organized and operated locally, nationally, or internationally; (b) engages in public benefit 
activities in any of the areas set out in the Sixth Schedule; and (c) is registered as such by the 
Authority.” 
5.2.3 Is Kenya copying Ethiopia’s laws?  
Suba Churchil stated that Kenya seems to be practicing what he referred to as a “cut-and-paste 
attempt” to emulate the regulatory tricks perfected by Ethiopia. The laws in Kenya seem to be 
copied from those previously promulgated in Ethiopia. Some are more obvious than others; for 
instance, the PBO amendment that attempts to restrict foreign funding to just 15% seems to 
resemble the CSP’s restriction of 10% in Ethiopia. Moreover, the anti-terrorism laws in the two 
states seem to share many commonalities. Article 75 of Security Laws (Amendment) Act of Kenya 
appears to mirror Ethiopia’s Article 6 of the ATP on the "encouragement of terrorism," which is 
punishable by 10 to 20 years of imprisonment. Article 75 of Security Laws (Amendment) Act 
states that a person can be imprisoned for 14 years if he/she "publishes or utters a statement 
that is likely to be understood as directly or indirectly encouraging or inducing another person 
to commit or prepare to commit an act of terrorism commits an offense.” Similarly, Article 6 of 
the ATP reads: “Whosoever publishes or causes the publication of a statement that is likely to 
be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct 
or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission or preparation or 
instigation of an act of terrorism.” 
Article 3 of Kenya’s Prevention of Terrorism Act’s designation of a terrorist label on entities that 
act “in association with” another entity designated as a “specified entity”/terrorist organization 
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seems similar to Article 25(2) of Ethiopia’s ATP, which extends the terrorist label to organizations 
that "directly or indirectly" "[support] or [encourage] terrorism." This can encompass acts such 
as extending "moral support" (Article 5(1)), which is punishable by 10 to 15 years of 
imprisonment. What Legal Practitioner and Human Rights Activist said clearly shows the 
implications of having such vague and broad statements that are open to various interpretations. 
He said, "If you are considered as a terrorist, which I do not know for a fact, then, my having 
coffee with you can be enough to get me labeled as a terrorist and put away for good on terrorism 
charges.”  
Besides the prolonged pre-trial detention of suspected terrorists in both Ethiopia and Kenya, the 
anti-terrorism laws in the two states give extensive powers to the security forces. Article 19(1) 
of Ethiopia’s ATP allows the police to “arrest without court warrant any person whom he 
reasonably suspects to have committed or is committing a terrorist act.” Similarly, Article 16 
permits the police, with only permission from the Director General of the Federal Police, to 
"stop vehicle and pedestrian in an area and conduct sudden searches at any time, and seize 
relevant evidence.” Article 23, on the admissibility of evidence in court, allows the use of 
"intelligence report[s] prepared in relation to terrorism, even if the report does not disclose the 
source or the method [in which] it was gathered.” This even makes it permissible to use torture 
methods to elicit self-incriminating confessions from people accused of terrorism. Mentioning 
Article 66(c)(v) of Kenya’s Security Laws (Amendment) Act suffices to make the point that 
security forces are endowed with extensive powers. This provision authorizes the security forces 
to “do anything considered necessary to preserve national security.” Such provisions, which are 
so broad to fit any activity are making human rights work the most dangerous of all.  
The discussions thus far have addressed the “how” research question. The within-case analysis 
provided shows how transnational human rights pressure at critical political junctures contributed 
to the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in state behavior in the cases 
of Ethiopia and Kenya. The following chapter addresses the “why” research question by 
presenting the analytically relevant systemic and case-specific contextual factors. 
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Chapter 6 
Strategic Importance:  
An Aggregation of Contextual Factors   
As discussed in the preceding chapters, the pressure applied by transnational human rights 
advocacy networks during the 2005 and 2007/8 political crises in Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively, 
ultimately contributed to the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in 
state behavior. The previous chapter on the two parts of the mechanism explained how this 
occurred, and the discussion in this chapter sheds light on why those processes played out the 
way they did. In order to clearly comprehend why target actors (target states and donors) reacted 
to the transnational human rights pressure applied during the identified critical junctures by 
constructing counter-discourse and engaging in quiet diplomacy, which was followed by 
regulatory crackdown, we must consider the conditioning impact of contextual factors. 
Therefore, the study uses a non-linear analytical framework to account for the relevant systemic 
and case-specific contextual factors.  
Advocacy strategies, especially those rooted in leverage politics, are expected to induce a positive 
human rights change in states that are conventionally considered to be vulnerable targets, which 
has not been the case in Ethiopia and Kenya. Western donors, the traditional champions of the 
human rights cause, have not responded to the pressure applied to them by transnational human 
rights advocacy networks to use their leverage in pushing these target states to conform to 
international norms. Although Ethiopia is an archetypally vulnerable state by conventional 
dimensions of vulnerability, the phrase, “Ethiopia is not vulnerable to transnational human rights 
pressure” was mentioned several times during the interviews conducted for this study. Due to 
the contextual factors discussed in the following sections, Ethiopia and Kenya have leverage to 
counter-balance transnational human rights pressure. As Terrence Lyons explained, if anything, 
the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya show that “vulnerability is contextual.” Hence, sensitivity to 
context should be at the heart of any human rights advocacy initiative. When doing advocacy, 
“we need to take into account background information on the political, cultural, historical, and 
religious matters,” said International Human Rights Worker 2.  
Page | 122 
 
Quite a few studies have tried to analyze the peculiarities of Ethiopia that might compel donors 
to practice quiet diplomacy by turning a blind eye to the ever-deteriorating human rights 
practices. Furtado and Smith (2009) point to Ethiopia’s negotiation tactics in creating a policy 
space to compensate for its high aid dependence. Fantini and Puddu (2016) have taken a historical 
lens and emphasized the role of “high-modernist” ideology in legitimizing the government’s 
development discourse and schemes, which they claim are accompanied by exceptional practices 
"to bypass the conventional standards of democracy, accountability, and transparency" (100). 
Dereje’s (2011) analysis focuses on ideological divisions in aid relationships. He finds it odd that 
traditional Western donors, who often subscribe to models along “the liberal continuum,” with 
the private sector taking the upper hand in facilitating economic development, channel huge 
amounts of aid to a regime that follows an alternative model that hails the role of the state in 
facilitating economic development. Borchgrevink (2008) points to the failure of donors in 
advancing a coordinated strategy as the major rationale for the ineffectiveness of donor 
conditionality in influencing Ethiopia's policies.   
Based on the semi-structured expert interviews and the in-depth analysis of primary documents 
and secondary sources, this study identifies alternative powers and the “new scramble” for Africa, 
and “security complex” and the war on terror in the HOA as the analytically relevant systemic 
contextual factors at the international and regional levels of analysis, respectively. The observable 
implications of these systemic contextual factors in the cases are also analyzed and presented. 
With regards to the case-specific contextual factors at the domestic level of analysis, political 
capital, and economic progress and potential are identified. While a scattered mentioning of some 
of the systemic and case-specific contextual factors has been attempted by preceding studies 
(Dereje, 2011; Wondwosen, 2013), this study offers a comprehensive analysis of the contextual 
factors that could have a conditioning impact on the processes of interest for this study. As 
highlighted in Chapter 3, these contextual factors are not causal agents in their own right; rather, 
they are existing conditions that affect how the processes of interest playout. These various and, 
often interlinked, contextual factors are aggregated and referred to as strategic importance.  
The study recognizes that the advancement of a pragmatic foreign policy of being aware and 
taking advantage of these contextual factors by the target states to have been contributing factors 
for the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian entrenchment in Ethiopia and Kenya. As 
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George Kegoro puts it, “The Kenyan government knows that it is not the Burundi government 
[…] so [it] can misbehave.” Many interview subjects similarly stated how aware Ethiopia and 
Kenya are of the leverage that these contextual factors provide. In the words of International 
Human Rights Worker 2, these states “play their cards incredibly well.” After all, these contextual 
factors provide these states with a “negotiating capital” (Whitfield & Fraser, 2010) in their 
negotiations with donors.81 
6.1 Systemic contextual factors  
The interview subjects pointed out various systemic contextual factors that contributed to the 
global backsliding of human rights promotion and protection. Many have voiced how liberal values 
seem to be under attack, and the crackdown on the civic space is one of the obvious signs. Among 
many others, the increasing normalization of far-right populist politics and the immigration crisis 
in the West were mentioned. Two of the recurring factors for a deeper analysis of their 
conditioning impact on the processes of interest are discussed below.  
6.1.1 Alternative powers and the “new scramble” for Africa 
The contemporary international order is characterized by the coming to an end of the US-led 
unipolar world with the rise of alternative powers from the Global South (Fantu & Obi, 2010). 
By offering competing models of development, these powers are redefining the modalities of 
international development cooperation (Eyben, 2013). This is manifested in the present-day 
rivalry to “scramble” the “up-and-coming”/“rising” Africa. Africa’s image is radically changing from 
that of a helpless charity-case often torn by war and famine to a place for business with expanding 
market opportunities, a cheap and abundant labor force, and untapped natural resources. Africa 
is home to some of the world’s fastest-growing economies. This explains global actors’ fierce 
competition in establishing a strong economic foothold in the continent, which has led to an 
increased influx of foreign capital. Africa’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock rose from 
153,745 million in 2000 to 709,174 million in 2014 (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2015: A7). Some, however, are skeptical about the potential of the rhetoric about 
                                                          
81 This is a recently developed analytical approach used to examine the negotiating strategies adopted by eight African 
states. It looks at the leveraging of prior economic, political, ideological, and institutional conditions in aid negotiations 
so as to secure policy preferences. 
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the rising Africa in furthering its interests. As benefits are not visibly trickling down to the poor 
segment of the continent’s population, it seems that only the few linked to the global financial 
value chains are profiting. Hence, the “Africa rising rhetoric” may ultimately facilitate the further 
looting of the continent rather than actually lifting it (see The Economist, 2013).  
With the emergence of alternative powers such as China and India, African states are provided 
with some policy space to maneuver the terms and the outcomes of their engagements with the 
donor community. With the case of Kenya, Bachmann (2012: 126) has shown how the changes 
in global dynamics present states with opportunities for state consolidation that are often 
executed by “attracting, sustaining, and diversifying international partners.” These new avenues 
of leverage provided to the African states challenge traditional/Western donors’ long-established 
influence in the continent. Further, this impact intensifies because the alternative powers have a 
different approach to development co-operation (Zimmerman & Smith, 2011). The alternative 
powers emphasize the importance of sovereign equality, and they frame their engagement with 
African states as among partners or as “economic co-development” (Anshan, 2007: 73), rather 
than the conventional donor-recipient relationship. Therefore, they try not to interfere in the 
internal affairs of their partners, at least in principle, and they avoid attaching governance-related 
conditions to the development co-operation they provide.  
China’s strategy, for instance, differs from the Western terms of engagement in Africa that, for 
long, pushed prescriptions of macro-economic and institutional reforms (Ilunga, 2015). China’s 
strategy in Africa is based on sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
states (Aning, 2010: 151). This, of course, is subject to some exceptions with regards to foreign 
policy objectives, such as the “one China policy” (Sun, 2014). As China views human rights 
promotion and protection as an exclusive domain of internal affairs, it frequently states its dismay 
at the naming and shaming of African states in different intergovernmental platforms. It argues 
that they are being judged by Western standards, which it considers to be unfair given the 
different historical and development trajectories followed in the continent (see Hanqin, 2012). 
This argument is also used to counter the criticisms regarding its own human rights practices. It 
thus uses its veto power in the UNSC to shield African regimes from international sanctions. This 
stance, however, has been criticized for encouraging the further commission of human rights 
violations.  
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The underlying motive for the renewed rivalry to “scramble” Africa is not only economic; it also 
has a political dimension. Cooley (2015) has noted how the increasing acceptance of “civilizational 
diversity” adversely impacts the protracted hegemony of Western liberal values. The West 
struggles to sustain its position as a source of global norms by outbidding the alternative powers’ 
appealing promise of autonomy. For instance, if the “China model” succeeds in Africa, it could 
show that Western democratic ideals are not universal (Sun, 2014: 1). Lukasz (2011) has stated 
that, beyond its model of development, ideas such as strategic partnership based on political 
equality and mutual trust make China attractive in the eyes of the African states. This has led to 
the impression of a growing Chinese soft power in Africa.  
Furthermore, the mere existence of alternative powers limits Western donors’ leverage. The aid 
conditionality regime that they may attach to human rights practices, or the robust measures that 
they may threaten to take, such as suspension of aid or the severance of diplomatic relations, can 
easily be offset by the alternatives powers. According to Levitsky and Way (2006: 383), “Western 
leverage” over authoritarian states is limited when there is “a regional power that can provide 
alternative sources of economic, military, and/or diplomatic support.” This explains the increasing 
fade of the liberally attuned conditionality regime pushed by Western donors. As Samwel 
Mohochi has argued, due to economic interests, the Western donors “had to water down their 
approach so that human rights are no longer a pre-requisite for foreign assistance.” This has come 
at the price of gross human rights violations perpetrated by recipient states against their citizens, 
he added. The current change in the discourse of international development cooperation, which 
increasingly subscribes to the aid effectiveness agenda that focuses on quantifiable results, is often 
attributed as a function of Western donors’ growing fear of losing ground to the alternative 
powers. 
Observable implications 
The leverage that emanates from this systemic contextual factor is advanced by Ethiopia's mastery 
of pragmatist foreign policy. Ethiopia's foreign policy has always been sensible to favorable 
opportunity structures in the international system to diversify its alliances. Except for a brief 
period during the previous military regime, when the country developed an exclusive alliance 
with the Soviet Union, this trend has been a defining essence of the country's foreign policy 
Page | 126 
 
strategy (Clapham, 1988: 239-240). At present, Ethiopia strengthens partnerships with the US, 
the EU, and China, in addition to reaching out to other emerging powers such as India, Brazil, 
and Turkey (Institute of Development Studies, 2012). By avoiding absolute reliance on a single 
power, Ethiopia capitalizes its leverage over powers that are in competition to set up uncontested 
economic, political, security, and ideological presence in Africa. In general, diversifying alliances 
contributes to minimizing the likelihood of a robust impact from the leverage politics of 
transnational human rights advocacy networks.  
After expressing his astonishment over the resources that the Ethiopian government spends on 
foreign lobbyists and advisors, Merera Gudina points out that the government’s mindfulness of 
its leverage over Western donors explains how it managed to counterbalance its vulnerability to 
transnational human rights pressure. Journalist also shared this view and emphasized the 
pragmatism of the regime, saying:  
Though it should have been vulnerable to human rights pressure, […] the system [the 
regime in power] knows how to counterbalance that by exploiting the West and the East 
division in the international system. It does not have a static political program or policy, 
either foreign or domestic, that it sticks with. It changes constantly. 
The same has been true for Kenya’s foreign policy. Diversifying alliances dates back to the Cold 
War years. Bachmann (2012: 130) has described how Kenya managed to exploit the Cold War 
divide to obtain assistance from various donors by avoiding reliance on one side. The Coalition 
(2013: 19) states that engaging with "the traditional economic powers, including the USA, Great 
Britain, and other European countries, as well as emerging players such as China, Brazil, India, 
and Russia" is important to realizing Kenya's national interest. Zahid Rajan has emphasized how 
the emergence of the alternative powers changed the dynamics of the relationship between the 
Kenyan government and the Western donors, saying, “The Chinese changed the equation.” 
The advantages of diversifying alliances are twofold. First, by showing that they have alternatives, 
Ethiopia and Kenya compel their Western donors to behave in their favor so that they avoid 
jeopardizing the economic, security, and other interests that they have in these states. 
Additionally, if these states lose their leverage that specifically speaks to the interests of their 
Western donors, then the alliance that they have already established with the alternative powers 
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would be useful. Here, recalling what happened during the 2005 political crisis in Ethiopia is 
insightful. When Western donors suspended direct financial assistance to the Federal 
Government, China stepped in to fill the gap, and it was the first country to applaud the EPRDF’s 
highly contested electoral victory (Gedion, 2009: 5).  
6.1.2 “Security complex” and the war on terror in the Horn of Africa (HOA) 
These contextual factors are intrinsically intertwined; thus, they are jointly analyzed and 
presented. The HOA is a geo-politically significant part of the world. By the virtue of its 
immediacy to the Red Sea, an inlet of the Indian Ocean, it separates Africa and Asia. Through the 
strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, it is connected to the Gulf of Aden, a waterway that provides an outlet 
for the oil from the Persian Gulf, where the world’s largest oil deposits are located. Moreover, 
to the north of the Red Sea lies the Suez Canal, an artificial waterway that provides an expressway 
to Europe and Asia without having to navigate around Africa. These geo-strategic perks explain 
why the superpowers engaged in a furious proxy politics during the Cold War years to have the 
region under their respective spheres of influence. 
The region has some peculiar features that distinguish it from the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Clapham (2017: 3) has referred to the region as “non-colonial Africa” to highlight the distinctive 
historical trajectory of the region. He argues that the region was profoundly influenced by the 
survival struggle of “the only indigenous sub-Saharan African state, the Ethiopian Empire, to retain 
its independence through the era of colonial conquest” (2017: 3). "Politically unstable," "volatile," 
and "conflict-ridden" are the most common catchphrases used by academics, politicians, and the 
media to describe the region. This is perhaps a candid depiction of the region's state of affairs 
given the fact that it has so far witnessed the greatest number of deaths and destruction the 
world has ever seen after the Second World War (Sharamo & Mesfin, 2011: xii). While it is 
ravished by innumerable and substantive security challenges with a transnational magnitude, such 
as the massive refugee outflow, a current global headache, the issue of terrorism and piracy are 
the most hyped of all.  
The theory of “regional security complex” best captures the security challenges of the region 
(Mesfin, 2011). According to Buzan and Waever (2003), in regions where security problems 
emanate from the geographic proximity of states, military and political threats are significantly 
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felt in states of the immediate vicinity. Insights from this theory can illustrate how the political 
stability of the states in the region is interconnected. States cannot afford to oversee turmoil in 
the neighboring states, as the spillover effects often transcend national boundaries. This is further 
exacerbated by the artificial boundaries in the region that are drawn and redrawn, as they were 
formed with utter disregard for the socio-economic realities of the region to serve colonial 
interests. Furthermore, the interventionist foreign policies of the states in the region contribute 
to the security problems. For long, states in the region have advanced foreign policies that involve 
extending support to proxy forces in neighboring states, a trend often seen as an empirical 
embodiment of the longstanding realist's notion, "my enemy’s enemy is my friend” (Mesfin, 2011: 
16). 
While the region served as a proxy battling ground for the superpower rivalry during the Cold 
War years, mainly due to its geo-political positioning, it has come to be considered a major threat 
to global security following the state collapse in Somalia in 1991. This year also marks the 
overthrow of the military regime in Ethiopia and the emergence of Eritrea as an independent 
state. Furthermore, Somaliland, an independent territorial entity in the region that lacks the 
recognition required for the status of statehood, was also established in 1991. These 
developments led Clapham (2017: 60) to refer to 1991 as the “year zero in the Horn.” After 
1991, Somalia was often considered a safe haven for international terrorists. Moreover, the 
international pirates that operate off its coasts are an increasing threat to the world’s energy 
security (Ulrichsen, 2011). Al Qaeda operatives and other fundamentalists in the region often 
collaborate with like-minded groups in the Arabian Peninsula, creating an “insecurity nexus” 
between the two regions. Besides the persisting confrontation between the different contending 
groups in Somalia and the increasing threat from Al-Shabaab, an Al Qaeda-affiliated insurgency in 
control of much of southern Somalia, the region suffers from other security threats. The border 
tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the intra-state conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan are 
only the tip of the iceberg. These security challenges, in addition to other natural catastrophes 
such as the incidence of drought often followed by famine, have made the region one of the 
hotspots of humanitarian crises in the world.  
The implication of the aforementioned security hurdles is far-reaching in the context of the global 
war on terror. The eminence of this international initiative following the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
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on the US elevated the strategic worth of the HOA. In addition to the security problems in 
Somalia, the frequent terrorist attacks in the region contributed to its consideration as a favorable 
proliferating ground for international terrorism. Here, a reminder of the region's past with Al 
Qaeda may be useful. Until he left for Afghanistan, Osama Bin Laden, its founder, lived in Sudan 
from 1991 until 1996 (Shinn, 2004a: 40). These facts attracted considerable attention as security 
problems have become increasingly transnational in the “globalizing” contemporary world. 
Attempts thus far to counter terrorism and piracy in the region have chosen an approach of 
containing the problems at the source, which often entails providing training and equipment to 
boost the capacity of the states’ security forces in the region. Here, the Combined Task Force 
150 (CTF-150) and the Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) are cases in 
point.  
The CTF-150 is a multinational coalition of the naval forces of 25 states. It is based in Bahrain, 
and it aims to promote maritime security by countering terrorism and piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
and the Indian Ocean. The CJTF-HOA, on the other hand, is a task force of the US Africa 
Command (AFRICOM), the only permanent US military base on the African continent. It is 
stationed in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, with a mission of building the defense capabilities of the 
states in East Africa to counter violent extremist organizations. Camp Lemonnier is used for 
drone operations against Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Islamist forces in the Yemen civil war 
(Clapham, 2017: 174). Djibouti also has France’s, China’s first, and Japan’s only overseas military 
bases. When it established the base in July 2017, the Chinese government stated that it would be 
used to resupply navy ships taking part in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in the region, 
particularly those operating off the coasts of Somalia and Yemen.  
The counter-terrorism and counter-piracy initiatives in the region, like the ones mentioned 
above, advance a policy of avoiding state collapse. The world has learned from the state collapse 
in Somalia that terrorist groups can take advantage of power vacuums. If other states in the region 
were to follow the same path, this would present a much larger threat to the security of the 
region with extensive spillover effect in the Middle East and the world at large. It seems as if the 
international community prefers helping authoritarian regimes with poor human rights records 
to remain in power than taking any action that might have a destabilizing effect. According to 
Wondwosen (2013: 1019), Western donors fear that more pressure on Ethiopia “could weaken 
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the state authority […] and finally might lead the nation and the region to political instability.” 
With the recognition of the need to mitigate the security risks that emanate from “ungoverned 
spaces,” Western states increasingly securitize their foreign policies towards regions with fragile 
states (Bachmann & Hönke, 2010: 101). The states in the HOA usually score among the top 20 
in the Fragile States index, which measures states’ vulnerability to conflict or collapse.  
Observable implications  
As Ndung’u Wainaina has said, the current tendency to perceive the world in a singular lens of 
terrorism is the most significant challenge to human rights promotion and protection, especially 
in states that are at the forefront of the war on terror. Similarly, Henry Maina has explained how 
difficult it is to pressure Ethiopia and Kenya, as they are the “regional leaders of the anti-terror 
campaign.” According to the 2002 National Security Strategy of the US, Ethiopia and Kenya, along 
with Nigeria and South Africa, are the “anchor states” for the US’s security policies in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Bachmann & Hönke, 2010: 103). Both Ethiopia and Kenya have served as a base for 
counter-terrorism operations in the HOA. Here, US drone stations at Arba Minch, Ethiopia (now 
closed), and Camp Simba in Manda Bay, Kenya, are cases in point (see The Washington Post, 
2013). Furthermore, the 2007 HOA rendition program, on which the US, Kenya, Ethiopia, and 
Somalia collaborated, is worth noting (See Human Rights Watch, 2008d). In the post-9/11 
international environment, the focus has shifted from human rights to advancing security 
interests, said Henry Maina. He mentioned Ethiopia’s current membership in both the UNSC and 
the UN Human Rights Council as examples of this shift. The fact that a state that, at times, refuses 
to cooperate with its special mechanisms manages to hold such a position in the UN system 
might come as a surprise, he added. Here, Ethiopia’s continued refusal to grant access to any of 
the UN special rapporteurs since 2007 is notable.  
A trend that Keenan (2013) refers to as "terrorism rent," an act of benefiting from fabricated 
terrorism threats, has gained momentum in contemporary Africa, especially in regions with 
security threats as in the Horn and East Africa. Ethiopia and Kenya have been accused of 
exploiting the global revulsion of terrorism to perpetrate human rights abuses. They use the 
terrorist label and the Western-donor-funded counter-terrorism infrastructures to crack down 
on domestic dissent. Bachmann (2012: 138) explains how the counter-terrorism regime has 
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strengthened the state’s authority in Kenya, especially the resources it provides with the intention 
of boosting “the policing capacities of intelligence services, the military, and various police units 
in a country.” Here, we are reminded that the Kenyan security forces are often accused of 
perpetrating gross human rights violations in the context of counter-terrorism operations. Kenya 
has long been among the top six recipients of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program, one of the 
US’s major counter-terrorism programs, alongside Pakistan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Jordan, and 
Iraq (Bachmann, 2012: 135). As the US seems to be advancing a policy of outsourcing the war on 
terror to regional powers, its security partnerships with Ethiopia and Kenya appear to be a 
priority that it wants to maintain at all costs, even if it means ignoring the transnational urges to 
check their deteriorating human rights practices. According to Paulos Milkias, Ph.D., professor of 
political science at Concordia University, the US is “too scared to go back to Somalia” after the 
Black Hawk Down incident.82 This incident took the lives of 18 US troops.83 “It was another 
Vietnam on a smaller scale,” he added. Similarly, George Morara said,  
The Americans do not have an appetite of going back to Somalia at all. If they can use 
their drones and their proxies here, they are ok. They do not want to have their people 
on the ground. They would rather have their people in the air where they can’t be reached. 
They would have us on the ground.  
Carothers (2007: 7) contends that the US administration “puts democracy on the back burner 
and maintains or cultivates warm relationships with nondemocratic governments” when 
economic and security interests are at stake. Due to Ethiopia’s involvement in fighting “Islamists 
in Somalia,” he argues, the US “has downplayed the democracy issue” (2007: 8). Similarly, this 
study argues that if it was not for the magnitude of their role in this enterprise, the impact of 
which escalates due to the “security complex” in the region, the leverage politics advanced by 
transnational human rights advocacy networks during the identified critical political junctures 
would have succeeded in inducing Western donors, especially the US, to take a robust stance in 
                                                          
82 Phone interview, September 2017. 
83 In December 1992, US troops entered Somalia by the order of the then President George H. W. Bush. The official 
justification given at the time was to provide support to UN’s humanitarian effort in alleviating a famine. After the 
casualties incurred during the battle of Mogadishu in October 1993, popularly referred to as the “Black Hawk Down” 
incident, the President at the time, Bill Clinton, withdrew the remaining troops. 
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addressing human rights concerns in Ethiopia and Kenya. The excerpt from the interview with 
Yakob Hailemariam captures these points.  
I don’t think Ethiopia would be vulnerable as long as terrorism is on the plate. I think they 
will always take refuge in that. They can get away with murder because of the fact that 
they are fighting terrorism. God knows how many Ethiopians have been sacrificed for this 
objective. 
Journalist believes that we would have had a different scenario “if Ethiopia was located where 
South Africa is,” for instance. In order to comprehend the case-specific implications of the above-
discussed systemic contextual factors on Ethiopia, a highlight of its regional hegemony is pertinent. 
In the words of Clapham (2017: 179), “Any framework for regional order must consequently 
take the dominant position of Ethiopia as a given.” Due to its vast population, military and 
economic capabilities, alliances in the continent and beyond, its relative stability and more, 
Ethiopia is often referred to as the “oasis of stability” in the HOA. Many interview subjects stated 
that this perception causes Western donors to forgo human rights concerns. Negasso Gidada 
said:  
The Ethiopian government is well aware that the West would not dare to disrupt a state 
that is considered to be a linchpin of a highly significant region. The stability of the Red 
Sea and the Indian Ocean is something that they would not gamble on. The regime uses 
this not to give in to its vulnerability. 
Furthermore, Ethiopia’s hegemony explains why it became the US’s key partner in the war on 
terror. While Ethiopia had a track record of fighting transnational terrorist organizations in the 
region such as Al Ittihad al Islamiya before the issue became a global priority (Shinn, 2004b), its 
2006 intervention in neighboring Somalia is often mentioned to underscore its dedication to the 
cause (Nzau, 2010). This intervention, which lasted from 2006 to 2009, aimed at helping the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia fight against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a 
cluster of Islamic courts that united with the aim of creating a rival government. By 2006, the ICU 
was in control of much of southern Somalia, including the capital, Mogadishu. Ethiopia's 
intervention in Somalia, which is referred to as an “invasion” by some, can be argued to have 
been pursued to advance a legitimate national security interest.  
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Ethiopia, given its long and un-demarcated border with its politically unstable neighbor Somalia, 
had to stop the ICU from establishing a legitimate government. If it had, ICU would probably 
have rekindled the irredentist sentiment of uniting all the Somalis in the region. Many at the time 
wondered whether ICU was “a Taliban Regime in the making” (Møller, 2009: 30-31). Moreover, 
it had already declared Jihad against Ethiopia; it was armed and financed by Ethiopia’s adversary, 
Eritrea; and it provided support to the OLF and ONLF, rebellious groups that the Ethiopian 
government already labeled as terrorist organizations. Ethiopia’s actions can thus be regarded as 
emanating from the need to safeguard its national security and territorial integrity. This 
explanation applies to Kenya as well, which is also, even more so, considered a regional hegemon 
and "anchor state" in the Greater Horn and East Africa. Its military forces also intervened in 
neighboring Somalia in 2011. Somali nationalism has always been viewed as a threat to Kenya’s 
national security and territorial integrity. Kenya also shares a border with Somalia and has ethnic 
Somali citizenry in its North Eastern Province. Kenya’s military intervention in October 2011 was 
aimed at fighting against Al-Shabaab, which started as one of the factions that came out of the 
disintegrated ICU. This intervention was the first of its kind in Kenya’s history; Kenya had never 
sent its soldiers abroad before.  
While terrorism is a real threat to the national security of Kenya, the counter-terrorism 
operations thus far have been criticized for not being in compliance with national, regional, and 
international human rights norms. Kenya is often accused of "fighting terror with terror.” This 
includes the profiling of certain groups along ethnic and religious lines, which is said to fuel 
radicalization and help sustain terrorist organizations, as it creates the grievance needed to recruit 
new members. To borrow Zahid Rajan’s expression, “It is true that Kenya has been a victim of 
terrorism. But the terrorism card has been used cleverly.” We can mention some of the major 
terrorist attacks in Kenya. The September 2013 attack on the gate shopping center in Nairobi by 
Al-Shabaab, that took the lives of more than 60 people, was the worst terrorist attack after the 
1998 US Embassy bombing that took the lives of over 200 people. The US Embassy bombing in 
Nairobi was accompanied by another US Embassy bombing in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and was 
carried out by Al Qaeda. These US Embassy Bombings were Al Qaeda’s first major attacks. Other 
attacks followed in 2002, on a hotel near Mombasa and on a passenger airplane. Since these 
attacks, Kenya has been a close ally of the West in the war on terror. Recent attacks, such as the 
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November 2014 attack on a bus that took the lives of 28 passengers, and another one in April 
2015 at Garissa University College that left 148 people dead, are worth noting. Al-Shabaab took 
responsibility for both attacks. Besides the security measures taken to fight terrorism inside 
Kenya and in neighboring Somalia, Kenya was building a 700-km-long security wall along its border 
with Somalia. The wall was planned to extend from Mandera to Kiunga, and was intended to 
prevent Al-Shabaab militants from crossing the border to Kenya. The construction, however, is 
suspended at the time of writing due to diplomatic talks with the government in Somalia. 
6.2 Case-specific contextual factors  
6.2.1 Political capital  
Maintaining partnership with states that have high esteem among their peers is often considered 
a valuable asset for diplomatic alliances in intergovernmental platforms. The lower sensitivity of 
Western donors to check human rights situations in Ethiopia and Kenya can be explained by their 
influential standing in regional and continental affairs. Both Ethiopia and Kenya have always been 
at the forefront of African nationalism. Their leaders at the time, Emperor Haile Selasse of 
Ethiopia and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, were the founding fathers of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU). The OAU was a predecessor of the AU, which was founded on 25 May 1963 in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ethiopia is the only African country that has escaped the onslaught of 
colonialism by a military victory over European colonial forces. Emperor Minelik II of the 
Ethiopian Empire fought and defeated the Italians at the battle of Adwa in 1896. Ethiopia is thus 
considered a true symbol of pride and independence, not just for Africa but for the entire black 
race. Furthermore, the support it has provided for other African states during their struggle for 
political independence from colonial rule adds to its political capital in the continent. As a sign of 
recognition of its monumental place in African political history and identity, the AU is seated in 
Addis Ababa, making Ethiopia a de-facto African capital.  
Similarly, Kenya commands immense political capital in the region and the African continent as a 
whole. In the words of Morris Odhiambo, Kenya is considered an "anchor state" in East Africa. 
It often takes a leading role in regional economic and security arrangements, such as the IGAD 
and the EAC. George Kegoro has used a historical lens to explain the roots of Kenya’s political 
capital in the continent. It served as one of three settler colonies for the British Empire in Africa; 
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the other two were Zimbabwe and South Africa. Hence, it has a special place in the 
Commonwealth of Nations, an intergovernmental platform for the former territories of the 
British Empire.  
According to Flemes (2007), a state has to fulfill four criteria to be considered a regional power: 
a willingness to assume the role; possession of the necessary resources, both hard and soft 
competencies; a foreign policy that combines coercive and persuasive instruments; and legitimacy. 
Ethiopia and Kenya seem to excel at all these conditions. Apart from their large sizes84 and 
populations85, and their competent military86 and economic capabilities, their influential 
involvement in regional affairs, either unilateral or through regional arrangements, qualifies them 
as regional powers. These states take the lead in settling conflicts and possible threats in the 
region by either coercive or diplomatic foreign policy instruments. Their engagements in the 
peace processes in Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan clearly demonstrate the magnitude of their 
regional role. In the words of Dereje Feyissa, “It seems safe to say that Ethiopia actively 
participates in almost all of the contemporary global issues ranging from peacekeeping to the 
refugee crises, and it is no wonder why donors want to capitalize on this fact.” Correspondingly, 
George Kegoro has explained how Kenya is seen as a standing ground for international responses 
to the security and humanitarian challenges not just in the Horn and East Africa but also in Central 
Africa. In brief, both states take the lead in multilateral initiatives to address regional and 
continental issues.  
Both Ethiopia and Kenya are at the forefront of peacekeeping initiatives in the region and beyond. 
Terrence Lyons has stated that these states' peacekeeping role in the region is more important 
than their counter-terrorism engagements. He argues that, as terrorism is as much of a threat to 
these states as it is to the rest of the world, it is in their best interest to take part in efforts that 
fight against it. “Ethiopia would not stop fighting Al-Shabaab if the US decides to end its war on 
terror,” he added. But one could also argue the same for peacekeeping operations. Keeping a 
peaceful neighborhood is also in the best interests of Ethiopia and Kenya. Both are the major 
contributors of troops to the UN peacekeeping missions. According to Bachmann (2012: 130), 
                                                          
84 Ethiopia is the tenth largest state while Kenya is the twenty seventh in Africa. 
85 Ethiopia is the second populous state while Kenya is the seventh in Africa.  
86 On the Global Firepower list for 2018, which rates countries by their military strength, Ethiopia ranks sixth while 
Kenya ranks fourteenth in Africa.  
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Kenya, which was among the top 10 troop-contributing states for the UN peace missions until 
the mid-2000s, has minimized the contribution to 900 personnel in 2009 from what used to be 
around 2,000 on average in the previous years. This change came about with its increased 
involvement in regional peace and security mechanisms, such as the African Peace and Security 
Architecture, which was enabled by Article 4 (h) and (j) of AU’s constitutive act.87 However, it 
still contributes military and police personnel to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the AU-UN 
Hybrid Mission to Darfur (UNAMID), the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad 
(MINURCAT), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and the UN Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUC) (Bachmann, 2012: 130).  
To clearly capture the leading roles of Ethiopia and Kenya in the maintenance of regional peace 
and security, let us closely examine their peacekeeping engagement in Somalia. Both Ethiopia and 
Kenya have taken an active role in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since its 
establishment in January 2007. AMISOM is AU’s “longest-running, largest, most costly, and most 
deadly operation” (Williams, 2018: 172). Ethiopia and Kenya are among the six troop-contributing 
states to AMISOM; the other four are Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone. AMISOM is 
AU’s peacekeeping mission which, in addition to its main mandates such as facilitating the delivery 
of humanitarian aid, supports the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in its fight against Al-
Shabaab. FGS is the current internationally recognized government in Somalia, which was 
established in August 2012 when the tenure of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
ended. TFG was the internationally recognized government of Somalia between 2004 and 2012, 
and it replaced the Transitional National Government (TNG), the first internationally recognized 
government of Somalia after the state collapse in 1991. TNG was in power from 2000 until 2004. 
The other notable example is their engagement in the peace processes in the two Sudans. Kenya 
hosted the IGAD-facilitated negotiations between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) that led to the signing of the historic Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Ethiopia also plays a lead mediating role in the peace negotiations, and 
                                                          
87 Article 4 (h) allows the Union to intervene in a member state in cases of grave human rights violations such as war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. And Article 4(j) allows a member state to request intervention from 
the Union to restore peace and security. 
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it is the chief contributor to the peacekeeping force stationed in the Abyei area between Sudan 
and South Sudan. 
In addition to their peace and security roles, both Ethiopia and Kenya undertake developmental 
initiatives to advance regional integration. Ethiopia’s hydroelectric dam construction is a case in 
point; the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)’s potential to advance regional integration 
is immense. When completed, GERD would be the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa, 
and it would generate exportable surplus electricity to neighboring states. Another initiative of 
this nature is the Lamu Corridor Project of Kenya. This large infrastructure project has various 
components: ports, highway, railway, crude oil pipeline, airports, oil refinery, and resort cities. 
And this would integrate Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. Furthermore, it is pertinent to note 
that Kenya provides a sea outlet to the landlocked Uganda and Rwanda.  
6.2.2 Economic progress and potential  
In the ever-changing discourse surrounding global political economy, we often hear about the 
advantages of seizing systemic windows of opportunity to jump-start economic growth. As 
discussed already, the alternative powers present such an opportunity, which developing 
economies such as Ethiopia and Kenya can use to their advantage. As they transform into capital-
intensive economies, the alternative powers outsource their labor-intensive jobs to the 
developing economies. According to Mills, Obasanjo, Herbst, and Davis (2017: 134), with ever-
increasing labor unit costs as China ascends the industrial ladder into higher-value-added goods 
production, 85 million jobs would be vacated within a decade. Hence, developing economies need 
to devise strategies to amplify their comparative and competitive advantages. This necessitates a 
range of reforms ranging from creating an enabling economic policy framework to ensuring 
political stability and investing in infrastructural development (Mills et al., 2017:134). Ethiopia, for 
instance, advances a policy of attracting private sector investment as part of the GTP II (see 
National Planning Commission, 2015) by stressing its competitive advantage - low labor cost.88 
GTP II is a five-year plan to guide national developmental endeavors from 2015 until 2020 with 
the objective of making Ethiopia a middle-income economy by the year 2025. It is an extension 
                                                          
88 In Mills et al. (2017: 236), Hailemaraim Desalegn, the previous Prime Minister of Ethiopia, who was in office at the 
time of the interview for the book, was quoted saying that Ethiopia has the lowest salaries in Africa for even its top 
leadership, with his official salary being less than 400 USD a month.  
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of the GTP I, which was operational from 2010 until 2015. As a result, Ethiopia increased FDI 
flows from 221 million USD in 2009 to 1.2 billion USD in 2014 (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, 2015: A7). FDI from the US alone was 4 billion USD between 2013 and 
2015 (Mills et al. 2017: 237).  
Similar to Ethiopia’s GTP, Kenya has a development plan called Kenya Vision 2030 that was 
launched in 2008 and aims at transforming Kenya into “a newly industrializing, middle-income 
country providing a high quality life to its citizens by the year 2030” (Government of the Republic 
of Kenya, 2007: 1). As mentioned in the previous chapters, Kenya fortunately managed to become 
a middle-income economy in 2014 after the GDP was recalculated with updated data from the 
better performing sectors - agricultural, manufacturing, telecommunications, and real estate. It 
was found that the GDP is actually 25% larger than what previous statistics had indicated. Abdul 
Noormohamed explained how the transformation in Kenya’s status from a low-income country 
to a middle-income country changed donors’ engagement. “Most of their funding now goes to 
trade instead of aid,” he said. 
 According to Africa Development Bank (AfDB) (2018: 8), East Africa is the fastest-growing 
region in the African continent, with a growth rate of 5.6% in 2017. The growth rate is estimated 
to increase to 5.9% and 6.1% in 2018 and 2019, respectively. The Bank’s categorization of East 
Africa encompasses both Ethiopia and Kenya. Kenya’s GDP grew by 5.8% in 2016, which declined 
to 5% in 2017 (2018: 150). Among other factors, the prolonged controversy that followed the 
August 2017 presidential election was mentioned as responsible for the decline in growth. The 
economy, however, is expected to recover and grow by 6.2% in 2019. Similarly, Ethiopia’s 
economy is one of the top-performing economies in Africa with a growth rate of 8% in 2015/16 
(African Development Bank Group, 2017: 261), making it one of the “African lion” economies 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2010). According to the WB, Ethiopia’s economy experienced growth 
averaging 10.5% a year from 2005/6 to 2015/16. As one of its former Presidents, Negasso Gidada, 
has explained, Ethiopia is an attractive destination from an economic perspective. The not-yet 
exploited natural resources, the abundant and cheap human resources, and the large market are 
priorities that Western donors and alternative powers want to take advantage of. This explains 
why they have traded the human rights cause for their economic interests. The same can be said 
about Kenya, especially after the recent discovery of oil reserves.  
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With insights that are drawn from the two case studies from the Horn and East Africa, this 
chapter and the preceding ones have shown how and why transnational human rights pressure 
at critical political junctures contributes to the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian 
entrenchment in state behavior. The final chapter in the following offers some concluding remarks 
on the issues of interest along with some recommendations that are put forth by the different 
experts interviewed for the study.  
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Chapter 7 
Zooming out of the Cases: 
Concluding Remarks and Recommendations  
Carrying out legalized actions that are often accompanied by administrative predicaments to 
systematically criminalize and/or incapacitate civil society actors seems to have become the new 
normal for contemporary authoritarian regimes. They have slowly abandoned the conventional 
ways of holding onto power. In the words of Henry Maina: 
States are learning and evolving in how to deal with the civil society actors. They are 
moving away from what would be seen as brutal use of state power to using a legalized 
process of managing what they would consider dissent, or people who are doing human 
rights work. In the past, they would just detain people without trial, for instance. Now 
they use laws to say that the actors have not paid taxes or that they are complicit in 
terrorist acts. They make sure that the law is structured to allow the freezing of assets 
the minute such claims are made, and they know that the issue would go through a 
lengthy court process. Even if you get acquitted of any crime, the damage is already done 
as intended. 
The strategies conventionally employed by transnational human rights advocacy networks are no 
longer effective in the contemporary international environment, especially those that rely on 
leverage politics. Western donors, who can positively influence the human rights policies and 
practices of recipient states, are less sensitive to the pressure applied on them to push target 
states to conform to international norms. While one would assume that the political cost of 
maintaining close ties to repressive regimes would outweigh donors’ security and the economic 
interest, this proved not to be the case with the presented within-case evidence from the Horn 
and East Africa. Donors have traded the human rights cause for other contemporary priorities, 
said Abdul Noormohamed. As Henry Maina explains, “The old donor conditionality approach has 
failed in the current multi-polar world.” Hence, transnational human rights advocacy networks 
must be creative in devising strategies that work better with the context at hand. This starts with 
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having a clear "understanding of the tools that are left in the toolbox," said Njonjo Mue. For him, 
coming to terms with the current reality is halfway to the solution: 
We must, first of all, accept that the ground has shifted. […] During the 90’s, there was 
an alignment of what we advocated for and the international environment’s permissibility 
for such ideas. Donors were effective leverage. There was an alignment of our interest 
and theirs. […] There was a window of opportunity in the early 90s. That was a time 
when change was blowing across the continent.  
At present, there is a change in the modality of aid; it is being pulled away from the civil society, 
especially from organizations engaged in advocacy. Unlike the 1990s, when civil society was 
endowed with considerable resources from the Western donor community to advance the 
human rights cause, there is a significant shrinking of funding, said Abdul Noormohamed. He too 
feels that recognizing this change is important, saying, “Let us be clear. We are not going to get 
funding as we did back in the 1990s. That model has gone.” Similarly, Morris Odhiambo said that 
learning about this shift has to take place, and one must realize that the traditional ways of 
advocacy no longer work. He then listed a serious of questions to be answered to determine a 
way forward. “How do we move forward? How do we get resources? How can we mobilize the 
public into funding this cause?” he asked. These questions are particularly applicable to domestic 
human rights NGOs in the Global South. In the words of Njonjo Mue, “We are alone,” and the 
sooner one realizes that, the better. At the moment, Western donors are experiencing 
democratic recession themselves, which “has robbed them of the moral high ground to come 
and lecture anyone about anything,” he added. The increasing normalization of far-right populist 
parties as influential political forces in Europe, the global migration crisis, the Brexit in the UK, 
and the success of President Donald Trump’s anti-immigration campaign in the US were some of 
the issues that the interview subjects pointed out to note that the Western donors are 
preoccupied with their own democratic backsliding. This has led many to voice the need for self-
reliance. In the words of Boniface Mwangi, photojournalist and politician, “The time has come for 
Africa to sort out itself.”89 In the introductory essay of Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in 
Crisis report, Michael J. Abramowitz, the president of Freedom House, states that 2017 marks 
                                                          
89 in-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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the year when political rights and civil liberties declined to their lowest point in more than a 
decade. He writes:  
Democracy is in crisis. The values it embodies - particularly the right to choose leaders in 
free and fair elections, freedom of the press, and the rule of law - are under assault and 
in retreat globally (Freedom House, 2018: 1).  
The rising “democracy charade,” a situation in which autocracies use elections as an instrument 
to pose as democracies without granting civil and political rights that make democracy meaningful, 
risks undermining human rights (Human Rights Watch, 2008a). The within-case insights provided 
by this study shed light on the political nature of human rights. As stated above, human rights 
issues are increasingly taking a peripheral position to security and economic interests. This is 
particularly true with regards to target states that are strategically important - those that draw 
leverage from systematic and case-specific contextual factors to counter-balance their seemingly 
vulnerable positions. According to Mesfin Woldemariam:  
The human rights issue is more of a political instrument than a normative principle. Think 
of it as a wound, and those countries [vulnerable target states] as wounded. It is 
something to touch so as to make it hurt, when and if needed. […] It is a rhetoric that 
is often used as an instrument of fear. Look at Saudi Arabia; it roundly violates human 
rights, but it gets to carry on with business as usual.  
Many interview subjects have expressed how the increasing normalization of self-censorship and 
insecurity in the civic space is backtracking the progress made on human rights promotion and 
protection. Samwel Mohochi has said that the continued attempts to muzzle dissenting voices in 
Kenyan civil society seem to be “a gradual mutation to autocratic rule” by abandoning the hard-
won civil and political rights. Journalist also expressed how the situation in Ethiopia often makes 
him feel that the state is “regressing in civilization.” Furthermore, the interview subjects have 
stated how counter-productive it would be in the long run if these states continue attempting to 
shrink or close the civic space. Jon Abbinik said, “They think it is smart. But it is not smart at all.” 
Similarly, a regional director of an international NGO who wishes to remain anonymous and who 
is referred as Regional Director of an International NGO, hopes that these states would realize 
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how “unsmart” this approach is.90 She said that the more brutal they get, the more attention they 
generate; she thinks that they are working against themselves. “When you close doors, people 
would always find another door to resistance,” she added. This stance is also shared by Erick 
Komolo (Ph.D.), a lawyer, who argued that attempts to clamp down on the civil society generate 
media coverage and sympathy for civil society actors.91 Therefore, it creates more publicity for 
the cause. According to Abdul Noormohamed, history has taught us that such a policy is “doomed 
to fail”; “You can't tell people who have already known what their rights are that they do not 
have those rights any longer. You can't tell a child who has already tasted a candy that he/she can 
no longer have some.” 
It is important to note that the above statements were made within the Kenyan context, where 
there is a relatively independent media functioning, as opposed to Ethiopia. The EPRDF coalition-
run government in Ethiopia seems to have managed to effectively institutionalize information 
blackout, or what Former Senior Official at the EHRC referred to as “the criminalization of 
freedom of expression.” To further explain what he meant, he used the print media as an 
example, “as the broadcast media is solely owned and operated by the government”; he provided 
a detailed explanation of the “unwritten and untold” legal and procedural bottlenecks that limit 
its significance. Terrence Lyons explained how transnational human rights pressure, which he 
described as "frustratingly ineffective," created an opportunity for the Ethiopian government to 
send a message to its Western donors that it would not be bossed around and lectured on issues. 
The counter-discourse against transnational human rights advocacy networks created the 
opportunity to make the abovementioned point “without having to directly tell this to their 
Western donors," he said. "HRW's criticism strengthened the EPRDF. They used the pressure 
to work for them rather than against them," he added. In sum, the pressure feeds Ethiopia's 
counter-discourse, which continues painting international and domestic human rights NGOs as 
promoters of a Western agenda and itself as a victim. Many interview subjects view the framing 
of human rights criticisms as "Western" to be a sheer defense mechanism. In the words of Abdul 
Noormohamed: 
                                                          
90 In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
91 In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
Page | 144 
 
[…] In the region, there is this belief that when people rise up and demand their rights, 
they are considered to be told by someone from outside to do so. It is foreigners who 
have come and told them that they have the right to have liberty or have a voice. Why 
would a foreigner come and tell you that you have these freedoms? In fact, it is the other 
way around. Foreigners came to colonize us and take away our freedoms. It is we who 
rose up in our struggle for independence. […] Our struggle for justice has always been 
local. 
Human Rights Lawyer 1 said that he measures progress with its human benefits, which he fails to 
see in Ethiopia. “As I see the situation getting worse, I cannot help but feel that our efforts are 
not bearing positive results,” he said. Note that a “network may have failed to accomplish its 
mission in terms of changing human rights practices in a tangible way, but it may still have made 
a big difference in other aspects” (Tang, 2009: 237). An insight from the field research in Nairobi, 
Kenya, is helpful to elaborate this point. Few interview subjects in Nairobi hesitated to use the 
expression “negative outcome” to refer to the impact of the transnational human rights pressure 
placed on advocacy targets during the 2007/8 political crisis. However, they agree that the impact 
goes further than a null effect. For them, the impact lies in a hard-to-categorize gray area. In other 
words, while they recognize the unintended negative consequences of the pressure in triggering 
the legal and administrative crackdown on the civic space, they, at the same time, gave credit to 
some positive outcomes of the pressure.  
Zahid Rajan, for instance, stated how the civil society served as “the voice of the people” during 
the days of the political crisis, without which there would have been a “complete muzzling” of 
opposing views. Similarly, others who are comfortable with labeling the outcome in state behavior 
as negative also mentioned some positive gains that resulted from the pressure. George Morara 
acknowledges the pressure’s impact in broadening the democratic space in Kenya. Ndung’u 
Wainaina said not to discard the positive impact on the greater public good, which he explained 
in terms of empowering the public with information. George Kegoro warned not to forget the 
fact that “the pressure brought international attention to Kenya, which resulted in an investigation 
of the crimes committed.” Hence, “It is not all gloom,” said Felix Kyalo. He then discussed the 
work that has strengthened the capacity of institutions and the acknowledgment of issues that 
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were not in the public domain before, such as the historical injustices that fueled the political 
crisis.  
7.1 The way forward  
As the insights from the Horn and East Africa show, transnational human rights pressure at critical 
political junctures on strategically important target states, though seemingly vulnerable, may 
defeat its purpose of effecting a positive human rights change and instead contribute to an 
unintended negative outcome in state behavior. Can the solution be applying more pressure? 
Some interview subjects suggested simply persevering in applying more pressure. They argued 
that, with sustained pressure and resilience by members of transnational human rights advocacy 
networks, change would eventually happen. “We just have to be vigilant to all the efforts that are 
made to gag the civil society,” said Teresa Omondi. Similarly, Regional Director of an International 
NGO believes that when the dissenting voices keep resisting and become strong, the states will 
eventually give in. On the other hand, would abstaining from putting any pressure be the solution? 
Should one simply wait for opportunity structures to open up at the system level that could 
possibly nullify the strategic importance of these target states? These options cannot be the only 
ones on the table, especially in dealing with issues that require prompt addressing as human rights 
violations. Thus trying to discover innovative ways to ensure that transnational human rights 
pressure does not contribute to an unintended outcome in state behavior seems logical. To this 
end, the interview subjects were asked to provide recommendations for advocacy strategies to 
be followed by transnational human rights advocacy networks to guarantee a positive human 
rights change.   
The provided recommendations are context-sensitive; there is no one-size-fits-all toolkit to be 
followed for effective advocacy. There is wide-ranging diversity across various indicators between 
different regions within a single state, let alone across the different regions of the world that have 
followed divergent historical and development trajectories. Hence, “it would be wrong to assume 
that identical efforts will play out in similar ways across world regions” (Hafner-Burton & Ron, 
2007: 382). For human rights advocacy to have resonance, sensitivity to context is important. As 
quoted in the preceding chapter, Human Rights Worker 1 said, “we need to take into account 
background information on the political, cultural, historical, and religious matters” in doing 
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advocacy work. The background information about the specific crisis at hand should not just be 
geographic; it should also extend to include lessons from similar cases from other spaces and 
times, said Ndung’u Wainaina. While we should subscribe to the universality of human rights, 
practical implementation demands sensitivity to contextual circumstances. Unless we 
contextualize the understanding of human rights, we would compromise the promise of its 
effective promotion, protection, and fulfillment. 
Thematically organized sets of recommendations provided from the interview subjects are 
presented below. While most are particularly applicable to domestic human rights NGOs, the 
lessons are transferable to other members of transnational human rights advocacy networks in 
the Global South, both CSOs and individual activists. These recommendations are said to be 
helpful to induce the intended positive human rights change in the contemporary environment, 
where the human rights cause is increasingly pushed to the periphery and the conventional ways 
of applying pressure to target states prove to be ineffective. 
Strategic target-actor-mapping  
Target-actor-mapping that is well informed by a thorough power analysis helps identify the actors 
that are better positioned to effect the change one wants to bring. All advocacy efforts would 
then be targeted towards those actors. Ndung’u Wainaina argues that a strategic target-actor-
mapping is necessary for the success of transnational human rights pressure at critical political 
junctures:  
You need to know who your actors are. Forget about the faces of the actors you see. You 
need to know the backroom actors, the real actors that shape things. You need to know 
who is who. Who are the players here? What is their interest?  
He then described what he referred to as “understanding their end game.” Putting oneself in the 
shoes of the potential actors and running possible scenarios of how things might transpire before 
they actually do better inform the choice of advocacy strategies. This is pertinent to make sure 
that “we are not barking at the wrong tree,” he added.  
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Strengthening South-South cooperation  
It is true that building alliances of solidarity across borders, both South-South and South-North, 
is crucial for transnational human rights pressure to induce a positive human rights change. 
However, with regard to domestic human rights NGOs in the Global South, many interview 
subjects stressed the need for the precedence of a South-South cooperation over a South-North 
one. Suba Churchil said, “the problems that we are facing are more or less similar,” which makes 
South-South cooperation more meaningful.  
Re-thinking resource mobilization strategies 
To address the massive shrinking of funding for domestic civil society actors, rethinking the 
conventional resource mobilization strategies, which were mainly dependent on Western donors, 
was said to be critical. Of all the alternative sources of resources that the interviewed experts 
mentioned, reliance on local philanthropy was the major one. In the words of Abdullahi Halakhe, 
“human rights groups need to be thinking beyond donor money. Change in African countries will 
happen at a point where the donor dollar ends.” He then went on to state that the human rights 
cause would not truly be anchored in local reality if it is not funded locally. In doing so, the focus 
should be to engage with the public rather than targeting wealthy individuals who are the 
beneficiaries of the establishment; “they would not want to fund causes that would shake up the 
status quo,” said Abdul Noormohamed. Furthermore, reaching out to private foundations was 
also mentioned as an alternative to the conventional resource mobilization strategies. "There are 
also other smaller foundations in the North that we are not even aware of because we have 
gotten so spoiled by the bilateral," said Njonjo Mue. To summarize, many have recommended 
that domestic human rights NGOs brainstorm about context-informed, innovative, and 
sustainable ways of generating resources.  
Owning the process 
To provide a context for what is presented in this section, let us first highlight some of the often-
vented grievances of domestic human rights NGOs against their international counterparts. 
According to Ndung’u Wainaina, the human rights movement is often “Westernized,” and this 
has many implications for domestic human rights NGOs. He said, “We are seen more as a 
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subordinate. […] The issue is about who owns what.” He then discussed what he referred to as 
"ownership of the discourse," arguing that international human rights NGOs often publish reports 
without acknowledging the contribution of domestic organizations in their attempt to “look 
original.” He thinks that, as they are better positioned in commanding resources, it would be 
better if international human rights NGOs served as “a middle link” between domestic actors 
and other actors with a position of power to make a difference, such as policymakers in the 
West. Similarly, Erick Komolo said that building the capacity of domestic actors so that they 
would be able to own the process must be a priority. In the words of George Kegoro, “If they 
are enabled, they can effect change on the ground.”  
The subjects interviewed from international organizations also shared this view. For Robert 
Herman, vice president of international programs at Freedom House, building transnational 
linkages and working at the grassroots level is important for the success of transnational human 
rights pressure.92 Similarly, Tor Hodenfield, UN advisor at CIVICUS, said that any advocacy 
strategy by an international human rights NGO must be grounded in supporting domestic human 
rights organizations.93 This is especially important in repressive environments where appealing to 
the morality of states is meaningless, as they openly subvert international norms. In such settings, 
according to Henry Maina, there is a need to integrate context and local knowledge in designing 
an advocacy strategy to deliver better results:  
Developing a symbiotic relationship between locals and internationals helps because it is 
a process of co-creating the advocacy plans and strategies, as opposed to one creating 
them and another one implementing, which then balkanizes people, makes people feel 
that they have been used in a cause that they do not believe in. 
Furthermore, what Njonjo Mue referred to as “re-connecting with the public” was one of the 
recommendations offered towards owning the process. He explained how domestic CSOs in the 
Global South have been disconnected from their constituencies whose interests they claim to 
represent. He referred to the relationship as “theoretical” and said:   
                                                          
92 Phone interview, November 2017. 
93 Skype interview, March 2018. 
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Let us ask ourselves this question. Who would miss us if we are banned? That is a very 
important question that many of us are not willing to ask ourselves because we fear that 
the answer might be that nobody would miss you. […] It is true that we cannot have the 
kind of relationship that politicians have with their voters. That is not realistic. But at the 
same time, we need to find a way to make sure that we are relevant and the people we 
serve have an actual and real connection with us to the extent of asking them to commit 
to us […] in funding some of our activities. 
Erick Komolo said, “We need to continue to create sufficient momentum for reforms here 
through local activists. We need to do it ourselves.” Similarly, Boniface Mwangi stated that getting 
in touch with the grassroots is the first step to effecting a meaningful change. According to Justus 
Nyang’aya, country director for Kenya at AI, informing and educating the public on how to hold 
governments accountable is one form of empowerment that both domestic and international 
members of transnational human rights networks should provide as part of their social 
accountability.94 By helping raise the political consciousness of the public, CSOs would create 
informed partners. Education is particularly important with issues that are “very precarious,” such 
as human rights, said Yash Pal Ghai, Ph.D., retired professor of law and chair of the Constitution 
of Kenya Review Commission.95 This is pertinent in the Global South, where states simply put 
human rights principles in their constitutions without the knowledge and the intention to actually 
implement them, he added. 
Diversifying partnerships  
Forming and maintaining partnerships with different actors, or what Mike Gachanja referred to 
as having "different pockets of pressure," is important for the success of transnational human 
rights pressure. After all, “leverage comes by coming together,” said Justus Nyang’aya. This is vital 
in the contemporary context in which “shaming and naming has run its course,” said Abdullahi 
Halakhe. “We have to engage the state or parts of the state, and there should be a serious and 
sustained engagement with an end in mind,” he added. Changing the dynamics of engagement 
with the state was also voiced by other interview subjects. Felix Kyalo, for instance, explained 
                                                          
94 In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
95 In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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the importance of identifying allies within the state, especially with independent or should-be 
independent institutions such as the judiciary. Such engagement would enable these institutions 
to maintain their independence, said Mike Gachanja.  
George Morara discussed partnering with what he referred to as “alternative voices of reason,” 
including the religious sector, the business community, and the middle class. As economic 
interests increasingly outweigh normative issues such as human rights, involving the business 
sector and tapping into its resources is helpful, according to Ndung’u Wainaina. In the words of 
Peter Kiama, “to be relevant, talk trade.” Furthermore, increased engagement at the international 
and regional intergovernmental platforms was also recommended.   
Exploring the potential of digital platforms   
By sharing first-hand information that would not be available otherwise on modern-day digital 
platforms such as social media, domestic actors would be empowered to frame the content and 
direction of the human rights discourse, said Ndung’u Wainaina. This less resource-intensive 
strategy is an effective way of mobilizing the public, said Mike Gachanja.  
Emulating Amnesty International? 
Tobias Hagmann, Ph.D., professor of international development and comparative politics at 
Roskilde University, recommended shifting the focus from donor governments to their public.96  
Making the citizens of donor states the prime targets of advocacy would increase the cost for 
donors if they continue being complicit in the commission of human rights violations, even with 
regards to strategically important target states. This could be done by making the citizens in the 
donor states aware that their tax money is abused to fund human rights violations. This would 
encourage them to hold their governments to account. Hence, donor governments would be 
forced to push target states to conform to international human rights norms. This 
recommendation resembles the strategy followed by membership-based human rights 
organizations such as AI, which uses its members in the donor states to pressure their 
governments to use their leverage to change the human rights situations of target states that they 
                                                          
96 Skype interview, September 2017. 
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support. AI members write petitions, letters, and emails, and they make phone calls to those in 
a position of power to change the situation of concern. According to Justus Nyang’ay:  
The way AI operates makes it hard for donors to ignore, as it reaches out to citizens of 
target donors to put pressure on their own government or the agencies that they support, 
saying their money should not be used in the ways that it did. This pressure […] is a 
different ball game because it is their own people that are questioning. Not the people 
that are directly affected. […] We make sure that they cannot ignore us. This strategy 
of campaign and activism is far-reaching. 
Context-sensitive issue framing  
Jon Abbinik said that framing in a “tactful and moderate tone,” especially in authoritarian contexts, 
is important. One needs to “make them feel that they are not being attacked,” he added. Similarly, 
Senior Official at the DAG stated, “In the Ethiopian context, one may need to use a different 
approach. For instance, one might need to raise these [human rights] issues in a way that would 
not make someone feel that they are just criticizing and not appreciating what is being done.” 
The issue of framing is particularly important in information politics, which often works by naming 
and shaming.  
Building fluid social movements 
Some interview subjects stated that, rather than an institutionalized networking, fluid social 
movements that would not need registration would decrease the likelihood of being targeted by 
states. In light of some of the political developments that have recently taken place in Ethiopia, 
this recommendation seems to bear better results in contexts in which formally organized civil 
society actors are systematically criminalized or incapacitated by states. The appointment of a 
new Prime Minister who appears progressive, though from the same EPRDF coalition that has 
been in power since 1991 and that has 100% of the seats in the current legislature, is a case in 
point. This change is partly attributed to the continued protests that have marked Ethiopia’s 
political scene since the year 2014. These protests were pioneered by the Oromo protests, 
highlighted in Chapter 3, which were mostly directed by unorganized and youth-led social 
movements. This shows that initiating collaborations, or emulating their ways, with fluid social 
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movements is the most logical path to consider for domestic human rights NGOs to maintain 
their relevance. This would also be an interesting agenda for future research.  
To summarize, the insights presented from the Horn and East Africa show that transnational 
human rights pressure at critical political junctures does not predictably yield a positive change 
in state behavior, even in states that are seemingly vulnerable. As discussed throughout the 
dissertation, it rather contributed to the unintended negative outcome of authoritarian 
entrenchment in state behavior in the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya. The pressure that 
transnational human rights advocacy networks placed on target actors during the 2005 and 
2007/8 political crises in Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively, contributed to the relentless attempt 
to effectively institutionalize rule by law. Members of transnational human rights advocacy 
networks, especially domestic human rights NGOs, are made targets for the subsequent legal 
and administrative retributions. State institutions that ought to be independent are often 
instrumentalized to perpetrate assaults on the civic space. 
The study’s inductively developed context-bound theory of a mechanism, with a middle-range 
generalizability, would be useful in providing a better explanation of cases in which transnational 
human rights pressure contributes to a null effect or an unintended negative outcome in state 
behavior. This is particularly true for cases in which the target states are seemingly vulnerable. 
Besides the theoretical and methodological contributions of the study highlighted in Chapter 1 
and detailed in Chapter 3, the analysis on the conditioning impact of the relevant systemic and 
case-specific contextual factors shows why the processes of interest played out the way they did 
in these cases. This information, which is presented in Chapter 6, has theoretical and policy 
implications. By showing how systemic factors such as the war on terror and the ever-rising 
interest in building economic, diplomatic, and security partnerships with African regional powers 
counteract human rights promotion and protection, the study provides an empirical embodiment 
to the chasm between human rights rhetoric and practice. This should not be the case in places 
where human rights violations are rampant, as in the Horn and East Africa. Contrary to what is 
frequently proclaimed, this study illustrates that human rights are used as political instruments 
that are systematically invoked when and if needed to advance policy objectives. The key takeaway 
is the importance of devising context-sensitive advocacy strategies in dealing with similar cases. 
This is especially significant because the reality is that transnational human rights pressure does 
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not necessarily and predictably induce a positive human rights change in strategically important, 
yet vulnerable, target states. 
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Interview Subjects 
Ethiopia  
Anonymous  
1. Academic and Legal Practitioner. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
2. Former Senior Official at the EHRC. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia.  
3. Human Rights Lawyer 1. In-person interview, September 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
4. Human Rights Lawyer 2. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.   
5. Human Rights Lawyer 3. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
6. Human Rights Lawyer 4. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
7. International Human Rights Worker 1. In-person interview, January 2016, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. 
8. Journalist. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
9. Legal Practitioner and Human Rights Activist. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia.  
10. Official 2 at the DAG. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
11. Official 2 at the EU Delegation to Ethiopia. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia.  
12. Senior official at the CSA. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
13. Senior Official at the DAG. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
14. Senior Official at the EHRC. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
15. Senior Official at the EU Delegation to Ethiopia. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia.  
Non-anonymous 
16. Dereje Feyissa, Ph.D., senior advisor at the International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI). In-
person interview, September 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
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17. Getachew Reda, acting Minister at the time of the interview of the Government 
Communications Affairs office (GCAO). In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia.  
18. Merera Gudina, Ph.D., opposition politician and professor of political science at Addis Ababa 
University. In-person interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
19. Mesfin Woldemariam, Ph.D., retired professor of geography and philosophy at Addis Ababa 
University. In-person interview, February 2016, Hawassa, Ethiopia.  
20. Negasso Gidada, Ph.D., a Former President of Ethiopia (1995-2001). In-person interview, 
February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
21. Yacob Hailemariam, Ph.D., retired professor of law at Norfolk State University and the 
former Senior Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Rwanda. In-person 
interview, February 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
Kenya  
Anonymous  
22. Regional Director of an International NGO. In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, 
Kenya.  
Non- anonymous  
23. Abdul Noormohamed, program officer at Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa. In-person 
interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
24. Abdullahi Halakhe, East Africa researcher at Amnesty International (AI). In-person interview, 
October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
25. Boniface Mwangi, photojournalist and politician. In-person interview, November 2017, 
Nairobi, Kenya.  
26. Collius Aseka, technical assistant at the Aid Effectiveness Secretariat (AES). In-person 
interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
27. David Jesse, youth political activist. In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
28. Davinder Lamba, director at the Mazingira Institute. In-person interview, October 2017, 
Nairobi, Kenya.  
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29. Dinah Musindarwezo, executive director at the African Women’s Development and 
Communication Network (FEMNET). In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
30. Erick Komolo, Ph.D., lawyer. In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
31. Felix Kyalo, country representative for Kenya at the International Development Law 
Organisation (IDLO). In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
32. George Kegoro, executive director at the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC). In-
person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
33. George Morara, deputy chair at the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR). 
In-person interview, November, 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
34. Henry Maina, regional director of Eastern Africa at Article 19. In-person interview, October 
2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
35. Joash Dache, secretary/chief legal officer at the Kenya Law Reform Commission (KLRC). In-
person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
36. Justus Nyang’aya, country director for Kenya at Amnesty International (AI). In-person 
interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
37. Mike Gachanja, deputy director at the Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW). 
In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
38. Morris Kaburu, director for legal analysis at the Executive Office of the President. In-person 
interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya. 
39. Morris Odhiambo, regional project director of East and Horn of Africa at Freedom House. 
In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
40. Ndung’u Wainaina, executive director at the International Centre for Policy and Conflict 
(ICPC). In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
41. Njonjo Mue, senior advisor at the Kenyans for Peace Through Truth and Justice (KPTJ). In-
person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
42. Otsieno Namwaya, Kenya researcher at the Human Rights Watch (HRW). In-person 
interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
43. Peter Kiama, executive director at the Independent Medico - Legal Unit (IMLU). In-person 
interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
44. Samwel Mohochi, executive director at the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ-Kenya). 
In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
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45. Soy Cherutoh Mercy, legal officer at the NGO Coordination Board. In-person interview, 
October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
46. Suba Churchil, president at the Civil Society Reference Group (CS-RG). In-person interview, 
October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
47. Teresa Omondi, executive director at the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA-Kenya). In-
person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
48. Yash Pal Ghai, Ph.D., retired professor of law and chair of the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission. In-person interview, November 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
49. Zahid Rajan, executive editor at Awaaz Magazine. In-person interview, October 2017, 
Nairobi, Kenya.    
50. Zarina Patel, human rights activist. In-person interview, October 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.  
Skype/phone interviews  
Anonymous  
51. International Human Rights Worker 2. Skype interview, September 2017.  
Non-anonymous  
52. Firoze Manji, Ph.D., author and activist. Skype interview, October 2017.  
53. Jon Abbinik, Ph.D., professor of politics and governance in Africa at Leiden University. Skype 
interview, October 2017.  
54. Muthoni Wanyeki, director of the Africa Office at Open Society. Phone interview, November 
2017.   
55. Paulos Milkias, Ph.D., professor of political science at Concordia University. Phone interview, 
September 2017.  
56. Robert Herman, Ph.D., vice president of international programs at Freedom House. Phone 
interview, November 2017. 
57. Sandra Diesel, head of cooperation at the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA-Kenya). Phone interview, November 2017.  
58. Terrence Lyons, Ph.D., associate professor of conflict analysis and resolution at George 
Mason University. Skype interview, September 2017.  
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59. Tobias Hagmann, Ph.D., professor of international development and comparative politics at 
Roskilde University. Skype interview, September 2017.  
60. Tor Hodenfield, United Nations advisor at World alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS). 
Skype interview, March 2018. 
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